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Journal of
Controversial
Discussions**

**Psychoanalysis
in the
21st Century**



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The International Journal of
Controversial Discussions

Psychoanalysis in the 21st Century

Volume 2 • Issue Two

September 2022

Jew-hating: The Black Milk of Civilization **Edited by Merle Molofsky and Harvey Kaplan**

Dedicated to the Murdered Six Million

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Death Fugue

[Paul Celan](#)—1920–1970

Translated by [Pierre Joris](#)

Black milk of morning we drink you evenings
we drink you at noon and mornings we drink you at night
we drink and we drink
A man lives in the house he plays with the snakes he writes
he writes when it darkens to Deutschland your golden hair Margarete
he writes and steps in front of his house and the stars glisten and he
whistles his dogs to come
he whistles his jews to appear let a grave be dug in the earth
he commands us play up for the dance

Black milk of dawn we drink you at night
we drink you mornings and noontime we drink you evenings
we drink and we drink
A man lives in the house he plays with the snakes he writes
he writes when it turns dark to Deutschland your golden hair
Margarete
Your ashen hair Shulamit we dig a grave in the air there one lies at
ease

He calls jab deeper into the earth you there and you other men sing and
play
he grabs the gun in his belt he draws it his eyes are blue
jab deeper your spades you there and you other men continue to play
for the dance

Black milk of dawn we drink you at night
we drink you at noon we drink you evenings
we drink you and drink
a man lives in the house your golden hair Margarete
your ashen hair Shulamit he plays with the snakes

He calls out play death more sweetly death is a master from
Deutschland
he calls scrape those fiddles more darkly then as smoke you'll rise in
the air
then you'll have a grave in the clouds there you'll lie at ease

Black milk of dawn we drink you at night
we drink you at noon death is a master from Deutschland
we drink you evenings and mornings we drink and drink
death is a master from Deutschland his eye is blue
he strikes you with lead bullets his aim is true
a man lives in the house your golden hair Margarete
he sets his dogs on us he gifts us a grave in the air
he plays with the snakes and dreams death is a master from
Deutschland

your golden hair Margarete
your ashen hair Shulamit



Todesfuge

Schwarze Milch der Frühe wir trinken sie abends
wir trinken sie mittags und morgens wir trinken sie nachts
wir trinken und trinken
wir schaufeln ein Grab in den Lüften da liegt man nicht eng
Ein Mann wohnt im Haus der spielt mit den Schlangen der schreibt
der schreibt wenn es dunkelt nach Deutschland dein goldenes Haar
Margarete
er schreibt es und tritt vor das Haus und es blitzen die Sterne er pfeift
seine Rüden herbei
er pfeift seine Juden hervor läßt schaufeln ein Grab in der Erde

Schwarze Milch der Frühe wir trinken dich nachts
wir trinken dich morgens und mittags wir trinken dich abends
wir trinken und trinken
Ein Mann wohnt im Haus der spielt mit den Schlangen der schreibt
der schreibt wenn es dunkelt nach Deutschland dein goldenes Haar
Margarete
Dein aschenes Haar Sulamith wir schaufeln ein Grab in den Lüften
da liegt man nicht eng

Er ruft stecht tiefer ins Erdreich ihr einen ihr andern singet und spielt
er greift nach dem Eisen im Gurt er schwingts seine Augen sind blau
stecht tiefer die Spaten ihr einen ihr andern spielt weiter zum Tanz auf

Schwarze Milch der Frühe wir trinken dich nachts
wir trinken dich mittags und morgens wir trinken dich abends
wir trinken und trinken
ein Mann wohnt im Haus dein goldenes Haar Margarete
dein aschenes Haar Sulamith er spielt mit den Schlangen

Er ruft spielt süßer den Tod der Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland
er ruft streicht dunkler die Geigen dann steigt ihr als Rauch in die Luft
dann habt ihr ein Grab in den Wolken da liegt man nicht eng

Schwarze Milch der Frühe wir trinken dich nachts
wir trinken dich mittags der Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland
wir trinken dich abends und morgens wir trinken und trinken
er Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland sein Auge ist blau
er trifft dich mit bleierner Kugel er trifft dich genau
ein Mann wohnt im Haus dein goldenes Haar Margarete

er hetzt seine Rüden auf uns er schenkt uns ein Grab in der Luft
er spielt mit den Schlangen und träumet der Tod ist ein Meister aus
Deutschland

dein goldenes Haar Margarete
dein aschenes Haar Sulamith



The Need Not To Believe: Freud's Godlessness Reconsidered

Arnold D. Richards

In considering Sigmund Freud's identity as a Jewish man of the 19th and 20th centuries I (Richards, 2008) have argued that one must consider three distinct strands. The first of these strands, and the subject of numerous studies both within psychoanalysis and without, is Freud's commitment to cultural assimilation via a well-rounded classical education and participation in the wider world of European science and letters—to wit, the tradition of *Bildung* as an educational, moral, and assimilationist ideal, one shared by many of Freud's Jewish contemporaries (Richards, 2006). This assimilationist strand was not without its ambivalent underside for Freud and for many of his Jewish contemporaries. In terms of Freud's own biography, this strand begins quite early in Freud's life, literally in his seventh year, when his father began schooling him in that great Enlightenment and assimilationist text, the Phillipson Bible, and it can be charted as a major theme in his identity throughout his adolescence and adult years. The second strand in Freud's identity derives from his response to antisemitism, which first became widespread, and virulent, in Vienna from 1881 onward. Freud's response was always one of defiance, but its particulars evolved over the course of his adult life with the development of psychoanalysis and with the subsequent evolution of the psychoanalytic movement. I cannot chart all its nuances here, but I should note that Freud's response entailed a heightened sense of himself as a Jew combined with an enduring sense that the Jewish tradition is favorable to the development of intellectuality generally, and of a scientific worldview particularly. Also to be noted is that at the end of his life, Freud finally offered his own analysis of the psychological nature of antisemitism in his book *Moses and Monotheism* (1939).

In this paper, I want to consider the third crucial strand in Freud's Jewish identity—his utter, militant Godlessness. Let us be clear at the outset what is at stake here. To be an unbelieving Jew, a *Gottloser Jude*,

was nothing exceptional, neither in the later decades of the 19th century nor in the first decades of the 20th. Indeed, it was commonplace and had been since the Haskalah first spread among the Jews of Europe. Nor was godlessness anything German Gentiles considered particularly striking among their own. Freud could have been offhanded about his disbelief. As he did with his adherence to telepathy, he could have treated it as “my private affair, like my Jewishness, my passion for smoking, or other things” (Gay, 1987, p. 148). He could have worn his disbelief lightly, and treated religion with simple indifference as fellow analysts like Karl Abraham, Sandor Ferenczi, and Isidor Sadger did. He could have contented himself with indirection, with a critique of its forms, with suggestions that the father god took on the qualities of the father of childhood, and let it go at that.

Instead, he went out of his way to make religion and belief a target of the new “metapsychology” of psychoanalysis, and he kept up the barrage throughout his later career, seemingly as a point of honor. The first real shot came in 1908, with the summary judgment in “Obsessive Actions and Religious Rituals” that religion was “a universal obsessional neurosis” (1908, *Standard Edition* 9: 126–127), with the chief difference between it and ordinary neuroses being that the instincts suppressed beneath religious practices are the egoistic and antisocial ones. The paper attacked ritual, which Freud was notoriously opposed to in his personal life, as well as belief. Judaism is perhaps more of a target than Christianity in this paper, though both, along with Islam, are implicated.

But that paper was as nothing compared to the salvo of *Totem and Taboo* (1913), written and published in four installments during the climax of the struggle within the psychoanalytic movement with his Swiss followers. The themes of this text bespeak Freud’s previous encounter and engagement with them, especially Eugen Bleuler and Carl Jung, and also with the American neurologist James Jackson Putnam. Here the target is more clearly Christian conscience and the practice of communion, beneath which Freud detected a phylogenetically inherited guilt over a primal murder of a primal father, reenacted in a totemic meal. *Totem and Taboo* was published in book form in 1913. At the time, Freud trumpeted to Abraham that it would “serve to cut us off cleanly from all Aryan religiousness” (Abraham & Freud, 1965, p.139). In a letter to Ferenczi at the same time, Freud made the same point, while arguing

that the Jewish spirit was more open to science: “... [T]here should not be a particular Aryan or Jewish science If these differences occur in conceptualizing objective relations in science, then something is wrong. It was not our desire to interfere with their more distant worldview and religion, but we considered ours to be quite favorable for conducting science” (Brabent et al., 1993, pp. 490–491). In 1930, in a preface for a new translation of *Totem and Taboo* into Hebrew, Freud added a universalist disclaimer while striking the same note: “it adopts no Jewish standpoint and makes no exceptions in favor of Jewry. The author hopes, however, that he will be at one with his readers in the conviction that unprejudiced science cannot remain a stranger to the spirit of the new Jewry” (1913 [1930], *Standard Edition* 13: p. xv).

By the time of the preface for the Hebrew edition of *Totem and Taboo*, Freud had already had gone into print with the *Future of an Illusion* (1926). One has to consult this book anew, and compare it to Freud’s other works stylistically, to appreciate how bald an attack it is, how lacking in the usual graces of Freud’s prose, how fiercely intent it is on hammering home its point.

Robert Paul (1994, p. 836) gingerly cites an interview of perhaps questionable provenance that Freud is alleged to have given on the subject to René Laforgue: “This is my worst book! ... It isn’t a book of Freud.... It’s the book of an old man!” The plaint rings true to the text. Be that as it may, thereafter, psychoanalysis itself was on the hook for Freud’s irreligion. For the whole crux of the demolition is based on the premise that with the advent of the new metapsychological discipline, science is now equipped with psychological tools adequate to reveal religion as illusion once and for all by revealing its wishful sources. In this context, Freud’s invocation of the primal murder of the primal father as the origin of the notion of a father god and of the psychic institution of conscience is almost beside the point, though the argument is there. What is central is the commitment to scientific reasoning, the positioning of psychoanalysis as a discipline within science, and the demolition of illusion as the consequence. Hereafter psychoanalysis itself was on the hook for Freud’s irreligion. There was left only the littlest bit of wiggle room for the next generation of analysts; as Freud wrote to Eitingon at the time: “It remains to be seen whether analysis in itself must really lead to the giving up of religion” (cited in Gay, 1987, p. 12). I recall my own

analytic training in New York City. By this time, the attempt to bleach religion out of psychoanalysis had reached its zenith. My own interest in Judaism was viewed as neurotic—by my Jewish instructors. I remember, too, the effort it took myself and my classmates to convince those in charge not to have classes on Yom Kippur. Stepping back, we see that Freud wed his own irreligion to his science and did this in the most determined, outspoken way. His stance is of a piece with his determination to ban Jewish ritual from his home, not to have his sons circumcised, to celebrate only the conventional Viennese holidays of Christmas and Easter, and to mock religious formulas when mushroom hunting with his daughter Anna. If there is anything Freud did believe in, it was science; science, in his view, will go as far in alleviating man's condition as it is possible to go. But by the same token, a true scientific stance, if it is informed by the insights of psychoanalysis, dictates that religious belief must go—an outworn and no longer needed “illusion.” This attack—again I encourage readers to take a fresh look at the text—was then reprised in *Civilization and Its Discontents* in 1930 and even more startlingly in *Moses and Monotheism*, written in 1934 but published in book form only in 1939, where shockingly Freud even sought to dispose of the idea that Moses had been Jewish.

The historian Josef Yerushalmi (1991, p. 68) has already decided that the issue is a psychological one: “Beyond any detail, the very violence of Freud's recoil against Jewish religious belief and ritual must arouse our deepest suspicion. It displays an aggressive intensity that normally accompanies a rebellion against an equally intense former attachment, more typical of a former Yeshiva student in revolt against Judaism than of one who had received a minimal Jewish education and whose father, we are assured, had become a freethinker by the time he settled in Vienna.” The psychoanalyst and Jesuit William Meissner has decided that the issue is a deep psychological one:

Freud's religious views perhaps more than any other aspect of his work and his psychology reflect underlying and unresolved ambivalences and conflicts stemming from the earliest psychic strata. Behind the Freudian argument about religion stands Freud the man and behind the man with his prejudices and beliefs and convictions lurks the shadow of Freud the child. A basic psychoanalytic insight says that the nature and content of any thinker's

or creative artist's work reflects essential aspects of the dynamic configuration and conflict embedded in the individual personality structure. Freud is no exception and his religious thinking unveils these inner conflicts and unresolved ambivalences more tellingly than any other aspect of his work. (Meissner, 1984, p. vii).

But how do we decode Freud's "argument about religion" in terms of his "unresolved ambivalences"? Where do we discover the "shadow of the child" in Meissner's terms? Where do we discover the equivalent of a "former Yeshiva student in revolt against Judaism" in Yerushalmi? Let's begin with where we don't find it—in Freud's childhood. It may be there, but in terms of the historical record, the cupboard is almost totally bare. We basically don't find God at all. True there was the Christian nurse till Freud was age 2½, who filled the boy with ideas of the hereafter, but efforts to pursue this early connection into Freud's adult life—such as those of Paul Vitz (1988)—must inevitably shipwreck themselves on the factual shoals that Christian themes are eternally, unalterably alien to Freud, not tantalizing, whenever he is later moved to address them. Then there is the single anecdote where his mother tells him as a child that man was made out of earth and would return to earth and then rubbed the palms of her hands together, producing blackened epidermis, to prove it. The feeling the six year old felt was one of mortality—"Thou owest Nature a death" (1900, *Standard Edition* 4: p. 205)—and one could wonder if that feeling has any connection with the nameless feeling he had of being a Jew that he later wrote about in a letter to the B'nai B'rith on his seventieth birthday—"dark emotional powers all the stronger the less they could be expressed in words" (E. Freud, 1960, p. 367)—or with the inherited guilt over a primal murder in human prehistory that he posited as the heart of all religious reverence. But as seductive as this invitation to depth psychologizing might be—and great powers of analytic imagination would be needed to explicate it—it is hard to see how it would get us nearer to Freud's "godlessness" as a consciously held, organizing facet of his later years. The next specific evidence of any kind that appears in the historical record comes when Freud is 18 and at University. In his letters to Eduard Silberstein, Freud recounts his encounters with the philosopher Franz Brentano, whose arguments for theism temporarily leave Freud tempted to abandon his own atheism. But a careful reading of these letters (Boelich, 1990) show something

very striking. Freud's "temptation" is not real; it is a matter of keeping a scrupulously open mind. What he really wants is to master philosophy, to take Brentano's arguments into better account, so that he can more confidently rebut them. This youth does not need a belief in God. Nor, which is more important for my argument, does he yet need a disbelief in God. If Freud's passion is later for disbelief, if his attitude is one of revolt against religion, it must have sources in his life after the age of 18, after 1874. And whatever those sources, they must grow psychologically stronger as he gets older.

Let me announce forthwith where I am going, if the reader has not already guessed it. I don't believe that Freud's godlessness reflected any kind of reaction against his own belief. Nor do I think it speaks to any kind of ambivalent reaction against his own self-identification as an assimilated Jew. That is to say, I do not think the godless strand in his identity reflects some personal ambivalence about his own beliefs. Even less do I think, per Vitz, that it has anything to do with some putative lingering Christian identification. Rather, I think that Freud's militant godlessness is a reaction against other peoples' belief, specifically the beliefs of many of his coreligionists. In this respect, it is a manifestation of a deep ambivalence, but that ambivalence is concerned with the condition of his fellow Jews; put another way, that ambivalence has to do with social psychological factors, with social shame, and that is why it became increasingly paramount in Freud's mind in his later adult years.

To return to the suggestion I advanced at the outset, social ambivalence was indeed the underside of an assimilated identity. Even as Jews welcomed the ideal of *Bildung* as intellectual home ground, the necessary divergence from traditional Jewish society brought its own strains. In *The Ordeal of Civility*, John Murray Cuddihy (1974) critically examines what emancipation meant for Jewish intellectuals. He situates Freud's creation of psychoanalysis against this backdrop, and, like many historians such as Oscar Handlin (1951) and Sara Winter (1999), he makes clear that the concept of *Bildung* had an expanded meaning for many Jews. This was especially true of the early Jewish analysts; it was their chance to achieve conformity with the cultural mores that would allow them to be integrated into a society and achieve a status from which they had historically been excluded. Yet each adoption of larger European cultural values was also a step away from the Jewish culture of their

families. Cuddihy suggests that upwardly mobile urban Jews of the nineteenth century felt embarrassment toward their provincial parents, and “guilt for being thus ashamed” (p. 58).

Certainly, this kind of ambivalence can be seen clearly in the coat of Freud’s identity. Though Freud emphasized his humanistic education, he persistently minimized his knowledge of Jewish subjects, including Hebrew and Yiddish. It is customary here to cite as typical his disclaimer to A. A. Roback in a letter of 1930: “My education was so unJewish that today I cannot even read your dedication, which is evidently written in Hebrew. In later life I have often regretted this lack in my education” (E. Freud, Ed., 1960, p. 395). And this kind of disclaimer can be dated back as far as *The Interpretation of Dreams*: In his analysis of “My Son the Myopes” dream in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud struggles out loud with the Hebrew word *geseres*: “According to information I have received from philologists, ‘Geseres’ is a genuine Hebrew word derived from a verb ‘goiser’, and is best translated by ‘imposed sufferings’ or ‘doom.’ The use of the term in slang would incline one to suppose that it meant ‘weeping and wailing’ ” (1900, *Standard Edition* 5: p. 442). As though he did not quite know what *geseres* meant on his own, either in Hebrew or in Yiddish (“slang” or, more resonantly in German, “jargon”).

Yet, as has been argued most succinctly by Yosef Yerushalmi (1991), Freud’s disclaimers are suspect. Hebrew lay on every facing page of the Phillipson Bible, and Freud’s father could read it.

A boy so brilliant as Freud would not have picked up some words? And as Yerushalmi (1991, p. 67) points out, we have “firm testimony” that “Jakob Freud would impressively recite the entire text of the Passover Haggadah by heart at the annual Seder.” Moreover, whatever the attention paid or not paid to it at home, Hebrew was part of the Gymnasium curriculum. Von Humboldt had put it there at the beginning of the 19th century and if only minimal attention could be paid to it compared to Latin and Greek by the time Freud went to school, that is not the same as no attention. In truth, in Gymnasium Freud studied Hebrew, along with the Bible and Jewish history, with his beloved teacher, Samuel Hammerschlag. As for Yiddish, Yerushalmi (1991, p. 69) offhandedly counts 13 words in Freud’s published correspondence, including common enough words like *Schammes*, *Schnorrer*, and *Meschugge*, but also

words like *Knetcher* (wrinkles), *Stuss* (nonsense), and *Dalles* (poverty). Even more to the point, there is good warrant to believe that Yiddish was Freud's mother's only spoken language. In what language, then, did father and mother converse? As for the son, Freud must have spoken it with her as a child—and even as an adult when he visited her every Sunday until her death in 1930. Freud may not have been as completely assimilated as he would have liked to appear. He, like many Viennese Jews at the time, was inwardly ambivalent about his Jewish roots and his connections through his father to the Jews of the Galician shtetl. Freud's attitude toward the languages of the Jews reflects this.

Mention ambivalence in connection with Freud and scholars typically hasten to the subject of his father Jakob. Marthe Robert (1976) reminded us more than four decades ago that psychoanalysis in many ways owes its existence to Freud's self-analysis—an analysis in which the major protagonist was the father, a “vague father” in Robert's phrase, who left the son suspended between two cultures. Certainly, in this context, one can review the famous anecdote in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, where Freud the schoolboy is ashamed at his father's very “unheroic conduct” (1900, *Standard Edition* 4: p. 197) when a Gentile knocked his fur hat, his *shtreimel*, into the gutter. In response, Freud felt fury and inwardly turned to the scene between Hannibal and his father Hamilcar Barca for sustenance, thus betraying his immersion in Classical culture. Truly, shame about the father is not hard to detect here, and elsewhere in Freud's corpus, though it is almost always admixed with affection, something perhaps too little emphasized in the secondary literature. Marianne Krull (1986), meanwhile, took Robert's argument much further—took it too far in fact—arguing that the central conflict in Freud's *oeuvre* is the need to cover up the sins of the father. But arguably Krull was on to something, for in his own life Jakob had moved far from his own origins and his own originating cultural and religious beliefs; ambivalence about tradition was something the father arguably felt, no less than the son.

Influenced by his grandfather, Siskind Hoffman, Jakob had become a Maskil, an enlightened Jew, more in sympathy with the German Jewish Reform movement than with traditional rabbinical Judaism (see Krull, 1979). In 1855, the year that he married Amalie Nathanson, his second or third wife, Jakob began to wear Western dress. By that time, he was

already speaking and signing documents in German rather than Hebrew or Yiddish. Still, he continued to read the Talmud—if not study it—as well as the Bible. (His son Sigmund would later acquire two copies of an edition of the Talmud in German, Hebrew, and Aramaic published in 1929.) Whatever ambivalence the father felt about his own escape from his father's milieu would have informed his instruction of his son. And to be noted is that sometime in the last two years of Gymnasium as he prepared to step forward to the University of Vienna, Freud altered his name, dropping “Schlomo,” which had been his grandfather's name, and changing “Sigismund,” which had lately become a favorite name in antisemitic jokes, to “Sigmund.” The paradox of the free-thinking Jakob's course in life was that while he could, and did, recite the entire Seder service from memory, he had raised a son who at the age of 18 would cheerfully write his friend Silberstein that he could scarcely tell the Holidays apart were it not for their differing dinner menus! Eventually, late in the day, Jakob did something about this state of affairs. In 1891, Jakob retrieved the Phillipson Bible that he had tutored the young boy on, had it rebound in new leather, and gave it to his son on the occasion of the latter's thirty-fifth birthday. Here let us note that in 1891 we are well into Freud's adult life. By this time, Sigmund had been in practice for five years—he had opened his office on Easter Sunday, making a point of his own—and had been married for four and a half. He had married into the Jewish intellectual and religious aristocracy of the Bernays family, but had lobbied insistently with his fiancée against her religious observances. Indeed, he did not want to stand beneath the *Chuppa* at the wedding, enough so that he created a small tempest by insisting on a civil marriage in Germany. But the union was not legally recognized in Catholic Vienna, so a second marriage had to be performed. Freud even considered conversion just to escape the ceremony. He capitulated finally under the friendly advice of his mentor and patron, Josef Breuer, who counseled simply that it would all be “too complicated.” Peter Gay (1988, p. 54) describes the denouement thus: “And so on September 14, Freud, the sworn enemy of all ritual and all religion, was compelled to recite the Hebrew responses he had quickly memorized to stamp his marriage valid.” Freud promptly “got his revenge or, at least, his way”, Gay adds, by not allowing Martha to light the candles on the first Friday evening after the marriage, “one of the more upsetting experiences of her life” (p. 54). Now, some four and a half years after that night, the

father makes a present to the son—the Phillipson Bible, which presumably Freud had left behind in the family home. But besides having the Bible rebound in new leather, Jakob added an inscription—written in Hebrew. And besides being written in Hebrew, the inscription is written in *melitzah*, a widely used device among Jewish writers, both enlightened maskilim and their rabbinical predecessors. As a kind of mosaic comprised of fragments of quotations rearranged to convey the sense of the speaker on the occasion, *melitzah* not only requires great familiarity with the Bible and sometimes also with the Talmud on the part of the writer, but it also assumes that the resonances will not be entirely lost on the reader. Consider this carefully: If Freud could not read Hebrew, as he later maintained, and if he could thus not make heads or tails of the passage, let alone at least some of the resonances, then the dedication potentially constitutes one hell of a rebuke. But that possibility would seem to be undercut by the manifest love and admiration of the father in the text. Still a reproach there, a loving one, and it has to do with not keeping to the traditions. One line specifically reads: “Since then the book has been stored like the fragments of the tablets in an ark with me.” As Yerulshami has pointed out in a delicate exegesis (1991, pp. 72–74), the line points to Talmudic sources and to the Talmudic tradition holding that after Moses broke the tablets of the Ten Commandments, the fragments were collected and stored, along with the new tablets, in the Ark of the Covenant. Thus the “Bible story” of Freud’s youth has lain there, with Jakob, like “the fragments of the tablets,” fractured and discarded though rescued and preserved by the father. If Sigmund is reaching for the pinnacles of assimilation in 1891, he is in danger of leaving his originating traditions too far below and behind. Or so the father seems to be implying. This is the kind of voice one hears calling from beyond the grave. In the event, Jakob had five more years to live, and when he finally did pass, his son would remember him fondly. Even so, there was conflict in the family over the funeral arrangements, with Freud pressing for a simpler ceremony. Let us leave it that ritual occasions seem to have been the occasion of difficulties for Freud personally...

Yerulshami hears an important late echo of the birthday inscription—“the fragments of the tablet in an ark”—in Freud’s account of visiting Michelangelo’s statue of Moses in St. Pietro, which he first did in 1901, ten years after the birthday gift: “How often have I mounted the

steep steps from the unlovely Corso Cavour to the lonely piazza where the deserted church stands, and have essayed to support the angry scorn of the hero's glance! Sometimes I have crept cautiously out of the half-gloom of the interior as though I myself belonged to the mob upon whom his eye is turned—the mob which can hold fast no conviction, which has neither faith nor patience, and which rejoices when it has regained its illusory idols” (1914, *Standard Edition* 13: p. 213).” Do we not hear the reproach of the father's Melitzah in this? Later, of course, in 1913 when the alliance with the Swiss within the psychoanalytic movement was falling apart, Freud would see someone else in the statue during repeated visits to St. Pietro, namely himself preserving the laws of science against the new psychoanalytic heretics.

Freud's predicament vis-a-vis his father's ambivalence and his father's milieu was reinforced by his own milieu. The Leopoldstadt, the district where Jakob had created the new homestead and where Sigmund grew up, living there till 1883, was one of three districts in Vienna in which Jews typically settled. The historian Marsha Rozenblit (2006, pp. 14–15) has described the resulting concentration:

Jews were 9% of the total population of the city, but they formed about 19% of the population of the first district (the inner city), 36% of the population of the second district (the Leopoldstadt), known affectionately as “Die Mazzesinsel,” the island of Mazzah), and 18% of the ninth district (the Alsergrund), where Freud lived his adult life on Berggasse 19, around the corner from Theodor Herzl). Within these districts, which were adjacent to each other, Jews also concentrated in certain areas, so that some parts of the city were—or at least seemed—almost wholly Jewish. While there were some distinctions based on wealth within this Jewish concentration, in general rich and poor Jews lived together in the same neighborhoods, with the richer Jews in nicer apartment houses on the main thoroughfares, and poorer Jews in shabbier buildings on the smaller side streets. [pp. 14–15]

Freud lived in both kinds of buildings, nice and shabby, during the course of his growing up. Moreover, even when he had finally settled in Berggasse 19, he was still in the ninth district around the corner, figuratively and literally, from his co-religionists. And let us bear in mind

that the Jews of Vienna, despite the success of some, were still in the main poor; some two thirds could not afford to pay the synagogue tax in the year 1900 according to Rozenblit; these Jews would have been closer than not to where the Freud family resided regardless of Jakob's fortunes year to year, or how his son's career progressed in the years following his marriage. Shame about the father may have been difficult to separate from shame about the milieu. We have several anecdotes pertaining to the latter. When Freud was twenty-seven, he was sufficiently chagrined at the behavior of his friend Nathan Weiss that he spoke of him to his important new acquaintance and fellow Jew, Josef Breuer. Weiss's subsequent suicide following a disastrous marriage, which Weiss had forced against all friendly advice including Freud's own, then led to an ugly scene at the funeral as the presiding lecturer blamed the girl and her family for the death. "And all this he spoke with the powerful voice of the fanatic, with the ardor of the savage, merciless Jew," Freud wrote at the time to his fiancée Martha Bernays, "We were all petrified with horror and shame in the presence of the Christians who were among us" (E Freud, 1960, p. 65). The milieu, and his father, continued to haunt Freud. In 1904, he had a disturbance in his sense of reality during a visit to the Acropolis with his brother Alexander. Much later in life he analyzed it (1936, *Standard Edition* 22: pp. 246–247) in terms of a feeling that "We really have gone a long way!" which he contrasted with the "the poverty of our conditions of life in my youth," while adding: "It seems as though the essence of success was to have got further than one's father, and as though to excel one's father was still something forbidden."

As to where Freud's own sense of identity stood roughly at the time of the visit to the Acropolis, we have a telling version of the same theme of social shame from the account of a Dr. M. Grinwald. Grinwald was a religious Jew who hailed from Buzhocz, the birthplace of Freud's paternal grandfather, Schlomo. In 1941 Grinwald contributed an article to Ha'aretz, the oldest Jewish periodical in Palestine, describing an encounter with Freud in Vienna in the early years of the twentieth century. Grinwald had just given a lecture on a controversial popular drama, *Yohanan the Prophet*, that many thought disparaging of Orthodox Jews. After the talk, while Grinwald and his audience were having a friendly luncheon, Freud made several jokes related to religion, and pointed out how many Jews resembled Yohanan, the protagonist of the play, with

his shaggy coat, unkempt hair, and mysterious face. Then Freud commented that he himself preferred to be the Jewish man in an elegant tuxedo rather than the one dressed like a prophet.

Grinwold (1941) recalled thinking to himself, “How far this man has drifted from Jewish life.” But for all his social ambivalence, Freud did not inwardly feel free to leave his coreligionists behind. The specter of antisemitism, which became increasingly virulent in Vienna from his adolescence and early adulthood onward, pushed him in the opposite, countervailing direction, evoking in him a defiant commitment to retain his identity as a Jew. His writings and public statements are explicit on this. In *Gymnasium*: “In the higher classes I began to understand for the first time what it meant to belong to an alien race, and anti-Semitic feelings among the other boys warned me that I must take up a definite position” (1900, *Standard Edition* 4: p. 229). In *University*:

“When, in 1873, I first joined the University, I experienced some appreciable disappointments. Above all, I found that I was expected to feel myself inferior and an alien because I was a Jew. I refused absolutely to do the first of these things. I have never been able to see why I should feel ashamed of my descent or, as people were beginning to say, of my ‘race.’ I put up, without much regret, with my non-acceptance into the community” (1900, *Standard Edition* 4: p. 9).

In 1896, when he joined the B’nai B’rith:

“I felt as though outlawed, shunned by all. This isolation aroused in me the longing for a circle of excellent men with high ideals who would accept me in friendship despite my temerity.... Whenever I have experienced feelings of national exaltation, I have tried to suppress them as disastrous and unfair, frightened by the warning example of those nations among which we Jews live. But there remained enough to make the attraction of Judaism and the Jews irresistible, many dark emotional powers all the stronger the less they could be expressed in words, as well as the clear consciousness of an inner identity, the familiarity of the same psychological structure.... Because I was a Jew I found myself free of many prejudices that restrict others in the use of the intellect; as a Jew I was

prepared to be in the opposition and to renounce agreement with the ‘compact majority’ ” (E. Freud, 1960, pp. 366–367).

At the age of 70 to an interviewer: “My language is German. My culture, my attainments, are German. I considered myself German intellectually, until I noticed the growth of anti-Semitic prejudice in Germany and German Austria. Since that time, I prefer to call myself a Jew” (cited in Gay, 1987, p. 139).

These are all the sentiments of an adult, an adult whose conflicts have been decided for him by events, whose ambivalence has been reshaped as to its target. In short, I think that the root source of the intensity of his contempt for religion is not to be found in his childhood and not in his personal-psychological history, but after adolescence in his social-psychological history. That is, I think buried within Freud’s attitude is his selective sense of shame, humiliation, and sheer frustration with his co-religionists insofar as they maintain the old religion, the old rituals, the old ways. That is their madness, that is what keeps them still tied to their shtetl backgrounds and keeps them as the obvious targets of antisemitic prejudice. But all this is going unsaid. As against this root, the more obvious motive of undercutting Christian belief, which motive can be and is shared with psychoanalytic colleagues, is altogether less important, though it is there. In this vein, let us look again at the psychological structure that Freud finds at the heart of conscience and at the heart of a belief in a father god: inherited guilt over an inherited murder. Personally, I do not doubt that when Freud examined his own self inwardly that this is what he found. Or perhaps better, we can say that the formula expresses what he found, which in itself is beyond words. What makes a man decide that parricide is in him, that he is not only capable of the deed but that in some sense he knows he has committed it, that he feels he has a conscience because he knows it hurts? In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud argued that this sense is universal: the structures of conscience, which enable man to monitor his egoistic and antisocial instincts, are in place because of phylogenetic memory of a murder gone wrong. In *Moses and Monotheism*, he went further and argued that beyond being universal, this memory was archetypally Jewish, the Jews having committed a second murder, of Moses, their religious leader, the man who gave them the father-religion and the custom of circumcision—thus repeating the first murder and further fixing the motif phylogenetically in their very

blood and bones. Many have speculated about the depth psychological meanings of this transposition to the Jews of the universal heritage and Freud's further claim that herein lies the essence of the Jewish people. But as most analytic commentators have conceded, Jakob, whom Freud remembers with a manifest and unthreatened fondness at the time of his death, makes a very unlikely antagonist for any putatively Oedipal drama. Might we not more simply see the motif of parricide as the expression of a two-generation social motif in the Freud family where in each generation the son abandons the religion of the father, and stakes his own claim to life, with an unfathomable combination of determination, shame, regret and perhaps sheer fury at having to do this to survive?

In *Moses and Monotheism*, I contend, we come to Freud's final statement—on religion and on Judaism, on godlessness and on the “many dark powers all the stronger the less they could be expressed in words” (E. Freud, 1960, p. 367). We come to the place where the three trends in Freud's Jewish identity intertwine at last—and, arguably, we also get his final socio-cultural view of his own science. His acceptance of being a Jew is embedded in the whole notion that the Jews have a special shared phylogenetic heritage. It is a racial view. His own identity as a cosmopolitan assimilated Jew is spoken for in the claim that the Jews have inherited a special intellectuality. Godlessness is here, too, of course. The belief in the father god is an inherited truth only in the sense that it recalls the primeval event of parricide, which it otherwise misinterprets. Science, the rhetorical lynchpin of his godlessness, is obviously spoken for in the very endeavor, for it is the application of the new branch of science, psychoanalysis, which enables Freud to justify his “historical novel,” and see it as superior to traditional biblical commentary, rabbinical or otherwise. As for antisemitism, it is the very provocation for writing the book. As Freud put it to Arnold Zweig: “Faced with new persecutions, one asks oneself again how the Jews have come to be what they are and why they have attracted this undying hatred” (E. Freud, 1960, p. 421). Moreover, Freud's answer to this question culminates in a psychoanalytic explanation of Christian hatred of the Jews; finally the anti-Semite is on the couch.

Even such small details as Freud's own antipathy to ritual is here, for what is important in his account of the essence of Judaism are not the rituals, but the monotheism, important as an advance over older

superstitions, and the intellectuality. Perhaps most important, Freud's examination of his own conscience against the backdrop of his relation to Jakob and to the world of Viennese Jews is there. One finds it gleaming through between the lines of the text in the fundamental irony that parricide is the aboriginal source of the psychic institution of conscience. It is all there. In fact, in *Moses and Monotheism*, I contend that we also have Freud's final testament to the Jewishness of his own creation, not simply a "*confession Judaica*" but also a "*confession analytica*." For if what distinguishes the Jew racially are inherited intellectuality and the equally inherited fact that he is closer psychologically to the forgotten truth of the primal murder, then it should not surprise us, and it did not surprise Freud, that the man who would finally uncover the truth of the primal murder should have been himself a Jew. In Freud, and for Freud, the Jewish tradition is at last becoming fully self-conscious, via psychoanalysis, and through it so is mankind. The will not to believe, I think, stems from the same psychological sources as the will to believe—not so much from personal roots deep in childhood, though these may be important, but from feelings of social solidarity that need to find expression in a worldview that offers a positive program, a sense of meaning and forward direction, a vision of purposefulness in a terminally uncertain world.

Where does this leave psychoanalysis, finally, and where does it leave us? Religion is based on fear. Psychoanalysis helps mankind overcome fear. The rest is commentary.

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Commentary on Arnold Richards's "The Need Not To Believe: Freud's Godlessness Reconsidered" and Some Thoughts on the Significance of Anti-Semitism in Freud's Life

David Lotto

Dr. Richards's paper gives us a comprehensive and insightful account of the role of Judaism in Freud's life. He describes three strands of Freud's Jewish identity: his commitment to cultural assimilation, the tradition of *Bildung*; his response to anti-Semitism; and his militant godlessness. I think they are all important components but I would argue that it is the second—his response to anti-Semitism that is predominant and which underlies the other two strands. My thesis is that the overarching and unifying theme that pulls the three strands together is anti-Semitism. With regard to the *Bildung*—with its valorization of a thoroughly westernized education, particularly the fealty to "science"—the main reason for his strong loyalty to it was that he saw it as the best path toward combating anti-Semitism. In general, science, and a scientific attitude toward the world was the best hope for countering anti-Semitism. In particular, his science, psychoanalysis, would hopefully prove to the world that, there was no Jewish science or Aryan science but one science that applied equally to all; we all share the same schmutz. And, as mentioned in the paper, his theory was an argument against those who saw the origin of psychopathology in inherited "taints." Such theories were used by anti-Semites, along with the idea of "racial differences" to justify viewing Jews as being hereditarily marked with a variety of psychopathological conditions and character flaws.

I also think that for Freud, and many others, the connection with and to science implied or even required a rejection of religion mostly because it embodied a world view that was antithetical and totally incompatible with that of science as they understood it. From the paper: "If there is anything Freud did believe in, it was science; science, in his view, will go as far in alleviating man's condition as it is possible to go. But by the same token, a true scientific stance, if it is informed by the insights of

psychoanalysis, dictates that religious belief must go—an outworn and no longer needed illusion.”

Most of the paper is devoted to the third strand—Freud’s godlessness, along with his antipathy to religion. Dr. Richards raises the issue of why Freud was so vehemently antireligious—where does the passion come from? I would answer that it comes chiefly from the two sources—the first, the commitment to the scientific view of the world, which is logically inconsistent with religion which was that scientific Psychoanalysis could stand as a bulwark against anti-Semitism. The science of Psychoanalysis had discovered the secret of the source which powers the delusionary belief in the existence of a supreme being—the infant’s wish to be taken care of by all-powerful parents. The truth shall set us free from the bonds created by our infantile wishes. When we discovered why we wanted there to be a benevolent supreme being, we would no longer need to believe that there was one.

The second source of the anti-religious passion is the belief that adherence to the old religious ways of Judaism was throwing red meat to the anti-Semites. The rituals, dress, and the observances of traditional Judaism were, for Freud, markers that were frequently used by anti-Semites to denigrate Jews. Freud saw Jewish religiosity as a mortal danger to his people because it could encourage anti-Semitic acts. As it came to pass, there was more than a kernel of truth to his fear for his people.

The history of religiously inspired Christian anti-Semitism was another reason for his detesting religion.

Both Meissner and Yerushalami think that Freud’s rejection of religion has a protesteth too much quality that requires a search for hidden motivation. But if one takes the scientific nature of psychoanalysis as Freud understood it seriously, then atheism is where one starts. There is no supreme being and any belief or suggestions that there may be something of value in traditional religion which is tied to such a belief, is nonsense.

Back to anti-Semitism. From the paper: “The specter of anti-Semitism, which became increasingly virulent in Vienna from his adolescence and early adulthood onward . . . evok[ed] in him a defiant commitment to retain his identity as a Jew.” His writings and public statements are explicit

on this. In *Gymnasium*: “In the higher classes I began to understand for the first time what it meant to belong to an alien race, and anti-Semitic feelings among the other boys warned me that I must take up a definite position” (1900, *Standard Edition* 4: p. 229). In *University*: “When, in 1873, I first joined the University, I experienced some appreciable disappointments. Above all, I found that I was expected to feel myself inferior and an alien because I was a Jew. I refused absolutely to do the first of these things. I have never been able to see why I should feel ashamed of my descent or, as people were beginning to say, of my ‘race.’ I put up, without much regret, with my non-acceptance into the community” (1900, *Standard Edition*).

Then there’s Freud’s statement, which is also quoted in the paper: “My language is German. My culture, my attainments, are German. I considered myself German intellectually, until I noticed the growth of anti-Semitic prejudice in Germany and German Austria. Since that time I prefer to call myself a Jew.” For me, this quiet courageous declaration is one of the things I admire most about Freud and is one of the reasons I think refusal to bow to anti-Semitism was such a central feature of his life as well his identity as a Jew.

In regard to Freud’s denials of being able to understand or speak Yiddish or read Hebrew, along with his vehement opposition toward all forms of religious ritual in his life, I think these are both aspects of his militant godlessness rather than any sort of rejection of his Jewish identity or faith in the tenets of the kind of Judaism he respected.

I think the reason the childhood memory of his father’s unheroic response to his hat being knocked off while walking in the street and his wish to take revenge for this anti-Semitic act played such an important part in his inner life is that it is one of the sources of his lifelong passion to refuse to accept the brunt of anti-Semitism. Another instance is his changing his name from Sigismund to Sigmund because Sigismund had become a favorite name used in anti-Semitic jokes.

And one last point. My take on what was at the heart of his deep love and loyalty to Judaism was what he learned from his father and the Phillipson Bible but mostly from Hammerschlag—to quote from Dr. Richards’s earlier paper on Freud’s Jewish Identity: “Religious instruction served

him [Hammerschlag] as a way of educating toward a love of the humanities..." "This was not the "dark emotional powers" he mentions in his remarks at the B'nai B'rith, which I assume refers to his long ancestral chain going back to biblical times, but what he was proud of about his Jewish heritage was its universal ethics where all humans are judged worthy of respectful treatment, along with the hard-earned experience of being able to see things in a different or new way that came from generations of living as outsiders.

I also see battling anti-Semitism as the source of the vehemence of his dislike of America. Freud had an intense dislike of much about America and Americans, by which he meant the United States and its denizens. His opinion of America remained steadfast throughout his adult life. In letters to many of his correspondents he fired off an unending barrage of disparaging remarks on a broad variety of things American. After returning from his only trip to the United States in the fall of 1909, he blamed his time in America for causing a number of physical ailments including stomach problems, "my colitis", and prostate trouble; and the blaming of the deterioration in his handwriting to his visit to America.

Freud made many negative comments concerning Americans. At various times he characterized them as prudish, having no time for libido, being savages, anti-Semitic, and cultural philistines.¹ He also disagreed strongly with the American Psychoanalytic Association's stand against lay analysis, was quite resentful of the popular success that both Jung and later Rank achieved in the United States; and after 1919, he displayed considerable anger at Woodrow Wilson and the Americans for abandoning their pledged commitment to Wilson's fourteen points.

But the vast majority of his criticisms, complaints, and characterizations of America had to do with money. Freud was repulsed by the excess materialism of Americans, their preoccupation with the pursuit of the almighty dollar.² In Freud's opinion America suffered from an anal fixation, which was the cause of their obsession. In a 1930 letter to Oscar Pfister he referred to the United States as "dollararia"³, presumably a pun

¹Gay p. 567, 211, 570, 563.

²Ibid. p. 562-569.

³Freud-Pfister 147 p. 135.

on the German and English for diarrhea.

In a 1921 letter to Jones, he gave a succinct summary of his view of Americans:

“... competition is much more pungent with them, not succeeding means simple death to every one, and they have no private resources apart from their profession, no hobby, games, love or other interests of a cultured person. And success means money.”⁴

There are also a number of references to Americans routinely cheating and engaging in shady business deals.⁵

Various biographers have speculated concerning the sources and surprising strength, along with the apparent irrationality of Freud's negative views of the United States.⁶ It is certainly an interesting question. Gay (1988) suggests that Freud may have envied the relative ease with which one could make a living as a medical professional in the United States as compared to anywhere in Europe. One could easily suspect some component of defensive reaction formation behind his vehemence against the supposed crass materialism of Americans.

But consider that Freud's accusations about Americans' alleged preoccupation with making money and using dishonest methods to acquire wealth are uncomfortably close to the traditional anti-Semitic accusations made about Jews. Thus, Freud's' passionate prejudice against Americans can be seen as an attempt to distance himself from the stereotypical anti-Semitic canard and demonstrate that he, a Jew and by extension other Jews, were not like that; it was the Americans who were.

⁴Gay, p. 564.

⁵Ibid. p. 562–564.

⁶Gay & Jones for example.



Musings on Arnold D. Richards's Paper "Freud's Jewish Identity and Psychoanalysis as a Science"

Daniel S. Benveniste

Arnold Richards approaches "Freud's Jewish Identity and Psychoanalysis as a Science" by recognizing three influences on Freud's Jewish identity: *Bildung*, or the cultivation of intellectual and moral character; the anti-Semitism of the times; and Freud's godlessness.

Bildung

Bildung is the cultivation of an intellectual and moral character. Richards cites George Mosse, who noted that this cultivation of the intellect was a search for respectability. And Carl Schorske observed that German Jews, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were commonly stereotyped as less moral and more governed by their passions than "proper Germans." Thus the motivations for cultivating an intellectual and moral character and for concealing one's passions was in some ways an effort to fit in. But it seems to me that Bildung was also a counterpoise to the religious traditions of orthodox Jews, with their taboos, rituals, prayers, customs, and costumes. Could Bildung have been a rebellion against the superstitions and magical thinking of Jewish religious life? Certainly. Richards cites the anecdote recalled by Dr. M. Grinwald, who gave a lecture on the play *Jochanan the Prophet*. Freud was in attendance and afterward made several jokes about religion, noting that many Jews resembled Jochanan in the play, with their "shaggy coat[s], unkempt hair, and mysterious face[s]." Freud reportedly said he would rather be the man in the elegant tuxedo than the one dressed like a prophet (Richards, 2014, p. 994).

So it seems the cultivation of an intellectual and moral character may well have been an effort to fit into broader German society by repudiating the contemporary Jewish religious traditions. But I'd like to suggest that Freud's position may have also been a repudiation of Jewish mysticism. If the traditional orthodox Jewish life was emotional, anxious, superstitious, and, frankly, obsessional, and Bildung was rational,

intellectual, and only somewhat obsessional, we might say that Jewish mysticism was emotional and intellectual with both its obsessional and histrionic aspects.

Mysticism is the very personal and immediate awareness of God's divine presence. It is a personal mystic union with God. Gershom Scholem (1941/1961) speaks of three stages of religious development. In the first stage, humanity is immersed in God with every step it takes. God is all around. It is a presence not recognized but lived. In the second stage, humanity is removed from God and religion comes about to span the gap. Humanity is separated from its mythical and primitive consciousness. Religion fills the space. The third stage is that of mysticism, which bridges the duality but not in a return to unconscious participation with God/nature. It is a revival of mythical thought that comes through an ecstatic encounter with the living presence of God (pp. 4–12).

The Kabbalistic mystical sphere is the meeting place of mythology and revelation (p. 22). Scholem says the Jewish philosophers had an intellectual approach that interpreted religion as allegory, but the mystical Kabbalists' essential mode of thinking was symbolic in the strictest sense (p. 26). The Kabbalists employ allegory as well, but the immediacy of the symbol goes to the heart of the mystical experience: "A hidden and inexpressible reality finds its expression in the symbol. If the symbol is thus also a sign or representation it is nevertheless more than that." Scholem goes on to say, "The whole world is to the Kabbalist such a *corpus symbolicum*. ... The infinite shines through the finite and makes it more and not less real" (pp. 27–28).

Kabbalism, Scholem says, "did not turn its back upon the primitive side of life, that all-important region where mortals are afraid of life and in fear of death, and derive scant wisdom from rational philosophy. Philosophy ignored these fears, out of whose substance man wove myths, and in turning its back upon the primitive side of man's existence, it paid a high price in losing touch with him altogether" (p. 35).

But they attempt to discover the hidden life beneath the external shapes of reality and to make visible that abyss in which the symbolic nature of all that exists reveals itself: this attempt is as important for us today as it was for those ancient mystics. For as long as nature and man are

conceived as his creations, and that is the indispensable condition of highly developed religious life, the quest for the hidden life of the transcendent element in such creation will always form one of the most important preoccupations of the human mind. (pp. 38–39)

Mystical states are like waking dreams in which one finds the world ensouled. It can be rapturous, illuminating, and spiritually uplifting in an experience of only a few minutes or hours, yet it can leave the psyche transformed and flooded with insights that might require a lifetime to integrate. But, of course, it also sounds a bit psychotic, now, doesn't it?

Silvano Arieti, speaking of those who experience hallucinations in mystical experiences, wrote:

The whole personalities and behavior of the people who experience these hallucinations are not such as to warrant the diagnosis of psychosis. Mystics are fanatical, but not in the same way as the paranoid. They lack the bitterness or resentment or the calm resignation and disdain of the unjustly accused. They show instead a serene and yet active optimism, like that of people who have been blessed by the love of a good mother. (Arieti, 1974, p. 277)

When Freud wrote of religion, it was about the obsessional aspects of religion, the totems and taboos, the projected parental imagoes, and the repression of primitive impulses with ritual formulas and acts. He also took up the phenomenon of the “oceanic feeling”—that is, the feeling of eternity, a oneness with the universe, limitless and unbounded. While he addressed this feeling far less than the defensive function of rituals, he was able to tie this oceanic feeling to infantile states such as the baby at the breast, who does “not distinguish his ego from the external world” (*Standard Edition* 21, pp. 66–67): “Originally the ego includes everything, later it separates off an external world from itself” (p. 68). Freud could certainly think about this phenomenon but noted, “I cannot discover this oceanic feeling in myself” (p. 65). Nonetheless, he related that he had a friend who was interested in these experiences and engaged in various practices, including yoga, to arrive at such states. Freud wrote, “He [the friend] sees in them a physiological basis, as it were, of much of the wisdom of mysticism” (p. 72).

So there you have it: Freud had not discovered the oceanic feeling in

himself, did not give himself over to the expression of strong feelings, did not much care for music, avoided religious rituals, and avoided attending funerals, including his mother's. And though I have no proof of it, I also doubt if he ever danced! He did allow himself the cocaine high, the nicotine rush of cigars, and a calming glass of wine. But other than that he kept his mind on a short leash and did not give in to strong emotions. We might also think of his approach to countertransference in this regard. All of these experiences—the oceanic feeling, countertransference experiences, and strong emotions—scream “danger,” from which Freud withdrew.

Thus, I suggest Freud's retreat from religiosity was not just the obsessional religiosity of orthodox Judaism but also the mysticism of the Kabbala, of which psychoanalysis has more than a little bit in common. Recall Gershom Scholem's description of the mystical stage, in which the mystic returns to the earlier mythological state, but does so consciously. Is that not similar to a regression in the service of the ego? I think so. However, in psychoanalysis it does not come in a state of rapture but rather through free associations and interpretations. Yielding to the feeling runs the risk of leading to confusion, psychosis, or sometimes even boundary violations.

One of the obsessional aspects of Jewish mysticism is the study of numerology, in which Freud dabbled from time to time and even went far enough to find some of its limits. In 1924 Freud and Karl Abraham had a lively correspondence concerning the mystical nature of the number seven. Abraham was very excited about it all, and Freud expressed a similar but more cautious enthusiasm. On August 22, 1924, Freud shared some of his ideas on the matter and in conclusion wrote, “The craziest things can be done with numbers, so be careful” (Abraham & E. L. Freud, 1965, p. 365). Even the Kabbalistic Golem story of the adept and master mentally creating a Golem, a mindless beast, to assist them in their spiritual work is laced with themes reminiscent of Freud's concept of transference.

Richards points out how Freud's behavior and attitudes suggest a desire to go beyond his father along with the sense that this was forbidden. Freud avoided Jewish ritual and saw himself more heroic than his father in facing down anti-Semites. I've always found Freud's critique of

his father unjust and his own claims of heroism as weak. These sorts of street conflicts are embedded in contexts that are not illuminated in the stories Freud told. Perhaps his father's judgment in not fighting the anti-Semites who knocked his hat off and into the street was wise under the circumstances, and Freud's bravado in standing up to some anti-Semites on a train may have been cheap bravado under the circumstances. Nonetheless, the stories amplify Freud's conflicts with his father and only secondarily with the anti-Semitic bullies.

We learn that while Freud was bogged down in his father's Judaism, he struggled to free himself, and his professional work was the key to his future. Richards explains that Freud's "analysis of his dreams would eventually give him a new authorial and professional self and so sublimate despair into inspiration" (Richards, 2014, p. 993). And, of course, many of Freud's dreams were about triumphing over the deaths of others or washing his hands clean of guilt for his mistreatment of others: his patient who died of cocaine addiction; his friends Joseph Paneth and Ernst von Fleischl-Marxow, who both died young; his son Martin, who disappeared for a time in the First World War, and more. And, of course, the original murder was the death of Freud's little brother Julius, who died when Freud was not yet two years old but old enough to wish him dead for stealing his mother's love.

Anti-Semitism

When addressing Freud and anti-Semitism, Richards recalls Freud's heroic self-report of an incident in 1883 when a party of anti-Semites called him a "dirty Jew" on a train to Leipzig. To his sweetheart he wrote, "I do think I held my own quite well and used the means at my disposal courageously. In any case I didn't fall to their level" (E. Freud, 1960, p. 123). It certainly sounds heroic, but what happened? What did he do? He doesn't tell her. He just portrays himself as heroic.

Freud was not an observant Jew and was not even a theist, but he said, "There remained enough to make the attraction of Judaism and the Jew irresistible, many dark emotional powers all the stronger the less they could be expressed in words, as well as the clear consciousness of an inner identity, the familiarity of the same psychological structure. Because I was a Jew, I found myself free of many prejudices that restrict others in the use of the intellect; as a Jew I was prepared to be in the opposition

and to renounce agreement with the compact majority” (p. 366–67).

The reference to dark emotional powers reminds us again of Freud’s avoidance of succumbing to strong feelings and preferring to stay close to the light of reason. And the reference to renouncing agreement with the compact majority shows us how anti-Semitism created a community of outsiders (specifically Jews) who became critics and innovators in art, literature, and science. Karl Marx stepped outside the economy in order to describe and critique it; Einstein stepped outside the contemporary view of physics in order to describe a new physics, Ludwig Fleck stepped outside the scientific movements of the day in order to describe the structure of thought collectives, how they create new disciplines, and how they change. And Freud, of course, stepped out of the then contemporary views of psychology and neurology and offered psychoanalysis as a theory of the mind and clinical technique for addressing psychological distress. It was once asked, “Who discovered water?” and the reply was, “I don’t know, but I’m sure it wasn’t a fish.” The outsider can see the water that the rest of us are just swimming in. The opportunity to free-associate outside the view of the analyst gives the patient a similar opportunity to self-reflect, to get out of the water one is swimming in and see oneself anew.

Freud spoke of the three narcissistic insults: Copernicus showed us we are not at the center of the universe but simply a satellite orbiting the sun; Darwin showed us we are not the pinnacle of God’s creation but just another animal on the planet. And Freud, by demonstrating the nature of the unconscious, showed us we are not the masters of our souls and captains of our fates. We are decentered by the overwhelming power of unconscious motivations. My mentor, Nathan Adler, saw a deep relation between the Jew as outsider and psychoanalysis as an outsider psychology. He used to say that psychoanalysis decenters the person away from the narcissism of the ego by recognizing unconscious motivations; consequently, he would say quite playfully, “Psychoanalysis is the way that anyone can become Jewish!”

In the earliest years of psychoanalysis, all of Freud’s colleagues were Jewish. With the appearance of Carl Jung on the scene in 1907, however, Freud’s heart was lifted thinking that Jung would carry psychoanalysis over the obstacle of Austrian anti-Semitism and introduce it

to the world. To his colleagues in Vienna, Freud said, “Most of you are Jews and therefore incompetent to win friends for the new teaching. Jews must be content with the modest role of preparing the ground. The Swiss will save us” (Wittles, 1924 p. 140). Of course, the relationship between Freud and Jung would further elaborate themes of atheism and theism, the Jew and the Gentile, and also the theme of murder and guilt for murder.

In August 1909 Freud, Sándor Ferenczi, and Carl Jung were at lunch in Bremen just before their trip to the United States. Jung was talking at length about some prehistoric cemeteries that had been discovered nearby. Freud became impatient with Jung’s way of talking about them and suggested that his interest in the prehistoric cemeteries was covering his unconscious death wishes. Jung disagreed and commented that Freud was just too eager to make such interpretations. Freud and Ferenczi then began to playfully argue with Jung in order to convince him to drink some wine with them, which he usually didn’t do. Right after successfully convincing Jung to join in drinking a bottle of wine, Freud fainted. Three years later, in November 1912, at a meeting in Munich, there was a discussion of Karl Abraham’s paper on Amenhotep, in which he asserted that his monotheistic revolution was tied to his deep hostility toward his father. Jung protested, saying that too much was being made of Amenhotep’s removal of his father’s name and inscriptions wherever they might be found and that the death wishes were of far less importance than his great feat of establishing monotheism. Suddenly Freud fainted again.

In his own analysis of the two incidents, Freud linked his fainting spells to the death of his brother Julius. Freud’s death wishes, directed toward the younger Julius, who had stolen the love of his mother, had seemingly killed his little brother, leaving Sigmund victorious but perhaps guilty as well. And now another battle was taking place—a battle between Freud and the younger Jung. When he convinced Jung to drink the wine, Freud had won and, “wrecked by his success” or guilty for surviving, he had to “die”—to faint. It does not matter here whether Freud’s interpretations of the presence of Jung’s death wishes or Jung’s denial of his death wishes are correct. What is important is that Freud interpreted his own fainting spells as related to death wishes (Freud’s projected or Jung’s denied) and his early childhood experience of the death of his baby brother Julius (Jones, 1955, pp. 55, 146–47).

While Freud intuited Jung's supposed death wishes, he also suffered survival guilt. Fortunately, he found a way to manage both his own death wishes and survival guilt by embracing a compromise in which he would eventually die but Jung would carry on his work. In 1909 Freud wrote to Jung, "We are certainly getting ahead; if I am Moses, then you are Joshua and will take possession of the promised land of psychiatry, which I shall only be able to glimpse from afar" (McGuire, 1974, pp. 196–97).

The theme of sibling rivalry is further elaborated in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, where Freud devotes several pages to the topic. "Many people ... who love their brothers and sisters and would feel bereaved if they were to die, harbor evil wishes against them in their unconscious, dating from earlier times; and these are capable of being realized in dreams" (S. Freud, 1900/1953a, *Standard Edition* 4, p. 251).

Psychoanalysis has historically focused on the rivalry and death wishes of the child toward the parent, and yet the death wishes toward siblings and of parents toward children are not to be overlooked. In fact, we can wonder if it might be more than coincidence that Freud was revisiting, in 1897, his death wishes toward his brother Julius and his related survival guilt, exactly twelve months after his father's death (1896), and at the same time that his youngest daughters, Sophie and Anna, ages four and two, respectively, were battling out their rivalry on the family stage.

It is well known that when Jung broke from Freud in 1914, Jung fell into a severe psychological crisis and had cataclysmic dreams of the end of the world. He interpreted these as premonitions of the onset of World War I. They were mostly dreams of earthquakes and floods but also a dream in which he murdered the German dragon-killing hero, Siegfried. When I conducted my own analysis of the dream, it was easy to see it as a dream of Jung's murder of Sigmund Freud and his guilt that followed (see Jung, 1961, p. 179–80).

Godlessness

Richards quotes Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi (1991), who concluded that "the very violence of Freud's recoil against Jewish religious belief in ritual ... displays an aggressive intensity that normally accompanies a rebellion against an equally intense former attachment" (p. 68). I would suggest that in addition to a former attachment, it may well have been a

rebellion against an equally intense temptation or fascination with the mystical. Consequently, his rebellion took odd forms such as resisting to be married under a chuppah, refusing to observe the Sabbath, and avoidance of participating in any ritual life—even though his wife found comfort in such rituals and practiced them after Freud’s death. Freud fainted in Jung’s presence twice: first when discussing prehistoric cemeteries and later when discussing Amenhotep’s death wishes toward his father. He didn’t go to his mother’s funeral, could not go to his daughter’s (Sophie’s) funeral, and didn’t go to his grandson Heinerle’s funeral either. Referring on murderous wishes and subsequent guilt Richards writes:

We can detect this dynamic in Freud’s analysis of the psychological structure of conscience. I do not doubt that when he examined himself, he found precisely what he proposed: inherited guilt over an inherited murder. But what makes a man believe that parricide is in him, makes him know that he is not only capable of the deed, but has in some sense committed it? In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud argued that this belief is universal. But later, in *Moses and Monotheism*, he argued that it is archetypically Jewish. (p. 1000)

Freud saw religion and ritual as covering the guilt for the murder of the primal father, and he makes a strong case for it in *Totem and Taboo* and *Moses and Monotheism*. It is hard to disagree with his thinking, but one fact is difficult to overlook. The monster, slain by the hero in myths from around the world, was identified by Freud and Otto Rank as the father, but Lord Raglan more accurately described it as a “king and/or a giant, dragon, or wild beast” (Raglan, 1956, pp. 174–75). And Erich Neumann, one of Jung’s most creative students, suggested that there were different monsters the hero must slay: a uroboric monster, a mother monster, and a father monster. Neumann did with the hero myth what Freud had done with birth trauma in relation to castration trauma: he recognized them both as points in a developmental progression. From this perspective I would suggest that the primal murder—which we are all guilty of, even before the murder of the mother and murder of the father—is the murder of the unitary (uroboric) psychic state, which results in a separation of consciousness from unconsciousness and marks expulsion from the Garden of Eden (Neumann, 1954, p. 153).

Freud's project was to both expose the murder of the father and demonstrate the attempt to resuscitate him in monotheism. But in recognizing the murderous wishes, the murderous deed, and humanity's remorse in resurrecting a God, Freud was killing God once more in order to arrive at the irony of human existence: the irony of being a symbolic creature that knows it will die without a God to welcome one on the other side of the River Styx. Nathan Adler once told me, "There is no ego, only egoing. There is no mind, only minding." When I shared this with the comparative religion professor Frederic Spiegelberg, he said, "That's right, and there is no soul, only souling." Since then I have suggested, "There is no God, only God-ing." The question is not, *Do you believe in God?* or *Is there a God?* but rather *Do you God? When do you God? Under what conditions do you God, or personify, the universe?* Again, Nathan would say, "God is your narcissism." And Freud would say, "I believe that a large part of the mythological view of the world, which extends a long way into the most modern religions, is nothing but psychology projected into the external world" (1901/1960, *Standard Edition* 6, p. 258).

Richards's analysis is not the first attempt to understand the relation between Freud and his Jewish identity, but it is a particularly creative attempt integrating the three factors of Bildung, anti-Semitism, and Freud's godlessness. In conclusion, my view is that it took Amenhotep and a line of Jewish patriarchs to do away with polytheism and establish monotheism, and it took an intellectually sophisticated secular Jew—Freud, that is—in anti-Semitic Vienna to look God in the eye and analyze "Him" as a psychic content projected onto the walls of the universe.

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Response to Arnold Richards's "The Need Not To Believe: Freud's Godlessness Reconsidered"

Nathan M. Szajnberg

Ambiguous this phrase Freud's "anti-Semitism." Is it the fumes of anti-Semitism that bathed Freud in Vienna? Is it the ambivalence about his Semitism that Freud indicated? We will return to this.

But for this commentary, let's examine Richards's question: "What does it mean that psychoanalysis was founded by a Jew?" (p. 987). For the fun of it, repeat the same question, changing the subject of the sentence, "psychoanalysis," to another word. Say it out loud. "What does it mean that —'special relativity' (Einstein); 'sociology' (Durkheim); 'cultural anthropology' (Boas); 'philosophy of science,' (Fleck and later Kuhn)—was founded by a Jew." I've limited the list to *fin de siècle* middle Europe. In the next couple decades, we have political philosophy (Casirrer), art history (Panofsky) and archival work (Warburg). Who are they? Can you imitate Lenny Bruce and say, "Kike! Kike! Kike!" What they all share — Einstein, Durkheim, Boas, Fleck, Kuhn) is a search for universal principles, whether these be of the universe, mankind, or the study of science. And they're all Jews. *And* this is quite Jewish. To search. To search for universals that underlie our common—universe, humankind, scientific communities. For psychoanalysis too, for Freud, is an attempt to discover what is commonly human to all of us. What lies beneath; what we share. It is a *Weltanschauung*, a world view, as well as a treatment and theory of mind. Yet, most people don't ask that question—What does it mean that.... Is founded by a Jew—of special relativity of sociology, of anthropology or of philosophy of science. At least they do not ask with the same ambiguous or ambivalent tone as it's asked about psychoanalysis. There can be, I suggest, a fundamental anti-Semitism even in posing the question about psychoanalysis.

Let's turn back to external anti-Semitism, for it too is a universal stretching back at least two millennia—before Christ, before Mohammed and well before Hitler. Seneca, the first century Roman, called Jews "a criminal tribe." Tacitus, not to be outdone, referred to Jews as "the abhorrent

ones.” And A.B. Yehoshua, who died recently, dates the first textual anti-semitism to the Book of Ester, where Haman refers to the Jews as “... a certain people scattered abroad and dispersed among the peoples in all the provinces of your kingdom; and their laws are different from all people; nor do they keep the king’s law: ... If it please the king, let it be written that they may be destroyed.” Not only does he state the Jew problem, he outlines the final solution, destroy them. So, Richard Wagner, the French Celine or the Portuguese Saramago have long-standing predecessors for Jew-hatred of Jew. They ain’t so original.

Freud attributed hatred of Jews (in his otherwise intellectually misshapen *Moses and Monotheism*) as due to Jews being stiff-necked (Genesis, 32:9), a form of self-pride that in turn evokes envy and hence hatred. “Stiff-necked” is God’s phrase; and God’s solution to Moses was to kill them off! Envy, we recall from Greek myth, is that ravenous beast with withered body, who consumes hungrily and is never satisfied, even as blood drips from its maw.

Freud might have been speaking of his complex self. A man certain of his inner search (personal analysis) of his search in others’ souls, of his technique which varied overtly little after the dream book: he stayed the clinical course, changing theories when the clinical work demanded. He was stiff-necked about listening to his patients, about creating a view of inner world, about humility before the impulses (sexual and aggressive); not so stiff-necked about theories. As Frattaroli demonstrated elegantly, Freud was both heterodox and orthodox. His lesser students (who were many) broke into camps of either heterodoxy (Jung, Adler) or orthodoxy (the Wednesday circle).

Let’s turn to Fleck, who offers Richards a foundation to his exploration of the science (or discipline as Wallerstein preferred) of psychoanalysis. Fleck was speaking of hard science, such as his immunology. Kuhn, a follower of Fleck, got his Ph.D. in physics; Polanyi, in chemistry. When they spoke of science, they knew whereof they spoke. Psychoanalysis as a science? Perhaps we can bridge the gap between “science” and “art” by referring back to the German academic terms for these different disciplines: *Naturwissenschaft* and *Geisteswissenschaft*. *Natur*, refers to “nature”; *Geistes* refers to “spirit.” But for the German, both are *Wissenschaften*, the bridging word brings them closer. The dictionary

will translate *Wissenschaften* as “science.” But we can get more concrete and try “knowledge work” for *Wissenschaften*. Wallerstein’s resolution of this unfruitful science-art debate is to call psychoanalysis a discipline (personal communication). Like other disciplines—physics, ballet, violin, medicine—it takes years of repeated and practiced and mentored effort to do it right. As Yitzhak Perlman said to a master class, “Practice makes permanent.” That is, corrected practicing makes the master.

Richards correctly argues that Fleck gave multiple factors that influence science: cultural, social, historical, personal, psychological. He then argues persuasively the personal and historical sources that helped Freud’s view of psychoanalysis. But, Kuhn, Polanyi and others built on Fleck, did not accept as given all that Fleck said. In fact, when the community of science works properly, the individual factors that may bias a given scientist’s or scientific community’s view, are winnowed out by further discovery. The truth will out. Einstein could not accept quantum mechanics, because (his) God would not place dice with the universe. But his physics community shifted towards demonstrating the validity of quantum mechanics. For emotions, Darwin postulated six or seven basic emotions. Margaret Mead, intent on arguing that cultures vary in all sorts of manners, argued that emotions and emotional expressions varied across cultures: a smile in New York would mean happy; in Samoa, something else. When Paul Ekman demonstrated empirically that at least our facial expression of emotions are universal, cross-cultural, Mead’s book review of Ekman was entitled, “the a-PAUL-ing” state of emotions research. Over the decades Ekman and his colleagues demonstrated that emotions are discrete and universal, often with cross-cultural facial expression. (Although gestures can vary culturally). That is, philosophy of science was initiated by Fleck, but did not stop there; Polanyi argued for individual aesthetic judgements of scientific theories; Kuhn, in his final book, argued for at least eight different factors used by scientists to judge the validity of a theory. And time counts. When Copernicus posited a heliocentric view of the solar system, many astronomers accepted it as more valid than Ptolemy’s, only because it was simpler, more elegant. Empirical proof for Copernicus’ view took another two centuries for Foucault’s pendulum. In the interim, the Church threatened excommunication (Galileo) and burned Tycho Brahe for their scientific demonstrations. That is, for a true discipline, the community of researchers will

move towards greater clarity and truth, move away from the idiosyncrasies of history or sociology or personality. On the other hand, fads may change (as do hemlines), but these we do *not* consider scientific advances. This is the dilemma for psychoanalysis: to what degree is it a discipline, to what degree faddish. Or to challenge us differently, to what degree is there a disciplined psychoanalytic community versus an array of dress-designers trying to get something new for this year's Fashion Week in New York or Paris?

Let's return to Richards's citations of Freud that documents his Jewishness, a non-religious Jewishness but embedded within a religiously scientific mind.

Freud's argument to the B'nai B'rith, where he presented many of his earliest ideas, was that as a Jew, he was prepared "to be in the opposition and renounce agreement with the compact majority" (p. 996). Elsewhere he articulates what he considered his Jewishness:

"...the attraction to Jewry and Jews (are) irresistible—many obscure emotional forces [which] were the more powerful the less they could be expressed in words, as well as a clear consciousness of inner identity, the safe privacy of a common mental."
<http://azure.org.il/article.php?id=18&page=all>

A bit elusive this: "obscure emotional forces...more powerful the less they could be expressed in words." Freud was extraordinarily articulate, winner of the Goethe prize. For him not to be to articulate something leaves us puzzled, wanting. But, Freud does undress the ritual of Jewishness—not just the Hasid's frock and hat, but also the prayers and such. He distills out some sense of way of thinking that served as an inner strength and identification with this stiff-necked people who, to Spengler's dismay, just wouldn't disappear.

Richards points out that the term antisemitism arose in the mid-nineteenth century, although as Yehoshua documents, the concept and sentiments well-predated the term. In his landmark book, Makari (2021) documents that the term "xenophobia" arose in late nineteenth century, is not an ancient Greek term. First used by an obscure French journalist. This sentiment—fear of stranger—also preexisted. But the words to say it—anti-Semitism, xenophobia—are created in the era that was

otherwise a time of great liberation for nations: the 1848 revolutions gave birth to European nations and identities. Except for the Jews. They belonged nowhere. Einstein, when his theory was still being examined critically, was asked by a journalist what the Germans and French would say of him. His answer. If his theory holds up, the Germans will claim him as German; the French as a citizen of the world. If it failed, the French would dismiss him as a German and the Germans as a Jew.

And Freud's Vienna was a cauldron of ambivalences. A center for both antisemitism and great cosmopolitanism (Bettelheim, *Freud and Man's Soul*, 1983). And we must recall that *the most enthusiastic anti-Semites in the 1930's were the academics, the students, the "intellectuals."* Auerbach, Adorno, Walter Benjamin, young Hanna Arendt (after being seduced by her middle aged, married, Nazi-sympathizing professor, that great Heidegger who never renounced his anti-Semitism) discovered this all too bitterly.

Let's return to one of the original questions: What to make of psychoanalysis being discovered by a Jew. Well, what to make of some twenty-percent of all Nobel prizes going to Jews, who number some eleven million (after the Nazi and later Stalinist culling)? We Jews *are* enigmatic. We are stiff-necked in the sense of hanging around with a common identity for so long, with our stories dating back to Abraham. To be stiff-necked means that one's spine is straight, a weight-lifter, gymnast taught me. Being stiff-necked and firm-spined creates an axis around which the athlete can be supple. So too with psychoanalysis, a firm spine (of technique and ethics) permits the analyst to have "supple thinking, relativism, playfulness and paradox" (D.J. Fisher, personal communication).

Freud would first look at himself deeply critically to understand feelings and reactions of those around him. He looked at his Jews to argue that our stiff-neckedness, our belief in such things as a one god (or, psychoanalytically, unity of one's self) our need to control impulses. The clarity of the ten commandments is exemplary of simplicity: in the Bible, there are five (mostly) yeses—I'm the Lord, no other gods; "God" not in vain; keep Shabbath; honor mother and father; and five no's: don't murder, don't adultery; don't steal; don't bear false witness, don't covet. Can we duplicate that for fundamental rules on psychoanalytic technique? Try. Start with Freud's three factors for a good interpretation: content,

timing, affect. Continue with transference and its dance partner, countertransference. And Freud's defenses are a good next step in this dance. If only we could agree on such clarity within our discipline.

But, back to Freud. He looks candidly at his fellow Jews and explains (without excusing, never excusing the anti-Semitic Gentile) as inducing anti-Semitic sentiment because of our stiff-neckedness. Or can we say pride in our legacy, our long-livingness, our ability to thrive in various "soils" foreign though these be. And we thrive not only for ourselves but for humankind's benefit—in *Wissenschaft*. This is not an indictment of Jews; this is not Freud suggesting that we not continue to be seekers of truths (whether this be of the universe's physical laws, or universal expressions of emotion, or our tumultuous inner lives and our capacity to rein them in).

How does Bellow (1998) capture the Jewish/Goyish dilemma?

"...there is something exceptional in all our Jewishness, ... the risk we take upon ourselves. ... (W)e live on the brink of an abyss and know how to do so. To us, our Jewish nature is clear and we can feel it—but it is hard to say the world can understand it."

We Jews, we psychoanalysts, live this dilemma. Psychoanalysis had to be discovered by a Jew. Perhaps also sociology or anthropology or relativity. For we seek truths that underlie our universe even as we recognize variations in our humankind. Erikson and Bettelheim—both Jews—in their last books, however spoke plaintively that we need to seek our common humanity for us to survive. That is perhaps the best we can do.

I thank Dr. Richards for his usual scholarly study and for the opportunity to respond to it.

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Comments on Anti-Semitism

Henry Zvi Lothane

I read and appreciated the long statements by Richards, Szajnberg, and Lotto. I shall be brief in my response.

Semitism is a philological category. Hebrew, Arabic, and Aramaic are semitic languages. Many years ago, I had a letter published in the New York Times saying: how could Arafat be anti-Semitic since he was a Semite himself? David Lotto has it right: it is anti-Judaism that we are discussing; but since the word anti-Semitism is the accepted usage, we should keep in mind that stands for anti-Judaism.

The first persecutors of the Jews and their religious beliefs and ethical values, in Europe, were the Romans. But there was one big fact to consider: the Jews fought the Romans in a series of uprisings whereupon Rome waged punishing wars and Titus burned down the Second Temple in Jerusalem and started the Jewish Diaspora.

The original wave of migration split into two branches: the Sephardim, from Sepharad, or Spain, who knew Hebrew and spoke medieval Spanish or Ladino; and the Ashkenazim, from Ashkenaz, or Germany, who knew Hebrew and spoke Alemanish, or medieval German. The Ashkenazim later spread from Germany to the east, to Poland and Russia, the most populous Jewish settlements in Europe. Arnie and Nate and myself are Ashkenazi, but I only imagine that he is either of Spanish or Italian ancestry.

While Judaism is a synonym for Jewish religion, the name Jew came also to mean a Jewish *race*, marked by certain physical traits, such as the shape of the nose, the taint of the skin, the color of hair. Alternately, race also came to mean a social group, a nation. When I lived in Russia and Poland until the age of 15 I was seen as a race. Later I became a Jewish citizen of Israel. In 1963 I came to America and became a religion.

The word Jew is derived from Juda, or Yehuda, in Latin Judas, also the name of the apostle who betrayed Jesus to the Romans. However, the

ancient Yehuda was one of the Hebrew tribes, and Hebrew is derived from the Hebrew word IVRI, and thus the Hebrew language is called IVRIT. In Russian, the genteel name of the Jew is IEVEI, from Ivri, and the vulgar name of the Jew is жид/Zhyd. In Polish the official name is Żyd, Zhyd. In Poland I was accused as a Christ murderer, to which I replied, I did not murder anybody. During a Schreber conference in Normandy in 1993 I told a group of Belgian Catholics that Jesus was convicted and executed by Pontius Pilatus. So instead of accusing the Jews, they should be given the Nobel prize for fulfilling the prophecy of John 3:16: "For God so loved the world that He gave His one and only Son, that everyone who believes in Him shall not perish but have eternal life." Only one woman in the group understood what I meant.

Christianity, created by two Jews, Jesus, the prophet, and Paul, the proselytizer, first persecuted by the Romans and then inherited Rome as a worldly power and the Western Church led by Roman Popes. In the East the Constantinople the Christian were led by a patriarch, while in Russia it morphed into the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarchate.

As the Church triumphed over the Synagogue, two types of church fathers emerged: the tolerant Augustine and the virulently anti-Semitic John Chrysostom. During the Middle Ages the Crusaders staged the first violent and genocidal massacres of on Jewish communities in many cities in France and Germany, fueled by anti-Semitic ideology and inflammatory narratives, e.g., 1230 Jews accused of circumcising a five year-old boy. A major goal of the violent pogroms was to grab Jewish properties and assets.

Virulent and violent was also the Inquisition, with its autos-da-fé, the torture and burning of Jews as infidels. After the Reformation, the greatest anti-Semite was Martin Luther himself. With the waning of the Middle Ages the economic importance of Jews declined as Christian capitalism flourished. Simultaneously, the Jews were vilified in art as the Judensau, the repulsive Jew-swine, and would also be adopted by the Nazis. Moreover, there were mass expulsions of Jews from many European cities.

The history of continuing anti-Semitism in the 17th and 18th centuries culminate in opposing trends in the 19th. With the emancipation of

Jews in Europe and their rise in their contributions to science, law, medicine, and psychiatry spurred a competitive backlash from the gentiles in the same professions. Coupled with the Darwin-inspired and weaponized *Social Darwinism*, fueling the resentment on the Jewish expansion. Social Darwinism would be adopted by the Nazis, e.g., Nazi doctrine of securing a “Lebensraum,” ensuring an existential space, for Hitler’s Third Reich (third empire).

However, in the 19th took place the notorious Dreyfus trial in which anti-Semitic defamation of Captain Dreyfus clashed with the impassioned defense by Emile Zola’s “J’accuse.” The history of German eliminationist anti-Semitism was documented in Goldhagen’s *Hitler’s Willing Executioners*, which was unfortunately panned by Jewish intellectuals.

Here is where Freud comes in. As a preeminent contributor to psychiatry with his creation of psychoanalysis, Freud and his family lived in Vienna during the times of the infamous anti-Semitic mayor of Vienna, Karl Lueger. However, the proud Jew that he was, Freud remained silent about anti-Semitism until his emigration to London, it is only there where he dared to discuss anti-Semitism, citing the *philosemitic* Count Heinrich Coudenhove-Kalergi’s book, *Anti-Semitism Throughout the Ages*. As a proud Jew, Freud was critical of Alfred Adler’s conversion to a Christian but was blind to C.G. Jung’s hidden anti-Semitic attitudes. It was the ostracized and banished Wilhelm Reich who in 1933, in *Mass Psychology of Fascism*, Cassandra-like warned the Jews about the Nazi danger. Many Jews in Austria and Germany failed to heed this warning. Thanks to Princess Marie Bonaparte, Freud and his daughter were spared the fate of Freud’s three elderly sisters, murdered in the death camp Treblinka.

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Personal Reflections

Selma Duckler

Arnold Richards's paper, "The Need Not to Believe: Freud's Godlessness Reconsidered," is simultaneously a careful textual analysis, a biographical essay, an intellectual history that looks at the importance for Freud's insistence on not believing in God. Although I cannot comment clinically or with extensive knowledge of Freudian scholarship, I feel that Freud's perspective is as important today as it was during his own life. In a post-Trump America, Freud's anti-Semitic world that controlled areas of his life, determined where he would live, who his colleagues would be, and deeply impacted his struggles with his family remind me of the world we find ourselves in today and evoke thoughts about my own experience of anti-Semitism and (dis)belief in God.

Freud has been part of my life since I was 16 when I first went to an analyst. I read *The Interpretation of Dreams* with an adolescent understanding, and because of my analyst—it was a start out of a depression—it gave me hope I had never dreamed of and Freud became my hero who has never lost that position with me. When my daughter entered Reed college, the enrollment form listed the question, Religion, and she wrote "Freud." The school called me to clarify, and I said she is correct. Many years later, when I noticed my nine-year-old grandson was listening to our very adult conversation about Freud, I said to him, "Do you know who Freud is?" He said "No, but when I go to my grandma's house, she is obsessed with him."

I am first-generation American. My parents came to America in 1921 from Poland from very different Jewish backgrounds. My mother's family, observant and religious, considered themselves modern and were stable and lived well and not in a shetel. My grandfather was the manager of a large estate owned for generations by a French family. He hired the peasants, managed the farm, and took over all aspects of making a large profit on the produce from the estate. His father and grandfather had done this before him. They had their own house and he could read,

write, speak several languages, and served as a leader for the Jews in the nearby shtetel, for news of WWI where the Germans were better to them than the Russians. He had 11 children, eight boys and three girls. My eight uncles all knew very well how to run a farm so when they came to America, they eventually left New York for the Midwest, where one had started a business repairing broken down tractors and he eventually brought his brothers to the mid-west, who worked for him early, and then started their own same business, so my uncles were all over the Midwest in tractor parts businesses and when I was five, because my father couldn't make a living, and it was the depression, we were sent by Uncle Irving to Newton, Iowa, and eventually moved to Des Moines, the capital, and then to Wisconsin. One Uncle started a sheep farm in North Dakota and was highlighted in a story about his life, in *The Daily Forward*, the Jewish newspaper of its time, entitled, "Yes, Virginia, there is a Jewish farmer." The youngest had no choice. They had decided one was going to be a professional man, and it was decided that Daniel, the youngest would be a doctor. Money was put away for him, and that was his future. As he was the least religious, he was my favorite.

My father's family were religious fanatics. The Enlightenment never touched them. The oldest in that family, my father's only brother, escaped to America, illegally to avoid a second term in the army, and became a proselytizing ardent Communist. His grandchildren all became highly educated, doctors and scientists. His father, my grandfather, came alone to America a few years later, stayed seven years, decided this was the land of the Goyim and planned to go back to Poland, where he had abandoned his wife, five daughters and a six-year-old son, my father. My father grew up living in barns owned by religious men, where he was being harshly trained to become a Rabbi. My grandfather's friends pleaded with him not to go back, saying it was a certain death, so he sent for his family, my father, now 13 and the family came to the US except the oldest, 17, who was sent to London for an arranged marriage with an older widowed religious Pole who wanted a young Polish wife. It saved them the cost of another fare. My father graduated high school in America and worked at *The Daily Worker*, the communist newspaper where his brother got him a job. He had a life-long struggle with his father's religiosity and discarded all religious feeling but on the surface acted as if he was a pious Jew as that was his entire education.

My father and mother met at a dance for immigrants. Her parents were angry that she was not married at 24 and he was 21 with no interest in marriage or responsibility. They married, and ten months later, now 1931, I was born to a religious mother and an atheist father.

My husband was also born to an immigrant family, a Polish mother and a Russian father, 30 years older than his wife who was a widow with a two-year-old daughter at the time they married. Larry's father was illiterate, never learned English, spoke only Yiddish and Russian and washed street cars for the electric company. Larry told me from the time he was 10 that he wanted to be a surgeon. He worked in high school to save for the state college in Milwaukee. Living at home, he could pay the tuition and get a pre-med degree, but there was a strict Jewish quota for medical school, and he had a feeling he would never get in medical school, so he also took classes to be a history teacher. His parents had no interest in this at all and there was no support of any kind. His mother was very religious, and his father a bitter atheist who had four grown sons when he married Larry's mother. He didn't want more children, but his wife did and got pregnant. Larry loved his father, signed his name for him when he bought two houses, took care of his illiterate problems, and father and son loved each other, Larry becoming as atheistic as his father.

When he graduated college to his shock, he got into medical school. It was 1940 but one year later, after Pearl Harbor, America found itself involved in the Second World War. It was a very low year for Larry. He had four jobs to stay in medical school as his parents would not help him at all. He worked weekends for a construction company, nights as a night watchman at Montgomery Wards where he studied, and as a busboy for a girls' sorority for his meals, and handyman in an old apartment complex for a room in which to live.

His anti-Semitic anatomy professor told him repeatedly, this wasn't the place for him. His "kind" of people did better in a shop, as a Jew, he was a misfit for medical school. The professor gave him very low grades all year, and after the final test in anatomy, the professor said he would have to repeat the class. He couldn't flunk him out of medical school, his grades were too excellent, but he could put off proceeding for another year. Larry was exhausted and felt he couldn't keep up with the demands

of school and simultaneously support himself in Madison, Wisconsin. Medical students had a deferment from the draft, but he was so deeply depressed about losing a year because of anatomy, he wandered into an army recruitment center and enlisted. He felt his country was at war. Jews were having a hard time, why should he be in medical school? He was sent to officers training for a few days, but the war was going badly and they needed everyone at the front. He was sent to basic training and then to San Francisco to ship out with a thousand other GIs who were never told where they were going. Two weeks later, when they got off the ship, they saw small dark men shimmying up trees and throwing coconuts down on the soldiers. They knew they were in the south seas. They were in Finchhaven, New Guinea, where he spent the next five years, assigned to a tent hospital in the jungle as an assistant to the surgeons. The group was following General McArthur and preparing to invade Japan, but the Atomic Bomb saved his life. They were about to invade and were told not to expect they would come back, but the next morning when Larry climbed out of his foxhole, he saw the officers' tent had been knocked down, and men were making alcohol out of grass. Someone said the war is over. Somewhere a bomb ended the war. "We don't know anything more about it," they said.

He was not part of my life then. We were ten years apart so I was still a child. When the war was over, he was sent to Manila, but had malaria so he couldn't come into America. He was billeted with a family in an impoverished neighborhood, and was put in charge of vice in Manila and was there for months. Finally home, he returned to Wisconsin to medical school, but five years had passed, the new Dean was kind and welcoming, but said he had to start over from the beginning. The anti-Semitic professor was gone, and the GI Bill was in effect so he didn't have to work to afford medical school. He became a doctor.

On a free weekend from medical school he would hop on a freight train to La Crosse, to visit his half-sister who lived there. We met in LaCrosse when I was 17, still in high school, and we married when I turned 19. He was 29. In two months, he would graduate medical school.

Larry selected Milwaukee County General Hospital as his internship as he had hopes of getting into their surgical residency program a year later. Indigent people who could not afford a doctor in those years went to the

County Hospitals for free medical care if they could get it. If not, they just went without, and ended up in the emergency room at the county hospital. The surgical residents did most of the surgery which is why he wanted it. He would have a huge amount of experience. In private hospitals people paid for a surgeon and expected their surgeon to do the surgery. Milwaukee County was tied to Marquette University which was Catholic and was called St. County because all the doctors and department heads were almost all from Marquette. Surgical residents were on a pyramid system, eliminating them each of the four years until one was left by the 4th and senior year who became chief. It was amazing a Jew got in because very few Jews were allowed to become surgical residents. Larry became the only Jewish surgeon in the hospital but I knew he would never become the 4th year surgical resident. He planned to eventually have his own office in Milwaukee. I wanted to leave Milwaukee. Two religious mothers were upsetting me. Larry, a busy resident, was not home very much and I asked if I could write for positions out of Milwaukee, using his name and credentials and he said ok but his plan was an office in Milwaukee.

We got a reply from a man from Portland, Oregon who was going to Detroit to settle his father's estate and wanted to meet Larry because his New Guinea experience and county experience were what they wanted in a surgeon who could do everything in a new prepaid insurance plan. Larry was not interested but I was. I talked him into meeting the man if he came to the hospital cafeteria and if Larry was not in the OR. Larry said, "You got me into this, so you have to come too."

Dr. F said Henry Kaiser was building ships in Vanport between Portland and Vancouver, Washington and were importing workers from the South who needed jobs. They needed medical care also and the doctors in Portland were not interested in them. Sidney Garfield, a surgeon in Walnut Creek, California, had created a new plan of prepaid insurance where the employer and the employee put money in an insurance so all their health needs would be met, from checkups to surgery. An interested group of doctors bargained with them for salaries and costs and would provide care only for them. It was unheard of in medicine at that time. It was a completely new system of health care in which the doctors took a lower salary for a normal lifestyle, and their salary paid for everything they did from office visits to high priced procedures. It was a huge

break with established medicine. They did everything they could in their specialty and sometimes just general medicine, but they worked regular hours, with a consistent even salary and a paid vacation every year. This was unheard of for doctors. They were not yet in Oregon as national Societies of Specialists said it was Communist, so they were allowed only in Washington. It was years before we got into Portland. I wanted to go to Oregon very much, and I said to Larry, “As a Jew you will never get the 4th year at County, and in Oregon working with a board surgeon in two years you will have board eligibility.” Finally, he agreed for just the two years and we left for Oregon— Larry, me and our 18 month-old daughter, Heidi.

I was so happy to leave our parents, to live my own life, noticing the change in me, within two weeks Larry decided we were never going back. He loved the workload which was always full, and he loved never having to say, “You need surgery but you can’t afford it.” Whatever the patient needed he could do. It was a dream come true. After the two years preceptorship Larry became a Kaiser doctor.

We made friends, I was going to school, and was involved in theatre, acting, that I always wanted to do, and Larry was making a salary, our first. Life was very full and good. We had a second child, another daughter. In the next three years, Kaiser moved into Portland and they gave up insisting we were communists, as health insurance plans were becoming very popular.

My third pregnancy surprised us with a boy and a girl, twins, so we now had four children. The oldest was seven. We had outgrown our tiny house. We searched buying a house but none were what I wanted so we decided to build. The most important item to me was the school district. I wanted the best Portland public school district. I researched and decided on Riverdale school district. This was in a neighborhood called Dunthorpe. It was a Portland public school district, but the neighborhood was wealthy, and they put money into furnishings, equipment, school supplies that were the best and the school and its programs were outstanding, but it was an expensive area and I hunted intensely. I was shocked to actually find a Dunthorpe lot for us. It was at the very end of Dunthorpe at the intersection of two highways; across the street was not Riverdale school district but this side with a lot was. It had no sewer

and we would have to put one in, and it had a small creek, and was overgrown forest, but I didn't care. It was what I wanted. We bought it, told everyone about it, found a contractor we could afford and met with him to settle on a variety of plans that I could put together to have what I wanted. We got a mortgage loan from the bank and started to clear the land. None of this was a secret. I shared it with everyone. It was very exciting.

One day I came home from shopping to find Larry at home. "What happened?" I said, "Why are you home?" He said, "I am leaving Kaiser." I was stunned. Larry loved Kaiser. "Why? Where are you going?" I said. "I don't know," Larry said. "We have no money. Everything is tied up in the new house. What happened?" I said. Larry said, "Dr. F. (head of the surgical department) called me in his office and said, 'Are you moving into Dunthorpe?' I told him, 'Yes, Selma found a lot we could afford and she likes the school district.'" Dr. F, who was from Detroit and trained at Henry Ford hospital, had many times said loudly to Larry, "You would never be allowed in Henry Ford. You would never have the kind of training, I did. Your kind are not allowed in that hospital. Henry Ford was a well-known anti-Semite. But this kind of anti-Semitism was everywhere, and we dismissed it.

He said now, "You don't belong in Dunthorpe. Dunthorpe is a place for landed gentry. You don't belong there. There are many neighborhoods where there are your kind. They live with their own kind. I will not have your children in school with my son." His son was exactly Heidi's age, and I invited him to her birthday parties, a lonely withdrawn sad child. "If you persist in this move, you have no job at Kaiser, and that is effective immediately."

I stared at him. We had made friends and were very social. We had a good life. I was in analysis, and by this time, had an active life as an actress. Everywhere we were engaged, we were a part of a community that we had help build. We also had a huge mortgage with the bank for our eventual house, we had no money for emergencies. What would we do? Larry said that Dr. F said if we found another lot, he would buy this lot from us at the cost of the new lot but Larry said he could not work with this man, and we were going to leave. But where?

I started to cry, so the children started to cry. "I can't talk about this here,

Larry.” I called a high school sitter, to come take care of the children, and we got in the car to discuss this privately.

We just drove aimlessly as I was crying. I loved my life. Larry might want to go back to Milwaukee but I made that break from a destructive past I needed to do for my marriage and independence. My five-times weekly analysis would have to end. There would be no money and we had four young children to raise.

I said, “If you go someplace else, anywhere, you will always meet this kind of person. Anti-semitism is everywhere. No different in another place than here. You need to make up your mind, that you are not going to let anti-Semites make the decisions for your life. We love Kaiser, we love Portland. Why should an evil person decide where we can live? Let’s just get another lot.” Larry said it has to be now. We can’t take the time to plan. We drove and talked and time passed. I don’t know where we were. Finally, Larry said so painfully poignant as he always provided the best for me, “What do you want me to do, Selma?” My heart was breaking for him. Out the window at that moment, there was an empty lot, which had a sign that read, “Lot For Sale” and a number. I put my hand out the window and pointed, and crying I said there is a lot. I was crying and didn’t notice but Larry wrote down the number.

We went home, and in the morning, Larry went to work, we didn’t say anything, as I was busy with the children. He called me late in the afternoon, and said I bought the lot. Completely forgetting, I said, “What lot?” He said, “The one you wanted.” I said, “I didn’t want any lot.” He said, “The one you pointed to. I called them. They are in Hawaii on vacation. I asked the price, and I said I will take it without having any discussion. Let Dr. F worry about that. I told F. and we made the exchange. I called the bank, and the construction guy, and tomorrow we will make the new adjustments.” “Where is the lot, Larry?” He said, “I don’t know. I thought you knew.” “No,” I said, “I didn’t know where we were. I just pointed to it because I was so angry.”

He came home, and we got in the car with the children, and tried to think where we had driven. I remembered we had driven to Council Crest Park but just sat in the car, and I thought it was shortly after that, so it must be somewhere around there. We found it. It was a one acre

steep hill, no even ground anywhere on it at all, with a lot of trees. It was an empty lot on the major street we were driving on, but the rest of it went into a cul de sac with houses, up the hill to a water tower at the top. We drove around, no bus stops anywhere, no grocery stores or shops, no school. I started to laugh. Then I was laughing and crying. I said to Larry, “Home, Larry, home.”

We built the house, the neighborhood were all contractors and business people, except for one elderly doctor. The comments were that the new neighbors are a Kaiser doctor, so must be communist, and he even painted the house pink, so it’s a sure thing. The day we moved, our mailbox which was on the bottom of the hill, on the street, had a big black swastika painted on it. But we got it off, and I didn’t even think any more about it. I had been there already.

I had always sent a Christmas gift to Dr. F’s family since he was head of the department. That year I sent a large American flag, and wrote, “Happy New Year.” Six months later I got a proper short thank you.

Richards writes that Freud’s response to anti-Semitism “was always one of defiance,” as well as affirmation. Richards observes, “I should note that Freud’s response entailed a heightened sense of himself as a Jew combined with an enduring sense that the Jewish tradition is favorable to the development of intellectuality generally, and of scientific worldview particularly.” Upon reflection, I could say that I too felt both alienated from Jewish ritual and religiosity yet when confronted with anti-Semitism, I felt a heightened sense of being a Jew. For instance, when I was young, I was surrounded by Jewish traditions that I was expected to follow regardless of my feelings. In 1946, a cousin at the University of Iowa married a black man, and my pious Aunt and Uncle had funeral services for her. This was kept secret from me, as I wasn’t supposed to know of such things but after I found out, I decided I was no longer a Jew and I would never marry a Jewish man. Everything about them repelled me, and I just wanted out. But life has many twists and turns. I met Larry when I was in my teens, but unknown to him I had already been a year with an analyst, taking the train every Tuesday and Thursday to Milwaukee, so on our first date all I talked about was Freud, and dreams, and analysis. I never mentioned high school. He had never heard conversation like this. In medical school at the University of Wisconsin, psychoanalysis was

regarded as a fraud and charlatan practice but he had made up his mind to marry me, and I was very intense and devoted to analysis and reading Freud who spoke for me. My analyst then, Dr. Black in Milwaukee, did not want me to marry as I was so young so I brought Larry to him, and they talked. Dr. Black said “Well, he’s not much of a Jew which I felt was a good thing.” So I married a Jew and it was the best thing I had ever done for myself.

Through the years, I developed a respect for the scientific mind which certainly was the description of Larry and his view of life, but after such serious situations as Dr. F’s and being far away from my religious Jewish relatives, my feeling about being Jewish now carried a definite pride. Richards’s quote of Freud at 70, rings true for me. Freud writes, “My language is German. My culture, my attainments are German. I considered myself German intellectually, until I noticed the growth of anti-Semitic prejudice in Germany and German Austria. Since that time, I prefer to call myself a Jew.”

Anti-semitism has been part of my life, but it hasn’t been the greatest part. I had long considered this because I was sheltered by my husband, and anti-Semitism didn’t have as much strength in the world of theatre as it did other places. But after having read Richards’s piece on Freud’s own shift from repudiating his Jewish past to solidifying his identity as a Jew, I’ve reconsidered my experience of anti-Semitism as one that has a particularly gendered bias. On reflection, I noticed that many of the incidents of anti-Semitism have been directed towards men and not me or other women. It made me curious.

What piqued my curiosity was that Larry, who didn’t have what typically is called a semitic look, was the object of anti-Semitic attack, whereas I never encountered anything of the sort. Why? Larry was a calm man and loved with a child on his lap if one was in the room and yet he incurred great wrath from Jew haters again and again. Not only that, but Larry was also a non-believer, never wore a head covering, and never even spoke about religion as it had no place in his life. Not only that but the anti-Semitic professor didn’t just give him a failing grade at the end of the year, he was openly and loudly hostile the entire year, publicly telling him he didn’t belong in medical school. Similarly, Dr. F did not forbid our moving into Dunthorpe as a single issue, he berated him every

chance he had about not being allowed to step foot into Henry Ford hospital as a doctor.

Another example was that years later after Larry's death, I was having a dinner with a holocaust survivor, who was at least fifteen years older than me. He also was also not a terribly semitic looking man. He was well over six foot, totally white-haired. He had lost all of his family in Poland, and had survived because he was young and strong, and told his family in the ghetto would receive more food rations if he signed up to work for Hitler. He did, but they were all killed (as he learned after the war). He spent the war years building factories to look like hospitals and was found near death in a small concentration camp (Dora) no one had heard of, about seventy barely living men with piled up corpses all over. One night we were sitting in a booth at a sushi restaurant, and a man came up to him and said sarcastically that we must be having our own little Chanukah party. It was winter, close to Christmas, not Chanukah at all. He said it was nice of the restaurant to let us in, and we should check the bill carefully as Jews don't like to pay. The man I was with was 95 years old, and I was frightened and only wanted to leave immediately.

I've thought about these incidents, and reading Richards's paper made me see that these attacks on the Jewish man (rather than me or other women) could be a result of Oedipal conflict in which the Jewish victim represents the primal father and the attack is a disguised attempt to win over the woman (me). Also notably, the attacks were always when I was with them, not when they were alone.

Here is where Richards's insights are helpful. He writes that "parricide is the aboriginal source of the psychic institution of conscience ... [and the Jew is] closer psychologically to the forgotten truth of the primal murder." In other words, the anti-Semitism that I experienced was directed towards men both because of Oedipal conflict but also because the Jew is the representative of an older civilization, nearer to the original killing of the primal father. Jews maintain a close affiliation to the past and reliving and rethinking the past is also part of the project of psychoanalysis. The attack on the father is also a replay of the aboriginal source of "the psychic institution of conscience." One of these anti-Semites said to me about my husband, "Is that your father?" It was meant to ridicule but it also implied that I was free and looking for someone. It was an attack on

my husband but it was also an attack on the “institution of conscience.”

Richards’s paper is an oasis of truth in a desert of lies and untruths we are living in today as our country and the western (and eastern) world heads to more religion which I agree is based on fear. But I fear also... that this new terrible uprising will destroy us.

As I read the commentaries, I thank the writers for more insights and analysis does that. It stimulates and forward and deeper we move.



Anti-Semitism: A Study in Group Vulnerability and the Vicissitudes of Group Ideals

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Anti-Semitism is a social, historical even a religious phenomenon; and it may seem presumptuous for a psychoanalyst to address the subject. The analytic method deals not with groups, but with individuals, through free association and the development of an intense relationship, called transference, in a two-person setting. Psychoanalytic hypotheses about group behavior are extrapolations from individual psychology. Yet groups are associations of individuals, and though one must avoid the error of assuming that the group is the individual writ large, some clues about group behavior may be drawn from the understanding of individual motivation. So while I am not historian, sociologist or theologian, I shall dare to hypothesize about anti-Semitism with one deed of entitlement: we are all dealing with the human psychological experience. I will proceed, then, with the hope that there is then some common ground where we can meet to make sense of each other's data.

Anti-Semitism is a very old phenomenon, appearing in the classical world among the Greeks and Romans. Dispersion of the Israelites in the Mediterranean world begins in the 9th century B.C. but anti-Semitism proper is recorded first in the 3rd century B.C. among the Alexandrians (Flannery 1965). Hecatus of Abdera asserts that Moses, "in the remembrance of the exile of his people, instituted for them a misanthropic and inhospitable way of life." Manetho, an Egyptian priest and historian, continues the theme: in addition to revising the Exodus to say that Jews were expelled because they were lepers, he avers that Moses has taught them "not to adore the gods" or "have anything to do with those not of their faith." Numerous authors repeat the charges of aloofness, disdain and non-participation in the common religious practices. A few, such as Apion of Alexandria in the first year of the first century and Tacitus in the last, become veritable founts of hatred and vituperation. Apion repeats the Alexandrian version of the Exodus but adds far more: "The Sabbath originated because a pelvic ailment, incurred as the Jews fled Egypt,

forced them to rest on the seventh day Jews are held under oath ;not to assist strangers, especially Greeks The Jews are reproached for not adoring gods of the city, and for sedition; they are ridiculed for sacrificing animals, abstaining from pork and practicing circumcision. Jews adore the golden head of an ass. They practice ritual murder. They fatten foreigners for ritual sacrifice and cannibalism...”

Almost all the elements of the anti-Semitism of the medieval and modern world are present in these early writers. How does this happen? Is humanity invariably evil? Are Jews invariably perverse? What are the ingredients of the noxious brew, the taste and smell which seem to repeat so reliably?

Psychoanalytic theories may help us out. Recent study of the clinical phenomena of “narcissism” has given rise, especially in the work of Heinz Kohut (Kohut 1971, 1972), to certain ideas about the vicissitudes of the development of self, its maintenance and pathology . Arrogance, intolerance, insensitivity, prejudice, bigotry and relentless revenge are phenomena associated with a traumatized self and its frequent accompaniment, narcissistic rage.

Though not always precisely defined, the self can be understood in simplified terms as the central organization of personality which consists of two poles, the mirroring pole, on the one hand involving conscious and unconscious ambitions and the idealizing pole on the other hand involving conscious and unconscious ideals. The generation of the self occurs in the two-person matrix of parent and child, in which the parent must perform essential psychological functions which both permit and are part of the child’s development of self. For example, the very earliest tensions of the child can be soothed only by an appropriately cognizant parent. We believe that the child does not feel the early experience of tension and soothing as a two-person phenomenon; even the soothing response of the parent is experienced as part of the child’s own self, and helps create the framework of all psychological structure. The early differentiation of self as a coordinated mind/body unit which has continuity in space and time and some degree of cohesion and coherence can occur only through the child’s experience of the parent’s pleasure in that whole self. The self is born in the gleam of the mother’s eye. The response, the gleam, is essential to the generation of the structure and

is experienced as part of it. The child expects to have the same control over such responsiveness as over his or her own body: a control absolute and unquestioning. In the average expectable developmental milieu, the responsiveness is good enough; the pleasure and investment the parent is able to provide mesh reasonably to allow the child to experience the self as whole, loveable and powerful a self-perception exaggerated still more in the adult's recollection of the childhood self. Gradually the self matures to realize its aims and ambitions through work, and to get the gleam from inner satisfaction and from the earned responses to achievement or the loving responses in a relationship of mutuality.

If, however, development is thwarted by delays, absences or peculiarities of response, or by the child's inability to perceive appropriate response, the subsequent adult structure is both brittle and infantile. The apparently arrogant demand for affirmation of perfection or lovability, irrespective of the appropriateness of such a demand or the capacity of another individual to meet it, betrays archaic origins. The frustration of such a demand is the stimulus for narcissistic rage. The lack of desired affirmation is a wrong, which must be righted and avenged at whatever cost. There is no empathy for the offender because he or she cannot be seen as a separate individual, but only a necessary function to complete or maintain the self. The sense of the entitlement of the injured is proportional to the insensitivity to the perpetrator.

Though I have discussed the importance of the affirmation of perfection in the one pole of the self, the mirroring pole, even more pertinent to our subject are the vicissitudes of the idealizing pole. As much as perfection and power may reside in one's self, in a narrow sense, it also resides, whether simultaneously or subsequently, in the other, that is, in the parent. The capacity to experience the parent as an assuring source of omnipotence and protection at the appropriate developmental time, enables the child also to feel strong and secure. Again, this two-person interaction is experienced as part of the self, because it serves crucial internal regulatory needs. The gradual phase-appropriate discovery of imperfections in the omnipotent other results in an internalization of strength and in self-regulating standards and values which become guiding ideals and give power to the conscience. Perfection then resides in one's own personal ideals and values, and as one participates in the larger culture these personal values may become related to the larger systems of values which constitute philosophies or religions.

Damage in the idealizing pole can give rise to the threat of depletion or disintegration and to narcissistic rage, at the discovery of weakness or imperfection in the person or institution which is to supply the inner strength and solidity. Furthermore, arrests and derailments in the mirroring pole can be compensated for by absorption into the idealizing pole. When the two aspects of self-development are telescoped into one, the likely outcome of disappointment in the idealized other is catastrophic disintegration or narcissistic rage. The patient in analysis is likely to show narcissistic rage as the human limitations of the analyst become evident in the therapeutic process. Assassins of public figures and some kinds of revolutionary leaders often act out of the rage engendered by what they experience as traumatic disappointment in the perfection of the person or system they then need to destroy.

Self-development leads naturally into the public sphere, rather than into self-sufficiency or self-enclosure. Ideally, the maturation of our ambitions leads to fulfillable goals which bring us satisfaction and render us less needful of the responsiveness of others, while the internalization of ideals renders us independent of our strength of others; nevertheless, our equilibrium depends on our place in a social matrix. The mutuality of our close relationships derives from early needs for confirmation, while the need for perfection now reposes in work, sports, politics, philosophy and religion rather than in the childhood experience of the parent.

The point of intersection between individual psychological development and the group is the shared ideals or ideology. This is a matter that Freud (1921) merely mentions in addressing himself to the phenomenon of the human group. For the most part he describes the group in terms of its identification with the leader. The members of the group remain bound to each other by their common possession of the leader, acting in a group according to the leader's wishes, even if these conflict with what has been their own conscience, for the leader takes the place of their own ego-ideal. Freud describes the importance of group ties in the violent and chaotic effects of their dissolution, still assuming that integrity is dependent on the leader. When Freud discusses the Church, here too he emphasizes the relationship of the believer to Christ as leader.

Yet human groups exist over time as identifiable entities which can change leaders and still retain their characteristics. Though leaders are

essential, enduring groups also require enduring organizing forces. The sharing of language or history constitutes one such organizing force, but the most powerful appears to be the common ideology. Group ideology lends itself very well to individual psychological needs, offering the opportunity for expansion and stability of the self. It also confers strength and cohesion on the group as a whole, indicating the achievement of a structure perhaps analogous to that found in the mature individual.

However, there is a dynamic within the group which is universally analogous to the development of the individual. For the latter the development of the mirroring pole requires the gleam, the validation of the self by the parent. For the group, the ideal requires validation by the members.

The fury which may then be unleashed is proportional to so dire a threat. The narcissistic rage of the group, like that of the individual, by definition precludes empathy: the offender appears not as an individual or group with needs, motivations, and goals which arise from quite separate or different concerns, but only as a malevolent force whose sole purpose is to destroy one's most precious asset, so the proper response is the obliteration of the danger. All manner of evil is then perceived in the dissenter. Such a phenomenon has often been explained as the projection by the offended party of its own disavowed evil, but in this framework that would be a secondary rather than a primary cause. More pertinently, the malevolence attributed to the dissenter has to do with the narcissistic injury to the group.

In the case, then, of Manetho and Apion, the anti-Semitic rage appears to spring from what they see as the insult of the Jewish group. "They were taught not to have anything to do with those not of their faith"; "they will not adore the gods." They will not, in other words, bear witness to the binding ideal of society, and hence they became seditious. But there is also a slur, specific to this time and not repeated in later expressions of anti-Semitism, that the Jews in Exodus did not flee an oppressive Egyptian Pharaoh, but were expelled from Egypt as lepers. Apion adds that there was something rotten in their pelvis, possibly alluding to venereal disease.

Why this particular form of insult? In the Jewish account of the Exodus, it is, of course, the Egyptians who were the villains, and the final

punishment God wrought on them was the death of their firstborn sons. But here is the Egyptian denial of the insult and the reversal of the slur. It was not Pharaoh who was defeated and degraded, but the Jews. It was not the fruit of the Egyptian, but Jewish loins that was damaged.

The ingredients of the brew become distinguishable. The Jews are seen as a cohesive group living within a host nation, refusing to bear witness to the local gods, but having their own god, a God of gods. The devaluation of perfection of Egyptian ideals could not be more complete. Even the accusation of ritual murder makes a kind of sense, partially as a reference to the insult of the Jews eating separately, but more seriously as symbolizing the threat by alien religious ideology to consume and destroy Egyptian identity.

The distinctiveness and the strong cohesiveness of this alien group is to be explained in large part by the nature of their group ideal, that is, monotheism. Though obviously the content of an ideal, itself, cannot determine its power, some ideals lend themselves better than others to participation in group experience and transformation through time. Monotheism is particularly suitable for both individual and for group needs. Monotheism proclaims that a unitary perfection exists; that one can participate in it; and that it encompasses everything. The very abstractness of the oneness lends itself to the expression of perfection, inclusiveness and absoluteness, and the One by definition includes all others. Hence it establishes for members of the group both a oneness with each other and a superiority over all others. For individuals it offers a haven for developmental needs that require systems of perfection for the maintenance of the personal ideal. For the group which collectively acknowledges such Oneness, the understanding confers a special stature and, hence, the group considers itself chosen. By its abstractness and comprehensiveness, monotheism may constitute a kind of ultimate statement of human ideals. It embodies the essential elements out of which all ideals select parts. In the moral universe it functions like a good theory in science in that it includes all others.

The evolution of monotheism from a primitive desert tribal God took place in an unlikely group, obscure and small by every temporal measure. The magnitude of the insight held by the group led it to notions of itself that were preposterous by any objective measure of its significance

in the ancient world. Nonetheless, the early Biblical Jews expected that the power to which they laid claim would be translated literally into temporal glory. We know the vanity of those claims. In addition to the perennial difficulty the Jews had in governing themselves, they were crushed and scattered by the Babylonians in 597 B.C.E. With the frustration of these illusions of temporal greatness and tribal supremacy, the further evolution of monotheism in the prophets expanded its ethical dimensions and requirements, and further distanced and transformed the expectations of temporal fulfillment.

When the prophets proclaimed that it was not God, the perfection, which was imperfect or defective, but the people, they heightened the ethical demands. Though they have been seen as requiring a masochistic submission to a punishing parent, the prophets manifested the inspired capacity to retain a unifying and dynamic ideal.

Further, they proclaimed that if Israel was stricken now, it would be great in the future. In that period there was forged the Messianic character of Judaism, with its expectation of future redemption and perfection. The Messianic expectation was for an end time, in which there would be political freedom, moral perfection and earthly bliss for the people of Israel in its own land and also for the entire human race. While some prophets spoke of Israel's political power at that time, the majority saw the aim of redemption as the establishment of conditions of peace and security for all nations. Other nations would exalt Israel not because of its superior political power, but because of its superior spiritual and ethical qualities.

Thus the prophets transformed the aspirations of the Jews from those of a politically ascendent national power to a morally distinguished beacon in an increasingly participant world, and led monotheistic Judaism through a crucial step to a universal faith. By this transformation, the national boundaries toward a definition of its evolution to a people were freed from themselves in terms of their Ideal. Both mobility and cohesion were provided by the new definition of the essence of the group in terms of its relationship to its God.

For all the universalist vision and comprehensive scope, this ideal was made in Israel, and the particular stamp that the Jews imprinted made its availability quite limited in practice. The path to God which was an

essential aspect of God himself, and the means of bearing witness to him lay through Torah, through the observance of His law and participation in His nation Israel. One had to practice circumcision and observe the many customs prescribed in Leviticus to be a member of the group. Further, one had to belong to the people and identify with their history. Belief alone was not enough.

Thus the emergence of monotheism and its evolution in Jewish history redefined the nature of the group ideal and increased its binding power, but also raised tension between ethical, universalist and the particularist, nationalist expression. This is the God of all, but he dwells in the house of Israel. The centuries before and after the birth of Christ saw a continuing movement toward universalization with the inclusion of even greater numbers of proselytes and converts and an increasingly metaphorical and spiritual interpretation of Torah and prophets. All in all, Judaism flourished in the Roman Empire, a *religio licita*, the only religion accorded official status outside the state religion itself. Jews lived throughout the Empire and were involved in all walks of life, though there were occasional outbreaks of popular anti-Judaism for the general reason mentioned. Even in the Islamic world, Jews had the opportunity for broad participation, despite periodic restriction and discrimination. The violence of Apion's hatred was to recur only in Christian Europe, and only in the succeeding Christian centuries would Jews be subjected to a sustained and relentless oppression.

The anti-Semitism of Christianity originated in the theological ferment and the crisis of truth and witness in Judaism in the same centuries preceding and following the birth of Christ and the destruction of the Temple (70 C.E.). Within the proliferation of Jewish thought one tendency, the so-called Hellenistic, sought actively to convert the Gentiles and offered a universalist vision of Judaism deemphasizing its nationalistic character. Codified by Philo, it interpreted the Torah as the embodiment of a universal ethical relation to God. The Hellenists attracted large numbers of converts and even more proselytes.

Another important group, the so-called Sectarrians, arose from messianic trends in prophetic Judaism. In response to the oppression of the Roman rule and the obvious impotence of Palestine, these true believers prepared for the imminent apocalypse and the arrival of the Messiah by

a call to repentance. In their view, the established Judaism was unredeemed; only the “true Israel” would be saved by entering anew into the covenant and following the way which established continuity with the past. Baptism, their ritual of initiation, deriving from the mikvah bath, indicated that all people, Jews and Gentiles alike, needed purification in order to enter the covenant and become true Jews. The messianic sects included Essenes, the Zealots, and of course, the Christians.

The Christians allowed far easier access to Judaism than did the Pharisees. Baptism was surely less formidable than circumcision, and belief in Christ more accessible than identification with the national past of the people. Ultimately the great success of Christianity was to lie with the proselytes and Gentiles. It is all the more necessary to remember then, that Christianity arose within Judaism: the teachings of Jesus were consistent with the prophetic tradition, and the Christians were not the only Jewish sect to expect or announce the arrival of the Messiah. Christian Jews proselytized, but the main thrust of their activity was towards their own people, seeking confirmation of their own vision of the transformation of Judaism.

After the fall of the temple in 70 C.E.,¹ the Pharisees moved to consolidate Judaism and by 90 A.D., the daily liturgy of the eighteen benedictions, the *Shemoneh-Esreh*, included a curse against the dissenting groups, invoking their destruction unless they returned to the convent. This was a definitive rebuff to Christians and other messianic groups, as well as groups such as the Sadducees who rejected the Pharisees’ development of oral law and denied the validity of resurrection. It was a rejection of the Christian vision of the meaning of Judaism and the Christian way to Israel’s God through belief in Christ rather than the observance of Torah.

Judaism would not transform itself; it would not bear witness to the Christian truth. Christians could not be Jews; Jews would not become the Christian version of what it was to be Jewish. In the Christians’ rage

¹I am indebted to the Catholic theologian, Rosemary Ruether (1974) whose work has formed the basis of my information about the origins of anti-Semitism and whose account I have paraphrased in this summary of the vicissitudes of Judaism and Christianity in the Roman Empire.

and disappointment, Jews became the very embodiment of opposition to the Truth; i.e. they killed Christ. Ruether, searching for the basis of the traditional Christian charge of deicide against the Jews, finds that basis in an alienated and angry Jewish sectarianism which believed it was founded on the true cornerstone of God's people, but found itself rebuffed and rejected at every stage by the synagogue... The anti-Judaic tradition in Christianity grew as a negative need to legitimate its revelation in Jewish terms... It continues on in the Church Fathers even to this day, as an on-going expression of this same need by the Church to legitimate its Christological midrash by insisting that this actually represents the true meaning of the Jewish Scriptures and is the divinely intended fulfillment of Moses, the Psalms and the Prophet.

Modern scholarship has ascertained marked change in the tone of the Gospels after that confrontation. In John, (1979) for example, the Jews are named more frequently and in more and more pejorative contexts. The Johannine version of the trial of Jesus is the most inflammatory of the Gospels. Here the Jews—named angrily as Jews—clamor for Jesus' crucifixion, and significantly their rage is roused precisely by Jesus' claim of divinity: it is for the blasphemy for saying he is the Son of God that he must die. Thus the depiction of the Jews as killers of Christ begins in response to Jewish rejection of the Christian vision.

We can certainly understand the Jews reasons for that rejection, when accepting the Christian version would have meant a drastic change in their relationship to their identity as a people. The religious structure would have been radically altered, for belief in Christ would have replaced the way of the Torah, and that was tantamount to superseding the Jewish truth with a superior one. The Christian demand meant a dismantling of the Ideal and hence was a threat to the cohesion of the group. If the group was threatened even more by the destruction of the Temple, the literal dwelling of the Lord, it closed ranks against all other traumatic disturbances of the equilibrium.

For the Christians, however, this was an even greater trauma. They failed in their bid for validation from the group from whom they issued and toward whom they turned: the most significant, indeed the only worthy witnesses to their truth, deemed them apostates. Theologically secure, the Jews turned their back upon the illegitimate issue and continued

remodeling their religious structure along the lines laid down by the Pharisees. The Christians, however, from then on, had to devote a significant part of their apologia to rejecting and anathematizing the Jews and elaborating on the Jewish rejection of Christ.

The epithet, “killer of Christ,” that became a battle cry for Jewish massacre from the Roman world to the Crusades in the eleventh and twelfth centuries to the Russian pogroms of the nineteenth—that epithet was born with Christianity itself, and its origins lay in the traumatic injury to the nascent ideal. Throughout Christian history, the Jewish presence would be a necessary one, since only the Jews could validate the Christian Ideal, and the conversion of the Jew was to be one of the essential signs of the Second Coming and Christianity’s historical fulfillment. So the Jewish presence must remain; yet, so long as it remained and so long as the Jews refused to validate the Christian truth, Christian existence was bound into a struggle with the Jew for possession of the same ground—the same Ideal. Thus in the formation of Christianity there recurred the same narcissistic rage as Egyptian was evident in Apion, the Egyptian. Two other factors would be duplicate to the Egyptian situation: Christianity would become dominant ideology and the Jews would be resident within the Christian culture. In 323 C.E. with the conversion of Constantine, Christianity established itself as the official religion of the Roman Empire. If a universalist ethical monotheism was required for the rejuvenation and transformation of the ancient world, Christianity was far more suitable than Judaism. For with the former there was no conflict of temporal identities. The Roman world could retain its history and believe in Christ. The temporal grandeur of Rome could be matched by the spiritual and religious grandeur of a universalist faith in a man, Jesus the Christ, whose nationality was trivial. But Rome could not bow to Israel.

Momentous consequences flowed from the Christian conversion of the Roman Empire: transformed from a persecuted minority to the dominant majority, the Christian group could translate its ideology into custom and law. Christian rage and narcissistic injury matured in progressive restrictions on Jews, with the purpose of defending Christian truth, avoiding further narcissistic injury to the Christianity or inflicting similar injury on the Jews. The Codex Theodosianus, completed in 438, retained official protection for Jews in the Empire, but forbade them to

proselytize. They could not own Christian slaves or convert their own slaves to Judaism. The decree was the first to strike significantly at the economic and professional status of the Jews: without slaves they could not continue in agriculture and industry. Moreover, they were now barred from public office and from the legal profession.

After the fall of Rome, the fortunes of the Jews varied with the political and social climate of the area. Everywhere they were accorded second-class status, and in some places were subject to forced baptism and/or exile. With the consolidation of the Christian world in the Middle Ages, the Jews' position deteriorated even further.

Bands of Crusaders in the eleventh century slaughtered communities of Jews in France, Germany, Bohemia and finally Palestine, and the Crusaders' violence was continued by the mobs. Though the Jewish communities recovered somewhat in the succeeding century, the provisions of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 set the stage for their social and cultural decline: usury was restricted; Jews were forbidden to appear in public at Easter and were still barred from public office; Jews and Saracens were to wear distinctive dress. From then on, as badges were imposed in various parts of Europe, the inferior and alien status of the Jews was progressively entrenched in law, custom and culture; and they were periodically taxed, attacked, expelled and slaughtered. Eventually, they lost all status in feudal society and became the property of the local ruling prince. Decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council made the Inquisition inevitable, for they insisted that Jews must not rise above a deeply subordinate position in European society. Eventually Christianity would have to rectify the ascendancy the Jews had won in Spain in a culture initially Islamic, and the violence of their fall would be proportionate to their previous height.

It may appear paradoxical that the medieval persecution of the Jews was set on by Christianity not in one of its more vulnerable periods but in a stage of resurgence and expansion. The Crusades were organized by a newly militant faith to reconquer Jerusalem from Islam. By the time of the Fourth Lateran Council, the Church was at the height of its power. Innocent III was one of the most powerful and effective Popes ever to hold office, and he moved with utter ruthlessness to exterminate the heretical Albigensians in Southern France. The Church could then more

definitively impose on the Jew the inferior status that prior injury and the historical process demanded. But at the same time, the need to put down Jews was all the more urgent. The Christian world, in a period of expansion which brought it into conflict with the other major religious culture, Islam, found it imperative to maintain the internal integrity of its Ideal.

As a dissenting religion, Judaism was unique, in that it could not be confined within a territory of its own. Islam and Christendom, Eastern Orthodox and Catholicism, all constituted groups with conflicting versions of monotheistic truth which could not live together in the same space, but had each its own territory. Even the later upheavals of the Reformation finally regrouped Protestant and Roman Catholic ideologies in separate regions. But the Jewish-Christian conflict could not permit such a resolution. Had they the means to defend themselves, the Jews might have engaged in a holy war and established security for their ideology within their own territory, but without that power, obliged to live in the midst of a group whose cohesion was bound to an antipathetic version of the universalist ideal, the Jews remained an irritating and sometimes frightening presence. The periodic expulsion of Jews from one or another part of Europe and their eventual enclosure in ghettos might be understood as spasmodic attempts to accomplish separation, but all these efforts were likely to make the Jews' alien presence more concentrated, and do little to relieve the Christians' sense of being invaded.

Behind all Christian complaints about specific Jewish offences, such as their activity in usury, behind the use of the Jew as the convenient scapegoat for social and economic ills, their lay the deeper religious injury—that the Jew had “killed Christ.” Their presence was necessary to Christianity, and, at the same time, an unavoidable threat to Christian truth and Christian civilization. It was not an accident that the Jews became second-class citizens in the Christian world, condemned to the same exclusion and inferiority they had inflicted in another way on Christianity. Though the social and historical injury to the Jews was far greater than the comparable Christian experience, the narcissistic injury done to the Christians made them unrelenting avengers.

In the long history of western Christendom, the Jew became the very

symbol of the invalidator of the Ideal-questioner, free-thinker, dissenter. It did not matter then, when Nietzsche pronounced that God was dead. When primary investment shifted from religious to secular ideals, the Jew now became the threat to the body politic. Hitler's view of the Jew as the destroyer of German power and glory resonated all too clearly the age-old view of Jew as killer of Christ. Traditionally the target of narcissistic rage from the injury to Christianity the Jew was the suitable object of the German's rage over their shattered national pride. The German Reich, adhering to an Ideal both post-Christian and pagan, was, however, willing to annihilate the offending separatist: it had no further need for Jewish witness.

Anti-Semitism is a symptom of a historical process in which humanity's reach for a universal binding ideal has failed. That the attempt has caused suffering and hardship to western civilization is demonstrated unequivocally. Does that mean that the attempt to find the universal Ideal is fad and should be given up? Now, more than ever, humanity needs the capacity to bind its members to each other in recognition of interdependence. Our very survival depends on mutual identification. Can the understanding of the human need for the creation of the Ideal enable us to reconstruct and maintain a vision which does not coerce or victimize? Perhaps the recognition of the need for unity and an understanding of the human dimensions of our ideals would make that possible. When the Messiah will come, no one knows. But if we don't create him, the Angel of death will come in his place.

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Personal Liberation Dreams and the Study of Religion: Response to Arnold Richards's "The Need Not To Believe: Freud's Godlessness Reconsidered"

Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi

1. The Art and the Artist

The first question about any theoretical venture is its usability for the audience, as reflected in publications and citations. It may surprise some psychoanalysts, but in the twenty-first century, Sigmund Freud's ideas about religion are of more than historical interest.

Freud expected his theories to be tested in clinical work, but academic researchers had other ideas, starting in the 1920s. Here is the view of a leading researcher: "Freud's writings should be taken as a series of observations, some of which are worth converting into testable hypotheses" (Bulbulia, 2013, p. 125). These observations are still being applied not only in psychology, but also among anthropologists and sociologists (Beit-Hallahmi, 2010, 2015; Belzen, 2010; Bulbulia, 2013; Hood, 2010; Ladd, Spilka, & McIntosh, 2011).

We know that Freud's observations (1907) about private obsessive symptoms and public religious rituals are still deemed relevant to students of ritual (Boyer & Liénard, 2008; Liénard & Boyer, 2006), and have led to some interesting studies of clinical and non-clinical populations (Fiske & Haslam, 1997; Hobson et al., 2018; Previc, 2006; Tek & Ulug, 2001; Tolin et al., 2001).

It might surprise analysts even more to learn that Freud's idea of the primal crime (1913) has been cited by generations of anthropologists, even though they never accepted its reality, or the notion of it being the starting point for religion and culture. These included A.L. Kroeber, Ernest Becker, Meyer Fortes, Margaret Mead, Robin Fox, and Derek Freeman. Most recently, evolutionary anthropologists and biologists have regarded the sons' bloody rebellion as the beginning of democracy (Beit-Hallahmi, 2015).

Thus, these consumers of Freudian ideas have responded positively to the art and found nothing controversial in it. They did not care if somebody considered these writing (Freud, 1907, 1913) to be attacks on religion.

Richards mentions *Totem and Taboo* as “targeting” the Communion. This ritual raises substantive issues which and most researchers are happy to ignore. Why is a mythical human sacrifice celebrated through imaginary cannibalism? Did the Communion appear because of a pre-historical killing, or because of persistent tensions and conflicts, pressing to be resolved? Freud’s (1913) theory may be farfetched and impossible to prove, but more parsimonious explanations are not being offered anywhere. The Communion remains a challenge and an enigma.

Is religion being targeted or under attack? All the human sciences are a threat to religion because they treat religion as a natural phenomenon, and not as a representation of a special reality or a special mode of knowledge. To add insult to injury, they study changes in culture over time and space, and show time and again that beliefs and customs, including religious ones, are relative and culturally conditioned. Even without psychoanalysis, any scholarly discussion of religion is an affront to the believers. It is subversive, deconstructive, and reductive, a most serious threat (Segal, 1989).

In Freud’s case, the attack on religion, or the analysis of religion, started in 1901, when he spelled out a theory of religion based on the mechanism of projection: “I believe that a large part of the mythological view of the world, which extends a long way into the most modern religions, is nothing but psychology projected into the external world.... One could venture to explain in this way the myths of paradise and the fall of man, of God, of good and evil, of immortality, and so on, and to transform metaphysics into metapsychology” (Freud, 1901, pp. 258–259).

Asking questions about the artist’s, or the theorist’s, motives is indeed the order of the day when we are curious about the lives of great artists such as Leonardo, Michelangelo, Tolstoy, or Faulkner, as well as major historical figures. Freud’s stature puts him in the list of creative minds whose motivations will be examined closely by historians and biographers. Moreover, Freud himself was involved in more than one

psychobiographical exercise, and so is fair game, so to speak.

More has been written about Freud's motives and personal life than about other classical theorists of religion (and fellow atheists) such as J.G. Frazer or Émile Durkheim, first because he is better known and second because so much documentation is available. The only exception is Karl Marx. Even in the twenty-first century, the motivations of atheists are in question, and much less is made of religious propagandists such as C.S. Lewis or Thomas Merton.

Our unquenchable curiosity about private writings, private thoughts, and private deeds feeds what social psychologists call social comparison (the process of looking at other lives publicly presented as compared to my own) and what psychoanalysts call idealization and especially de-idealization.

Richards (2022) raises two psychobiographical questions about Freud's work on religion. First, why was Freud so militant about his atheism, and second, how much of Freud's ideas about religion can be accounted for by his Jewish heritage? Freud's Jewishness has been discussed ad nauseum, but Richards should be congratulated for his original contribution, which is backed by new documentation. Rejecting the stereotypical attempts to seek causes of adult behavior in early childhood, Richards regards Freud's motives as stemming from social solidarity and representing maturity.

2. New and Old Atheists

How was Freud's work related to his atheism? Becoming an atheist, or being an atheist, does not require any special knowledge or training, and certainly not a theory about religion. Freud did not become an atheist after developing a theory about religion, but at a young age. Later on, when he started theorizing about human behaviour, he responded to the challenge of explaining why most of humanity clings to what he considered illusions and delusions.

Richards asks why Freud did not keep his atheism under wraps.

Was Freud a militant atheist, and if so, how? Most questions about militancy are related to political struggles, where militants, by definition, take risks and invest psychic energy in attempts to change the world

around them. Today, atheists in India, or in Moslem-majority countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Saudi Arabia, are taking enormous risks, and sometimes lose their lives, when they make their views public. Freud was not taking any such risks. Even a Godless Jew could speak his mind in Europe in the early twentieth century, unmolested. It might be said that anti-Semites did not care about whether a Jew was devout or not, but T.S. Eliot warned that: "...reasons of race and religion combine to make any large numbers of free-thinking Jews undesirable... if one wants to maintain or develop a society in which a Christian tradition can flourish" (Eliot, 1934, pp. 19–20). Freud was just one of many such Jews.

Bonaparte (1958) argued that psychoanalysis naturally leads to realism and atheism. At the same time, she pointed out that such realism is also a form of sublimated sadism. The voice of the debunker is indeed full of arrogance and superiority over his gullible fellow men.

Freud was ready to ask impolite questions about any materials presented in support of religion. Here is one such response: "God, as we know, allows horrors to take place of a kind very different from the removal to a dissecting-room of the dead body of a pleasant-looking old woman. This has been true at all times, and it must have been so while my American colleague was pursuing his studies. Nor, as a medical student, can he have been so sheltered from the world as to have known nothing of such evils" (1928, p. 170).

Freud's starting point in questioning this report is one of common sense. The next step is an interpretation which is counter-intuitive and speculative. We don't have to accept the interpretation in order to appreciate the basic question and the inquisitive attitude. Freud's convert reports that his trigger was seeing a woman's body on the way to dissection, (which got him to think bitterly about God permitting such evil in this world). Freud asked why is it that the "The problem of evil" serves as a trigger for change on some occasions and not on others, while the presence of evil in our life is permanent. Life-transforming moments should be scrutinized within the whole span of the transformed life.

3. Intellectualism and Atheism

Research, starting in the early twentieth century, found that eminent academics, who are marked by intellectualism, i.e., a total commitment

to scholarship and high levels of analytical, non-intuitive thinking, keep their distance from religion. This has been summarized by Feist and Gorman (1998, p. 13): “Scientists in general, and eminent scientists in particular, are conspicuous in ... , an almost complete absence of current religious faith.”

Since the nineteenth century, an international intellectual elite, committed to the life of the mind, and made up of creative and highly secular individuals, has been very much in existence.

This low religiosity does not appear in individual academics during the years of academic training, but results from the tendency of those already lower in religiosity to select an academic career (Beit-Hallahmi, 2015). The early experiences of a gifted child in an environment that values academic achievement and independence would lead to the choice of an academic or professional career. Curiosity, intellectualism, critical or skeptical thought, and/or personal dedication to a branch of knowledge could be recognized by age 18 in many adolescents, and some of these qualities emerge much earlier. Age 16 was a turning point, with future academics switching to a religious nonaffiliated status at that age.

The family atmosphere plays a role. Fathers represent authority and tradition, and in traditional families they make crucial decisions. This was the case in the Freud family of Vienna in 1865, when the father, Jakob, decided to send his son to a public, secular, school and not to a Jewish one. Strictly Orthodox education was certainly available in Vienna then, as it is even today.

If we compare religiosity (or political views) in parents and children, continuity is the rule (Beit-Hallahmi, 2015). Conflict is tied to discontinuity, when children rebel against parental authority. This may take the form of apostasy, but also of hyper-religiosity. In the case of Jakob and Sigmund, there was no conflict, and we might speculate that the son was acting out paternal wishes.

Another phenomenon is the child who goes further than his parents in a liberal direction. The continuity and radicalization hypothesis was supported by research on United States youth in the 1960s, which found that politically liberal parents raised radical children.

4. How outspoken are academics about their absence of religious beliefs?

Francis Collins, MD, PhD is the most outspoken Christian among eminent scientists today. His personal prestige and charisma make him highly effective, and universally liked. His motivation is never in question, but he is still the exception to the rule.

Non-believers are often ambivalent about speaking out. Max Perutz (1914–2002), Nobel Laureate in chemistry, was born in Vienna to Jewish parents, who baptized him as Roman Catholic. In later years, he was known for being an atheist who did not want to offend believers. Still, letting his atheism be a matter of public knowledge was a message by itself.

If most academics are non-believers, as we know, they are even less outspoken than Perutz. A few well-known academics have taken a stand. Linus Pauling (1901–1994), who has been called greater than Leonardo, and won the Nobel Prize twice, denied being a militant atheist, but did not hide his position. Stephen Hawking (1942–2018) was a world-famous physicist, who discussed his atheism on several occasions and has been bitterly attacked by defenders of religion. Jacques Monod (1910–1976), Nobel Laureate the Physiology or Medicine, was outspoken about his atheism. Noam Chomsky dismissed religion in the following way: “...if you ask me whether or not I’m an atheist, I wouldn’t even answer. I would first want an explanation of what it is that I’m supposed not to believe in, and I’ve never seen an explanation.” (Chomsky, 2002) The biologist Richard Dawkins is, of course, the best-known atheist in the world, and the leading New Atheist.

In psychology, some of the names known to every Psychology 101 student have been atheists, such as Chomsky, Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, and B.F. Skinner. Maslow appeared in public to be sympathetic to religion, but in his private writings heaped scorn on believers. I once attended a public appearance by Carl Rogers, in which he demonstrated Unconditional Positive Regard and unlimited patience. When a member of the audience thought that Rogers shared with him a belief in a “personal God,” Rogers became furious, and his audience stunned. So, Freud is in good company.

As made clear above, once you start studying religion, not offending the believers is impossible. It has been said, wisely, that religion is fiction with authority (Boyer, 2008). There are tens of thousands of religions, offering many authorities and many fictions. If you do not accept any authority, all you have is fiction. It does not matter if the story is about Osiris, Moses, Jehovah, Jesus, Muhammad, Krishna, or Buddha, it is purely fictional and may be interpreted as reflecting wishes and anxieties (Beit-Hallahmi, 2010, 2019, 2023).

Richards writes about *Moses* (p. 5) “...where shockingly Freud even sought to dispose of the idea that Moses had been Jewish.” “Moses” is purely fictional, and the idea that “Moses” was Jewish is part of the fiction. What is Jewish about the “Moses” myth is that it was created by Judean scribes and became part of the Jewish tradition. Bible scholars ask questions about the creation of the myth, finalized in the third century BCE, not about any reality behind it (Ben-Zvi, 2019; Schellekens, 2022; Zlotnick-Sivan, 2004).

That is why *Moses and Monotheism* is Freud’s most resounding failure. Generalizations and psychological insights contained in the book are still of value, but the main thesis reflects a shocking naivete and ignorance of earlier Freudian ideas. Freud (1908) introduced the idea of the family romance, which is relevant to the myth of Moses, as to many others. In Rank (1914) Moses is mentioned as a typical birth-of-the-hero myth, and in the 1915–1916 *Introductory Lectures* Moses is mentioned again as a myth.

Freud’s identification with Moses might have caused a regression to childhood and a commitment to tradition. The atheist stance was forgotten. Why is monotheism an achievement? Why is one god better than 700? Biblical mythology about the Exodus was taken to be historical, and Judaism regarded as a source of pride and even chauvinism. This leads to references to Jewish intellectuality and ethical standards as superior and unique.

Growing anti-Semitism and the reality of the Nazi threat might have caused this reaction in Freud, as he was working on *Moses* in the 1930s. His last book was affected by anxiety and vigilance. Jews, despised and persecuted, soon to be hunted, could find consolation in the memory of

imagined past greatness. Such claims to greatness are common. In *A La Recherche du Temps Perdu*, the narrator Marcel ridicules Jews who claim Jesus, the mythological founder of Christianity, as one of their own (Proust, 1954). In *Ulysses*, we see Leopold Bloom doing just that: “Mendelsson was a Jew and Karl Marx and Mercadante and Spinoza. And the Saviour was a Jew...Christ was a Jew like me” (Joyce, 1986, p. 280). This takes place right after Bloom’s attempt to define himself as being Irish fail to persuade his companions.

The Hebrew Bible, written in post-exilic times, was the result of a similar process. Defeated, powerless, Judeans invented stories of triumph over Pharaoh and the conquest of Canaan, including genocidal fantasies. Compensatory dreams of past and future glory fuel nationalism everywhere. Here is what one expert writes: “Nationalism ... usually seems to be caused by wounds, some form of collective humiliation” (Berlin, 1972, p. 17).

5. The 100 Years Plan for The Freud Family

In his writings, Freud shared with the world the way he was coping with the burden of Jewishness and his shame about his cowardly (or simply helpless) father. His honesty is commendable. In his private life, Freud was determined to save his descendants from the terrible fate of being Jewish.

The problem with being Jewish was twofold. First, Jewish identity was a stigma and a misfortune. Beyond that, it was a religious identity, tied to rituals which Freud considered barbaric. For modern Jews distance from the past was measured by adherence to the rites of passage and to the sacred calendar. For Freud the mere content of beliefs and rituals, which for some Jews has been associated with warm feelings of ties to home and ancestry, was only a source of alienation. There was nothing attractive about them.

Handling Jewishness in Freud’s stoic manner meant a readiness to carry the burden of being socially identified as a Jew, together with avoiding any investment in either religious tradition, or in the modern incarnation of Jewishness as nationalism. Jewishness was a social fact, not something to be kept and preserved. “My parents were Jews, and I have remained a Jew myself.” (Freud, 1925, p. 7).

Jewish rites of passage (or holidays) were for Freud something he could not tolerate. He could analyze them as an observer, but not take part in any of them. In 1886, “Freud thought of joining the Protestant ‘Confession’ so as to be able to marry without having the complicated Jewish ceremonies he hated so much” (Jones, 1957, Vol. 1, p. 167). Then, when he had three sons, he did not have them circumcised. And when the time came, Freud’s funeral ceremony, at Golder’s Green Crematorium in North London, was devoid of anything Jewish or religious.

The model Sigmund Freud presented at his home was one of total secularity, which meant giving up any vestiges of Jewishness, because those were bound to be of a religious nature. Even the most minimally defined Jewish identity meant, for most individuals, some traces of religion. Among relatively secularized Jews, those who want to convey a symbolic sense of Jewish identity to the next generation still celebrate some holidays and some rites of passage, especially circumcision. Freud was quite strict in staying away from such symbolic or material gestures.

The message Freud passed on to his children was unmistakable: Don’t be Jewish! This message was conveyed through daily life and explicit enough words. And so, within three generations, the distance from tradition has grown and the descendants of Jakob and Amalia Freud became non-Jews.

The case of the Freud family (or clan) is a good one to look at in assessing the success of integration into European society, as envisioned by Sigmund Freud. His descendants, most of whom live in Britain, are cosmopolitan Europeans, members in good standing of the First World elite, and mostly indifferent to either Jewishness or Zionism. We don’t know much about many of them, and may not wish to invade their privacy, but some are public personalities. The best known among the grandchildren of Sigmund and Martha Freud were the brothers Lucian (1922–2011) and Clement Freud (1924–2009). When it comes to Jewishness, the two brothers (who became totally estranged in 1954) chose separate, but equally distant paths. Lucian, whose identity was clearly tied to art, denied any connection to Jewishness, and when Sir Clement Freud (knighted in 1987) was once listed among the Jewish members of the House of Commons, where he served 1973–1983, he was quick to correct the error. He had been a member of the Anglican Church

since his marriage in 1950 (Grunberger, 2001). His parents, Ernst and Lucie Freud, as atheists, refused to attend the church wedding, but did attend the reception that followed (Freud, 2001).

The next generation of British Freuds, the great-grandchildren, includes accomplished novelists, TV personalities and wealthy entrepreneurs such as Matthew Freud and Lord David Freud, who may be the only Zionist in the clan (Freud, 2008). Among the North American grandchildren, Sophie Freud made a name for herself as an articulate critic of her grandfather. One of her sons is a likely Nobel Laureate in economics.

The message of avoiding Jewishness was not rare among intellectuals of Jewish descent. If we look at the list of prominent psychoanalytic thinkers since Freud, we discover that those of Jewish descent chose the same tack. They did not want to be known as Jews and did not want their children to be Jewish. If we look at the life of Melanie Klein (Grosskurth, 1986), Erik Erikson (Falk, 1975-76; Friedman, 2000), or Heinz Kohut (Strozier, 2004), the picture is identical. All these well-known theoreticians of psychoanalysis wanted to cleanse their lives from any traces of Jewish identity. It was not a matter of ambivalence, but of total aversion.

Heinz Kohut, who was born in Vienna in 1913, decided after 1945, while living in Chicago, to assume a gentile identity. Kohut's actions regarding his Jewish ancestry seem the most baffling thing about his private and public persona. He was born to Jewish parents in Vienna, but since coming to the United States described himself as half-Jewish or as a gentile. Later on, he described himself as Christian, and attended church.

Kohut called himself Christian and was a member of a Unitarian congregation in Chicago for many years, but most Unitarians do not refer to themselves as Christian. Kohut wanted to call himself a Christian, apparently for the sake of appearances and for his son, who should not know of the curse of Jewishness among his ancestors (Strozier, 2004).

After the Holocaust, who among us could judge Kohut and other Jews who made the same decision?

Sigmund Freud seemed to have been proud of his stoic acceptance of personal Jewishness (Freud, 1925). Still, some may suggest that Freud's 100-year plan reflects a loss of nerve and is really no different than

Kohut's one generation plan. Who among us can judge Freud, who wished his descendants to escape persecution, hoping for their survival in a better world?

6. Freud's Impatience

Freud was impatient with humanity, telling fellow humans to give up illusions and grow up as soon as possible.

"The whole thing is so patently infantile, so foreign to reality, that to anyone with a friendly attitude to humanity it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view of life" (Freud, 1930, p. 74).

Freud was a spokesman for Enlightenment humanism, promoting a vision of autonomy and freedom. Like others, he regarded religion as a roadblock to progress. He sounded like Karl Marx and other Enlightenment thinkers when, during a visit to Rome in 1901, he wrote: "I found almost intolerable the lie of salvation which rears its head so proudly to heaven" (Masson, 1985, p. 449). Religious salvation was a lie and should be exposed as such. Even if it does bring temporal relief, for Freud and Marx it dooms humanity to eternal damnation, because progress must follow truth and nothing but the truth.

While denouncing the lie that religion is, Freud had no misconceptions about the impact of his own work. His writings posed no danger to the status quo and will not corrupt the mind of any believers: "There is no danger of a devout believer's being overcome by my arguments and deprived of his faith" (1927, pp. 57–58).

As noted above, Freud was able to express his views because of historical secularization in Europe. Public atheism in the West was a consequence of secularization, not its cause. What led to secularization were major historical changes over centuries, including new social classes, the Reformation, and the Thirty-Year War, not to mention industrialization and technological developments.

Atheist intellectuals are impatient with the way individuals stay loyal to religious identities inherited from parents even when they no longer believe or practice anything related to those identities. They don't understand the power of identity, the sense of belonging and the feeling of

superiority and certainty. These intellectuals are willing to give up such an identity because they have an individual sense of superiority and certainty thanks to their intelligence and intellectualism. Like Sigmund Freud, they were admired as children for their talents and did not need group belonging to support their self-esteem. Such intellectuals are rarely committed nationalists and may be suspicious of most ideologies.

If they dream of changing humanity's fate, it is, for Freud, by increasing knowledge about human desires. Does increasing psychological knowledge work? We are still unsure.

Freud's dream was a world where "Jew and Christian ought to meet on the common ground of irreligion and humanity" (Wortis, 1954, p. 144). Cutting off all ties to Jewish tradition was the only way to create a better world, with as little religion as possible. The humanist, stoic, way was not just a matter of ideals, but of everyday practice. This clearly could lead only to total integration (or "assimilation"). It is possible that he wanted all of humanity to be reborn as realistic, moral, human beings without neurotic practices and religious illusions, but then he was wishing for a human liberation, rather than just a Jewish one.

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Power, Submission, Freedom and the Creation of Psychoanalysis

William Greenstadt

Arnold Richards's penetrating and sophisticated analysis of Freud's self-avowed identity as a "Godless Jew" focuses on the persistent creation of a sense of self as a "Man of Science." Science is the "religion" to which Freud adhered with unremitting tenacity, and, like Moses, and for the Greeks, Zeus, gave birth to a great idea—a heroic campaign—in the pursuit of which was born a child of the intellect—Psychoanalysis.

Richards's analysis centers on the formation of Freud's identity as it concerns itself with his relationship to his father, Jacob Freud, and its unconscious oedipal matrix. In this account the determining factor in the emergence of Freud's atheistic, tenaciously-held beliefs, is this paternal relationship. The god of the Jews—Jahweh—and his heroic offspring Moses, may be thought of as mythical representations of the father and son. Richards appears to have linked the quintessentially Jewish myth with Freud's discovery of its central impetus—the oedipus complex.

But an integral precursor of the oedipus complex, as Freud and many have further discovered, is the pre-oedipal relation to the mother. Beneath the oedipus complex, as a relatively late-developing mental structure, is the pre-oedipal foundation of the self and identity-building interaction with the mother.

Accordingly, I would like to dwell for a moment on the role of Freud's mother in the formation of his scientific and atheistic identity. As Richards and others point out, Freud seems to have made a bit of a mystery of his relationship with Amalie, although Jones describes her as a lively, youthful woman, and a doting mother to Sigmund (Jones, 1953).

The Moses legend describes the foundation of a nation with a distinctive character (in particular, monotheism): from an undifferentiated mass of degraded slaves to a proud, distinctive and conquering culture. In

particular, it is necessary to acknowledge what preceded the monotheistic cult of the Hebrews. In the multi-lingual collection of tribes in the Near East region and beyond, the polytheistic belief-systems appeared to be the rule. In addition, many of the most revered and powerful gods were female.¹ In some of these religions and cults, the male servants of the goddess (priests) engaged in *self-castration*.²

As a departure from the father-centered interpretation of Freud's atheism, I wish to turn attention to the myth of the gestation and birth of the Greek father-god, Zeus,³ who was saved from death by the deceptive agency of his *mother*, Rhea. In this myth Cronus was threatened by being overthrown by his children, but Rhea saved them by substituting rocks

¹Wigington, P. (2021). Mother Goddesses. *Wikipedia*.

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²The cult of Cybele, also known as Magna Mater, would be part of Rome's fabric until its Christianization. Her statue was paraded through the streets annually, accompanied by long-haired priests...and flagellating themselves with whips... These priests were the Galli.

The Galli differentiated themselves from Rome's civic religion through their clothing and behavior. After entering the cult and castrating themselves, the Galli wore the clothing and jewelry of a Roman woman. *Wikipedia*.

³Zeus, in ancient Greek religion, chief deity of the pantheon, a sky and weather god who was identical with the Roman god Jupiter. His name may be related to that of the sky god Dyaus of the ancient Hindu Rigveda. Zeus was regarded as the sender of thunder and lightning, rain, and winds, and his traditional weapon was the thunderbolt. He was called the father (i.e., the ruler and protector) of both gods and men.

According to a Cretan myth that was later adopted by the Greeks, Cronus, king of the Titans, upon learning that one of his children was fated to dethrone him, swallowed his children as soon as they were born. But Rhea, his wife, saved the infant Zeus by substituting a stone wrapped in swaddling clothes for Cronus to swallow and hiding Zeus in a cave on Crete. There he was nursed by the nymph (or female goat) Amalthea and guarded by the Curetes (young warriors), who clashed their weapons to disguise the baby's cries. After Zeus grew to manhood he led a revolt against the Titans and succeeded in dethroning Cronus, perhaps with the assistance of his brothers Hades and Poseidon, with whom he then divided dominion over the world. *Britannica*.

as Cronus was preparing to eat them.⁴ An elaboration of this myth, regarding it as an unconscious fantasy, identifies Zeus as a quintessential male—the father of mankind. He is, then, among his other attributes, both phallic and oedipal. But in this myth, it is the mother who exhibits the courageous defiance (albeit, through the means of deception) to save the product of her femaleness—her children.

Two myths, however, raise some ambiguity about Zeus' hyper-masculine identity. Athena, a major goddess in the Greek pantheon, was, in one version of the myth of her origin, born from Zeus's forehead—we might say as the product of his intellect.⁵ In another myth, Zeus completes the gestation of Dionysus by carrying him sewn into his thigh.⁶ I am calling attention to the male's wish to take for himself the power belonging to the mother.

Male envy and female magic—procreative powers—are perhaps contained in these myths.

These two fragments suggest that heroic or great ideas emerge, narcissistically, from a male's deep, and often renounced identification with his mother.⁷ A possible inference is that in the mythical (infantile fantasy)

⁴This theme of being saved by the mother also appears in the Biblical myth of Jacob's obtaining the "fatherhood" by a deception initiated by his mother. *Genesis* 27.

⁵In Greek mythology, Athena was believed to have been born from the forehead of her father Zeus. In some versions of the story, Athena has no mother and is born from Zeus' forehead by parthenogenesis.

⁶Zeus rescued the fetal Dionysus, however, by sewing him into his thigh (whence the epithet Eiraphiotes, 'insewn', of the Homeric Hymn). A few months later, Dionysus was born. This leads to his being called "the twice-born". *Wikipedia*.

Among the attributes of Dionysus is his supposed "femininity". He was the god celebrated in the ecstatic rites of Athenian women. Aristophanes wrote a comedy based on this mythic theme: *Thesmophoriazusae* or *The Women Celebrating the Thesmophoria*.

⁷K.R. Eissler. 1971. *Talent and Genius*. New York Times: Quadrangle Books. P. 291: "As Kris (1931) has pointed out, one observes in very creative personalities an acceptance of passivity and femininity. It is highly probable that this had also been Freud's problem prior to his journey to Paris [Charcot], but he apparently solved it, whereas in talented males one can observe, over and over again, how

father Zeus “steals” the procreative and gestational power of Hera, for which she is eternally cursed with impulses to revenge this theft, and to destroy the stolen offspring. The revenge may well be enhanced by the gender of the baby (male). In this construction, the wronged, vengeful, and envious woman (mother) becomes an object of danger.⁸ She exposes herself to the man-to-be, producing in him an erection. And this “dangerous,” involuntary reaction of tumescence, (passively experienced) may be in danger of the penis being violently abolished by the parents (in the primal scene), or, ambiguously, by the generation of a wish in the boy to protect this source of pleasure by activating an active and omnipotent wish to protect this source of pleasure by (omnipotently) sacrificing it to the source of the “problem”—the mother goddess. Perhaps, in the enactment of this protective self-castration he has identified with the power of the woman (mother) to both produce the “magical” erection as well as to remove it. And this may, in turn, refer to the basic sequence, which appears throughout psychosexual development: need—awareness of need—unpleasure—gratification of the need—and the disappearance of the unpleasure. In the magic world of early childhood this fantasied self-castration and identification with the mother represents a transformation of a *passive* experience of dangerous need-gratification to an *active* solution.

I am suggesting that perhaps an earlier identification with his mother may be included in the formation of Freud’s scientific and atheistic identity. The mother-figure, in unconscious fantasy, contains the power of the origin of “mankind”; and the retention of this “mystery” is an important part of her great power. The woman’s body is not only a representation of the threat of rendering a man weak and powerless (an element in the castration-complex), but it also both fosters and inhibits

⁷(continued) their desperate compensatory fight against the acceptance of another person’s superiority prevents them from optimal use of their potential.

Here we encounter a problem of the greatest consequence, which is pivotal in the comparison of talent and genius. I have briefly touched on the possibility that the growing boy may have identified with the mother, who knows about life and death and has the ability to demonstrate the truth; I have also mentioned that this strongly suggests identification with the life-bearing and life-giving mother.”

⁸Cf., Freud, S. (1922). Medusa’s Head. *Standard Edition*, 18, pp. 273–274.

curiosity, without which gift a person cannot become a scientist. Finding the answer to the problem “Where do I come from?” becomes the paradigmatic question the scientist addresses to Mother Nature. The fear of finding the answer to this secret of the powerful mother and father leads to comforting illusion and delusion—religious belief. One might say that this intimidated individual has intentionally made himself *not-knowing*. But the solution to this fraught question renders the “self-castrated” researcher powerless against the tantalizing mysteries of Nature.

It must be clear to most liberally educated persons that the religion-atheism polarity is really a life and death battle that Freud was propelled by his character to enter. What is it that produces life, and what causes a living thing to die? Richards appropriately applies the tools of psychobiography to answer the question for Freud’s decision to take the side of atheistic science. He calls attention to the prevailing *Bildung* movement, and more specifically, to the spirit of the Phillippson Bible, containing within it the spirit of the Enlightenment. But on a deeper level, the atheism is a product of an intra-psychic conflict about his relationship to his mild, benign and loving father.

On the other hand, Freud calls attention to his father’s judgment of him when, at the age of 6, he urinated (in the chamber pot?) in his parents’ bedroom, and his father rendered the judgment: “The boy will come to nothing.”⁹ So, this may well represent both an act of competitive defiance and, finally, through his father’s temporary removal of supportive love, a blow to the boy’s narcissistic self-image. In becoming a scientist, Freud may have been attempting (with almost complete success) to carry forward the defiant, self-affirming impulse, a component of his oedipus complex. It may also have produced a text for Freud’s family romance fantasy, which, accordingly, would include the idea of God; and a possible elaboration of the resultant fantasy is that one follows the (identificatory) injunction of a monotheistic God: “Be like me—but *subordinate!*” It is also possible to see this as a defiance of the monotheistic paradigm: “You must *not* try to be like me—the one and only god!”¹⁰

⁹Freud, S. (1900). The Interpretation of Dreams. *Standard Edition* 4, p. 216.

¹⁰At the end of the Book of Job, God admonishes Job for questioning His omnipotence and omniscience by intimidating and threatening him for his self-assertion in the face of injustice.

A parallel narrative in Greek mythology is to be found in that part of the Oedipus drama¹¹ where he defies his father, Laius, at the crossroad¹² from Corinth to Thebes, only subsequently to marry his mother, Jocasta, and become king of Thebes. The conflict is about precedence, which, to Oedipus' ultimate downfall, he is punished with self-mutilating blindness—he deprives himself of one of the primary tools of scientific inquiry: perception. In the end, Oedipus is left only with “inner” knowledge, for which he is revered in Athens—one might suggest that he becomes capable of self-analysis.¹³ The scientist is not only firmly tied to intellect, but he or she assumes a dependent position toward perception.

Yet another analogy may be identified in the circumcision ritual. After the foreskin has been removed (through a symbolic castration), the glans-penis is *constantly* “revealed.” In the uncircumcised this occurs during erection (sexual excitement), and this may represent a self-revelation, a possible reference, symbolically, to self-analysis. In the psychoanalytic situation between the psychoanalyst and the patient, the analyst becomes a transference object for the patient and presides over *revelation*, thus becoming for the patient an object of desire, and at the same time an object of fear—an object of mistrust (transference resistance).

Returning to the urinary (phallic) function, the act of micturition produces a sense of release from a bodily tension. Lactating mothers apparently experience such a sense of release in the “let-down” feeling. Although not especially convincing, it may be possible to analogize this to the “let-down” experience in micturition. In a successful analysis with real insight, there may also be representations of a sense of maternally-induced release and relief (pleasure), all of which could be linked to a defiance of the prohibitive “law of the father” (superego).

Thus, intellectual autonomy — vital to the scientist — constitutes both a rebellion against and an identification with God (father). But, in addition

¹¹Sophocles. *Oedipus the King. And, Oedipus at Colonus*. (Robert Fagles, Trns.). New York: Viking Penguin Classics (1982).

¹²Symbolically, a place of decision-making.

¹³Another myth—this time about Heracles—refers to the role of the mother in both promoting and inhibiting independent mental freedom and creativity. Cf. Greenstadt, W. M. (1982). Heracles: A heroic figure of the rapprochement crisis. *International Review of Psychoanalysis*: Vol. 9. Pp. 1–23.

to this way of thinking about the experience, the mother also plays a role in facilitating the transition from the tension of not-knowing to the relief of knowing. I believe Richards has made this quite clear, and I have attempted to add the role of the mother, both preoedipally and oedipally, to the evolution of creative independent thinking in Freud and the heroic child of his “gestation”, his grand opus: psychoanalysis.

Further, in the scientist, a free range for the exercise of the “epistemophilic instinct”¹⁴ is essential. Permission is granted to know; and pleasure in knowing is thus allowed by the threatening superego (father, God), and facilitated by the mother; but, one should also say, only by modifying the form of the pleasure by the process of sublimation. In order to invoke self-education (research) about God’s creation (the world), sublimation is what is permitted under the power of the superego to inhibit pure instinctual pleasure. Sublimation would, then, be considered a compromise-formation.¹⁵

The conflict between *knowing* and *not knowing* has a long and influential history. Within the Jewish religious culture, Spinoza, under the *Zeitgeist* of the Enlightenment and the burgeoning scientific revolution of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, may be thought of as representing the “cause” of *knowing*. He was ultimately excommunicated by the Dutch-Jewish community, a temporary victory of the prevailing forces of *not-knowing*. This temporary victory of illusion over reality (still actively embattled) was also pursued by the dominant Christian Church.¹⁶ Under the influence of the *Bildung* movement, however, Freud clearly chose the side of knowing and Science. Richards has offered a psychoanalytic understanding of this choice as a product of Freud’s ambivalent attitude toward his father. I have added the role of his gratifying mother. Thus, the compromise-formation in Freud’s mind resulted in almost total victory for *knowing*.

It was not only the *Bildung* movement that could be called forth to account for this compromise. Aspects of temperament, pride (narcissism),

¹⁴Freud, S. (1917). Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis: Part III, The Development of the Libido. *Standard Edition* 16, pp. 326–327.

¹⁵Freud, S. (1924). A short account of psycho-analysis. *Standard Edition* 19, pp. 199–200.

¹⁶The examples of Galileo and Kepler come to mind.

cultural freedom, and a great endowment of intelligence and the “epistemophilic instinct” must be accounted for. Thus, Freud’s medical education resulted at first in his becoming a talented microscopist and neurological researcher.¹⁷ It is quite clear that the deep gratifications of scientific research impelled him toward the camp of “knowing”. And, according to Jones, he only reluctantly left research for medical practice.¹⁸ Psychoanalysis, Freud’s unique creation, has since been characterized by the combination of therapeutics (medicine) and theorizing (metapsychology)—perhaps yet another facet of his compromise-formation.

I want to emphasize the idea that these structural developments in Freud’s personality had the effect of rendering the instinctual drive forces (libido) into the realm of neutralization, essential for autonomy, and cohesive, organized theoretical thinking.¹⁹ *This suggests that the atheistic, objectivist attitude in Freud had, to some extent, disengaged itself from the conflict-dominated structure of the universal pre-oedipal and oedipal time of childhood, resulting in the emergence of the “independent man”.*

¹⁷Jones, E. (1953). *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud: Volume I*. New York: Basic Books. Pp. 36–57.

¹⁸Jones, E., *ibid.*

¹⁹Hartmann, H., Kris, E. And Loewenstein, R.M. (1964). Papers on Psychoanalytic Psychology. *Psychological Issues*, Vol. IV, No. 2, Monograph 14. New York: International Universities Press.



The Mysterious Case of the Suspiciously Silent Psychoanalyst

Richard P. Kluft

Abstract

Freud's 1895 abandonment of hypnosis has been considered a landmark in the history and development of psychoanalysis. Within psychoanalysis, the merits of Freud's decision to abandon hypnosis have seemed self-evident; there has been little interest in exploring his rationales. However, recent scholarship has questioned Freud's arguments, challenging some for their accuracy or logic, and noting that most of Freud's more serious criticisms of hypnosis were voiced ten to twenty-five years after his 1895 decision. This both raises concerns about the merits of the rationales Freud presented at the time of his decision, and invites exploration for possible historical revisionism. Further, a review of the nature of Freud's characterizations of hypnosis both raises doubts about their accuracy, and suggests that alternative understandings of his decision deserve consideration. One viable alternative argues that the incredible popularity of a work of fiction in which an evil Jewish hypnotist exerted dominant control over a young Christian woman forged a link between hypnosis and anti-Semitism in the imagination of the public. Perhaps this made continuing a career in hypnosis a dubious course of action for a rising young Jewish professional. Freud's abandonment of hypnosis may have been occasioned by his circumspect withdrawal from what may have been perceived to be an increasingly vulnerable and besieged position.

Introduction

I will argue that anti-Semitism exerted a profound influence upon Sigmund Freud in a particular manner during a particular period of time. Anti-Semitism thereby influenced both the origins and the form of psychoanalysis as we know it. This line of thinking emerged unexpectedly after 50 years of my intermittent and often desultory pondering the interface of psychoanalysis and hypnosis. Over those five decades, I

asked dozens of respected analytic colleagues to share their understandings of Sigmund Freud's abandoning hypnosis in 1895. Many admitted that they had no ideas beyond what they had read. The explanations offered by the remainder were generally superficial and unhelpful. Similar inquiries made of senior colleagues in the field of hypnosis were equally unrevealing.

I reached the reluctant understanding that while this question vexed me, few others shared my concerns. Most analytic colleagues regarded Freud's abandoning hypnosis as a giant leap forward in the development of psychoanalysis, and left it at that. My question remained unanswered. It remained an unsolved mystery, a dusty and almost forgotten "cold case" in the history of our profession.

Then, two serendipitous events rekindled my curiosity. Steve Lankton, Editor of the *American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis*, believed that the interface of hypnosis and psychoanalysis needed an updated review and re-exploration. He invited me to edit a special issue on the subject. While I was working on that project, and asking myself the same old questions once again, author Jane Kelly arranged for a number of mystery writers to participate in a book fair.

We didn't drum up much business. That left us a lot of time to sit around swapping ideas about our various projects. I said that my writing time was committed to a special journal issue on psychoanalysis and hypnosis, but the real mystery I wanted to solve was my historical "cold case" question: "Why did Freud dump hypnosis in 1895?" A history professor among us offered the standard psychoanalytic rationales. I agreed he'd summarized mainstream opinions, but said that that I was beginning to doubt these conventional explanations. I confessed to my mystery-writing colleagues that I was stuck. I had no new ideas left to explore.

Jane Kelly had done graduate studies in modern literature. "1895," she said with a smile, "was a landmark year in the development of popular modern literature." The meteoric success of du Maurier's (1895) *Trilby*, she explained, had inaugurated the era of the international best-seller. Of course, I was familiar with *Trilby* from studying hypnosis. I knew about the evil Svengali, who used hypnosis to dominate the beautiful young Trilby. But I don't believe I'd ever known that *Trilby* was published in 1895.

Come nightfall, I was at work following up the lead Jane had provided, hoping it was a hot clue, but fearing it was my latest dead end. du Maurier, *Trilby*'s author, was a notorious anti-Semite. *Trilby* was saturated with his venomous prejudice. Svengali was not only a Jew, but a Jew from the area in which Freud's parents were born.

Serialized in 1894, *Trilby* received a sensational reception. By 1895, *Trilby* had become a popular play, performed in several nations. That fall, *Trilby* was published as a novel, and became an instant best-seller in Europe, North America, and throughout much of the British Empire. In one market, it sold 200,000 copies in two months. This hatred-filled story about an evil Jewish hypnotist became a world-wide phenomenon the same year Freud abandoned hypnosis. That seemed a haunting coincidence, indeed. Any presentation of an intriguing assemblage of facts as mere "coincidence" presents an irresistible challenge to any writer of mysteries, police investigator, or clinical scientist.

Developing the special issue left me no time to pursue my "cold case." However, in doing my research, I found myself becoming immersed in yet another question: What did Freud really have to say about hypnosis? When I had asked analytic colleagues about Freud's abandoning hypnosis, those who referenced the literature referred to articles depreciating hypnosis, to the *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer & Freud, 1893–5), and to a few places in which Freud had expressed gratitude to hypnosis for allowing the early insights that paved the way for psychoanalysis itself. The most common reference they cited was dated a quarter of a century after Freud abandoned hypnosis (Freud, 1921), one which offered menacing and destructive depictions of both hypnosis and the hypnotist. Interestingly, while it contained a more benign portrait as well, my colleagues and mentors recalled only the negative representations.

Could it be as simple as that? Hypnosis had helped in the explorations that led to the origins of psychoanalysis. Then, it was perceived to have certain negative qualities, such as a potential to distort the transference. Freud offered observations that indicated hypnosis had some limitations that he felt were not problems for his psychoanalysis. While he increasingly maintained that psychoanalysis was a superior approach, truly negative assessments of hypnosis were not in evidence. A quarter of a century later, however, the hypnotist would be depicted as a monster.

That the most devastating condemnations of hypnosis and the most potent reasons for abandoning its use were offered only a quarter of a century after Freud's rejection of hypnosis raises profound concerns about what was actually the case in 1895, and provokes suspicions of historical revisionism. Sigmund Freud as an opponent of methodologies that oppress, dominate, and control is a far more pleasing and heroic vision of the founder of psychoanalysis than Sigmund Freud as a man who decided to go his own way, and offered rationales for doing so that now appear more suitable for preaching to the choir than for convincing readers not already in his camp.

In the account below I will share a journey of discovery which is far more in accord with my avocation as a writer of mystery-thrillers than my "day job" of professional practice and conventional scholarship. Fellow mystery aficionados will recognize that this essay's title is derived from a conversation between Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson in "The Silver Blaze," an 1894 mystery by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Holmes comments on the curious incident of the dog in the night-time. Watson observes that the dog did nothing in the night-time. To that, Holmes replies that that this, the dog's doing nothing, was the curious incident. Many potentially relevant events transpired in 1894–5. About these events, Sigmund Freud said nothing. He remained silent.

This said, exploration of these accounts proceeded more in the manner of Hercule Poirot mystery by Agatha Christie than that of a Conan Doyle story. Early in almost every Hercule Poirot narrative, Poirot enunciates his two principles of investigation: "order and method." However, as order and method lead to one theory after another that crashes as new evidence undermines them, and as Poirot's "little gray cells" are called upon to rise again and again from the ashes of their own earlier formulations, Poirot reveals a third principle. He states that a mystery is only understood when the explanation acknowledges and accounts for every bit of evidence. Psychoanalysts rarely look for evidence beyond the realm of the psychoanalytic literature.

A Closer Look at Hypnosis

When we speak of Freud's abandoning hypnosis, we risk starting at a profound disadvantage. What was this hypnosis that Freud abandoned? If we don't know what it was, how can we understand whether he

abandoned it, or what his abandoning it might mean?

In the nineteenth century hypnosis was a major force in both culture and the healing arts. Further, many saw hypnosis as a doorway to the spirit world. Major authors and individuals from diverse background became students and practitioners of hypnosis. Charles Dickens became interested in hypnosis. He gave public demonstrations, undertook some treatments, and became entangled in transference/countertransference difficulties. Robert Louis Stevenson studied hypnosis. Conan Doyle was conversant with hypnosis, but considered it most useful for contacting departed souls in the spirit realm.

The hypnosis capital of the world was France. Charcot had convinced the French Academy to accept hypnosis as a legitimate field of study. Many French gentlemen and scholars dabbled in hypnosis, as did rogues and ne'er-do-wells. Affluent and cultured French women held hypnosis salons, to which gifted subjects were invited, and where their hypnotic talents were demonstrated by skilled practitioners.

Returning to Christie's Hercule Poirot, a French-Belgian (Walloon): Poirot was a young man when hypnosis was at its peak of popularity and was aware of the rise of psychoanalysis during his mature years. Christie builds this sophistication into some of her novels. Many years after his "retirement," Poirot effects the dénouement of *A Peril at End House* (1937) by conducting a fraudulent séance to unmask a killer. His up-tight companion, Captain Hastings, conventional as he was, nonetheless knew how to play his part as a hypnotic medium, and may have slipped into trance. Hypnosis, with its many uses, medical, psychological, spiritual, and recreational, was ubiquitous.

When Sigmund Freud became the German translator for both Charcot and Bernheim, he acquired a place of respect in the hypnosis community. With Bernheim, he was schooled in both self-hypnosis and the hypnosis of others. Further, Bernheim pioneered and taught suggestion without formal trance induction. This is a crucial historical point. Freud knew he could make use of hypnosis without the formal prelude of ceremonies of induction.

The Paris-based Salpetriere school of hypnosis, led by Charcot, included the brothers Pierre and Jules Janet among its luminaries. Charcot's vision

of hypnosis involved elaborate inductions that took the patient through a series of behaviors and altered states that were considered characteristic of true hypnosis. These would later be discredited. Charcot himself was involved in a major revision of his thinking when he passed away. The Nancy school, led by Bernheim and his teacher, Liébeault, held that the crucial element of hypnosis was suggestion. Some members maintained that under hypnosis, the subject surrendered his or her will to the hypnotist, and was virtually under the hypnotist's domination and control. To oversimplify: the emphasis of the Paris school was on what we now would classify as dissociation and trance, using suggestion to promote them; while the emphases of the Nancy school marginalized dissociation, prioritized suggestion, and accorded importance to trance as well.

Summarizing, hypnosis was understood by both schools to be a process by which one individual influenced another to render the other receptive to suggestion, but both the mechanisms involved, and the powers attributed to hypnosis, were in dispute.

The modern history of hypnosis has been marked by ongoing disputes over whether hypnosis should be described and defined by the actions antecedent to it, or by the phenomena of the state that is created (see Elkins, Barabasz, Council, & Spiegel, 2015). This has been complicated by the facts that many individuals can induce trance in themselves, and that individuals may drift into trance by reverie or fantasy or imagination, or be triggered into trance by what Janet would call "vehement emotions." Various individuals and schools of thought have devised definitions that best suit their models and/or their purposes.

Researchers often have advocated for a procedure-based definition that focuses on defining hypnosis as what happens after a procedure (induction). They believe this will promote uniform understandings, and approaches that will facilitate research. Clinicians and researchers approaching from the perspectives of different sets of phenomena prefer a focus on what the state of hypnosis is like. Both groups, but primarily the researchers, have often confused the terms, "description" and "definition." The former permits linking the phenomenon to particular situations, while the latter focuses on what is thought to be the essence of the phenomenon per se.

Psychoanalytic commentaries on hypnosis have generally followed Freud's practice of assuming both author and reader understand the meaning of the term "hypnosis," notwithstanding that the practice of hypnosis has continued to evolve, and that the history of psychoanalysis has been marked by the ongoing redefinition of many of its core terms and concepts.

In Freud's day, inductions were often so complex and directive that it was difficult to discern between phenomena essential to hypnosis, and phenomena suggested or introduced by antecedent procedures and conveyed expectations. On the one hand, it is understandable that Freud would define hypnosis in terms of what followed an induction, and thereby proceed as if he could draw a firm boundary between when hypnosis was used, and when it was not. On the other, his mentors had taught Freud a more nuanced understanding of hypnosis and that its existence did not depend upon formal induction. Nonetheless, in offering his reasons for abandoning hypnosis, Freud left these more sophisticated matters unexamined.

It may be useful to share a widely accepted current definition of hypnosis in order to distinguish the phenomena of hypnosis from the more obvious and easily described phenomena of induction. Recently, a task force of Division 30 of the American Psychological Association has endeavored to develop a modern definition of hypnosis, moving from a procedure-oriented definition most useful in experimental hypnosis to a thoughtful generally applicable effort to define its essence:

Hypnosis: *"A state of consciousness involving focused attention and reduced peripheral awareness characterized by an enhanced capacity for response to suggestion."*

(Elkins, Barabasz, Council, & Spiegel, 2015)

Kluft (2015) suggested this definition be accompanied by an acknowledgement that hypnosis as thus defined could be produced by suggestions from others (i.e., inductions for heterohypnosis); suggestions made to oneself by oneself (i.e., autohypnosis, self-hypnosis); and could occur spontaneously (i.e., produced in response to external stimuli or inner processes). Hypnosis tends to focus and catalyze whatever mental processes are ongoing or suggested.

Therefore, from one perspective, if Freud simply discontinued using formal inductions, he could claim that he had abandoned the use of hypnosis. Any trance that occurred in session that was not induced by induction would fall outside the realm of formal hypnosis. It might be described as hypnosis because it was like the consequences of formal hypnosis, but it would not be hypnosis done by Freud. That the essence of hypnosis was not encompassed or addressed by Freud's observations and reasoning has not been appreciated by mainstream psychoanalysis.

From another perspective, however, Freud bypassed addressing how he dealt what is currently understood to constitute the essence of hypnosis. We may wonder whether he may be continuing to utilize it, absent inductions.

So, while Freud's decision would free him from accusations of "using hypnosis," it leaves a number of problems unresolved. Freud already knew that hypnosis did not require formal induction. Bernheim's work on waking hypnosis and suggestion were well-known to him (see Freud, 1888). He also knew that people might drift into trance, and that patients with many forms of psychopathology, forms we now would link with dissociative disorders, slipped in and out of altered states as a symptomatic manifestation of their disorders.

I reviewed Freud's work on hypnosis to see if he not only abjured the induction of trance, but also avoided the use of trance in any way. Space does not allow a segue into Freud's use of an intermediate technique between hypnosis and free association, forehead pressure. However, it is a profoundly suggestive approach that replaces one technique of distraction and enhanced focus with another. It may even have had the effect of providing a variant form of induction.

We need look no further than Freud's 1900 *The Interpretation of Dreams* to appreciate that Freud was keenly aware that when patients drifted into trance or hypnosis on the couch, he might elicit further and deeper associations. He clearly was continuing to make opportunistic use of trance. As we consider Freud's (1917) instructions to the patient for beginning a psychoanalysis, we might ponder the results of a little research study I can never publish. Here are some of Freud's words to the patient:

"So, say whatever goes through your mind. Act as though, for instance,

you were a traveller sitting next to the window of a railroad carriage and describing to someone inside the carriage the changing views that you see outside... ” (Freud, 1917, p.235).

The research? I presented this verbalization to over a dozen members of the workshop faculty at a hypnosis meeting, and asked for their reactions. 100% immediately identified it as an imagery or visualization induction. None understood it as a psychoanalytic intervention.

Again, the point of these illustrations is that Freud’s abandonment of hypnosis appears to have been limited to his discontinuing the use of contemporary formal inductions. He continued to note and to make opportunistic use of trance phenomena as they occurred, and did not refrain from the imagery and suggestions associated with current mainstream hypnosis. In his era, the show of abandoning hypnosis could be achieved by no longer engaging in overt procedures of induction. He could proclaim that he was not utilizing the authoritarian methods he attributed to “the hypnotist.” However, what remained unsaid about this matter was that only a tiny minority of legitimate practitioners, if any, used the type of approaches from which he distanced himself in his writing. Liébeault and Bernheim were gentle in their approaches. While Charcot was often authoritarian, Freud’s anecdotes about him indicate that he could be whimsically humorous. When he pressured patients, he did so mostly to promote the manifestations of symptoms he thought were related to diagnostic and treatment concerns, and he usually did so under observed medical conditions.

The type of hypnosis against which Freud railed was not being practiced by the legitimate healers of the day. He launched his attacks against a straw man. The identity of that straw man will be discussed later in this article.

Freud worked in an era during which much was poorly understood and ill-defined. We can accord him considerable latitude on these accounts. However, his main mentor was Bernheim. Notwithstanding Bernheim’s emphasis on suggestion as used benignly, he was very modern in his understanding and exposition of many matters that Freud (1888) knew about, but overlooked and/or bypassed for the occasion. That is unfortunate, because studying Freud’s work demonstrates that Freud, perhaps

inadvertently, retained elements of hypnosis. For example, most forget that the iconic analytic couch was once the iconic hypnotist's couch.

What Does Freud Say About Hypnosis?

After investing years establishing a career in hypnosis, Freud endeavored to rationalize, create, and perpetuate a schismatic rift between the hypnosis of his era and his emerging psychoanalysis (see Kluft, 2018b, 2018c). As a rule, his contributions commonly assigned to those taking analytic training express his unchallenged negative opinions (e.g., “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” [1921]; “The Ego and the Id” [1923]; and “Analysis, Terminable and Interminable” [1938]). Others have demonstrated an unquestioning acceptance of Freud's unexamined positions. Consequently, these negative opinions continue to pass for wisdom in the analytic literature.

Working on the special issue project, Brenner (2018), O'Neil (2018), and I (Kluft, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d) came upon numerous instances of Freud's illogic, self-contradiction, and predictable selections from among alternative stances of those most favorable to and supportive of his own ideas.

I set about discovering and reviewing the entirety of Freud's writings about hypnosis. A PEP-Web search for Freud's mentions of or allusions to hypnosis yields 73 items, of which 71 are both unduplicated and accessible. They were written over a 54-year period. Further searches discovered no previous efforts to assemble Freud's full range of observations on hypnosis and subject them to a scrutiny of both their scientific merits and their meanings in historical context. The examples offered above are a few of many that were noted and explored (Kluft, 2018b, 2018c). I was particularly impressed to find that in his later years, Freud would level against psychoanalysis many of the same charges that he made against hypnosis early in his career (Freud, 1938).

One criticism that Freud made of hypnosis commands respect in terms of the circumstances that prevailed in 1895, and continues to have a degree of currency in the present. Freud expressed concern that hypnosis might exert a distorting impact upon the transference and hamper free association. In Freud's era the power and authority of the physician was much more pronounced than in modern doctor-patient relationships. The expression in stance and technique of the imbalance normative in

that era would not be welcomed in modern settings. That said, modern hypnosis works very hard to promote permissiveness and to avoid controlling or dominating relationships. Current uses for power stances remain commonplace in stage hypnosis, but are quite limited in therapeutic settings, where they are restricted largely to emergencies and to strong suggestions made to extricate patients from pathological trances in which they are “stuck” (Kluft, 2012).

Freud’s caution is useful to keep in mind, but given the permissive nature of modern hypnosis, it does not retain the relevance it may have held in the 1890s. The major risk of suppression of free association by hypnosis today is not the hypnosis per se, but therapists’ failures to accurately assess and address relevant relational and object-relational concerns.

On many occasions, Freud makes strong statements that he contradicts elsewhere, whether inadvertently or in following some agenda (Kluft, 2018b, 2018c). Here, I offer only a handful of observations illustrating the nature of the problems that are encountered.

In 1938 Freud looks back to how hypnosis offered proof of the unconscious and of repression. He cites the importance of suggested amnesia for post-hypnotic suggestions as evidence. Freud had spent a career emphasizing the importance of conflict in generating repression, and its undoing by interpretation. Yet this illustration of repression is in conflict with his definition, and is much more congruent with dissociation.

In Freud (1925) offered protests against hypnosis, apparently referring to matters he took into consideration in the 1890s. He complained that he could not succeed in hypnotizing all subjects and could not get all of his subjects to enter as deep a state of hypnosis as he would like. He spoke as if he “discovered” such limitations, and lists them as objections to hypnosis. He suggests that that perhaps he is a mediocre hypnotist.

It is difficult, but not impossible, for an outstanding person to train with the best of the best, and still be less than fully competent, if not exceptional/inspired/etc. But suppose we put aside for the moment our reverence for Freud, and put aside his expression of modesty as well, to look at the historical record. Freud’s (1888) preface to his translation of Bernheim’s work is a masterful summary of the work of a master. Freud wrote that Bernheim was quite aware that individuals differed widely in

the hypnotizability. He knew he could not hypnotize everyone, and did not disguise this fact.

Further, Bernheim understood the importance of the social psychology of the setting in which hypnosis is applied. After Freud returned to Vienna, he encountered a very refractory patient. He travelled with her to Nancy to have her evaluated and treated by Bernheim. Bernheim worked with the patient and failed to achieve the desired results. He remarked to Freud that such patients did better when treated in his special unit. In contemporary terms, we might add, where setting and expectation were likely to enhance the impact of his efforts.

What Freud has done in his later writing is to speak of discovering the differences Bernheim had described, and Freud had translated, and that the two had observed and discussed together, as if these were new observations that offered a rationale for abandoning hypnosis. It remains unclear whether Freud's demurral of his talents as a hypnotist were accurate. But it is clear that Freud has distorted his narrative to make it appear that he abandoned hypnosis due to his modest skills when the basis for that assertion is contradicted by the distribution of varying degrees of hypnotizability in the general population. Instead of stating that hypnosis may be more useful in some patients than others, Freud attacks hypnosis.

There is another curious aspect to Freud's argument. When he attacks hypnosis most ferociously, he attributes great power to the hypnotist, reverting to the Mesmeric notion of animal magnetism. Although Mesmeric theories were invalidated by the French Royal Commission over a century before 1895, they did persist in common belief and lore, and Mesmerism did itself continued to persist to some degree.

Let us examine Freud's most famous pronunciamento against hypnosis:

Let us recall that hypnosis has something positively uncanny about it; but the characteristic of uncanniness suggests something old and familiar that has undergone repression. Let us consider how hypnosis is induced. The hypnotist asserts that he is in possession of a mysterious power that robs the subject of his own will; or, which is the same thing, the subject believes it of him. This mysterious power (which is even now often described popularly as "animal magnetism") must be the same power that

is looked upon by primitive people as the source of taboo, the same that emanates from kings and chieftains and makes it dangerous to approach them (mana). The hypnotist, then, is supposed to be in possession of this power ... (Freud, 1921, p. 125).

When Freud attacks hypnosis, he appears to countenance these completely disproven ideas, perhaps because they attribute the power of hypnosis to the hypnotist, and “justify” cautions against the dark power of this modality. Surely, Freud knew he was dabbling in unscientific popular mythology, engaging in the provocative and dishonest depreciation of a modality he still saw as in opposition to his own.

We must wonder why generations of analysts have accepted without protest Freud’s fraudulent mischaracterizations of hypnosis and the hypnotist and accepted the intellectually dishonest portraits he promoted. I speculate that is so attractive to the psychoanalytic reader to encounter Freud as a defender of freedom and a warrior against tyranny, oppression, and domination that it is aversive to challenge the accuracy of his representations.

1889–1895 and Beyond: The Cold Case Revisited

Jane Kelly opened my eyes to a whole new perspective. I studied du Maurier and *Trilby*. I reacquainted myself with Svengali. But my understanding, although increased, remained tantalizingly incomplete. I probed the usual psychoanalytic resources to see if either du Maurier or *Trilby* made an appearance, and came up empty. I knew that there had to be a connection, but the complete absence of attention to what I thought would be significant stopped me in my tracks. Something was missing. Even if *Trilby* undermined public confidence in hypnosis, it was just a book ... Wasn’t it? I bumbled along, grasping for a connection I thought must be there, that I could allude to, but that I just couldn’t prove was there. I shared my frustration with a group of colleagues who met for lunch monthly, smart people whose company I really enjoyed.

At lunch a few months after that conversation, forensic child psychiatrist Laurentine “Laurie” Fromm, M.D., handed me a copy of Steven Levingston’s (2012) *Little Demon in the City of Light: A True Story of Murder and Mesmerism in Belle Epoque Paris*. My first response was bland. But within a few pages, I realized that while the case of Gabrielle

Bompard was well-known in the literature of forensic hypnosis (Laurence & Perry, 1988), the story and person of Gabrielle Bompard herself was not.

Gabrielle Bompard, a young French woman, claimed she had been hypnotized by the dastardly Michel Eyraud and commanded to participate in the murder of Toussaint-Augustine Gouffé. Steven Levingston is a former investigative reporter, now an Editor at *The Washington Post*. He had become fascinated by *L’Affaire Eyraud/Bompard*, the story of a gruesome murder in Paris. He and his wife had researched the murder and the trial that followed for many years.

As I read, I realized that I was in a whole new world of depth and dedicated pursuit of comprehensive understanding. Laurence and Perry (1988) had explored key issues in the trials of Gouffé’s killers. They had applied thoughtful expertise to topics associated with forensic hypnosis. Levingston approached the same material informed by an encyclopedic knowledge of the era, and by his astonishingly vigorous pursuit of the detailed backgrounds of everyone and everything associated with *L’Affaire Eyraud/Bompard*.

Reading *Little Demon* ... is no chore of obsessive drudgery. Levingston was able to recreate Belle Epoque Paris in my mind’s eye. He helped me follow the uncovering of the crime and the criminals through the eyes of Goron, one of the greatest detectives of that or any era. Levingston’s love of Paris imparted a lyrical grace to those sections that embraced the city. His insightful knowledge of France and the French gave the book a warm texture. Levingston’s diligence had both crafted an incredibly well-done police procedural and provided me with the most useful insights into the place of hypnosis in continental European society that I had ever encountered.

For all these reasons and more, I was enthralled. My hopes that Levingston had solved my problem were dashed quickly, but I had a sense familiar to analysts, detectives, scientists ... I’m getting closer! I did not know to what I was coming closer, but I knew that precious insights were imminent.

In the summer of 1889, Paris was welcoming the world. *L’Exposition Universelle*, the Paris World Fair, was in full swing. Its centerpiece was

The Eiffel Tower, erected to honor the occasion. The First International Congress of Hypnosis would be held in conjunction with the *Exposition*, with Charcot, Bernheim, Leibault, and the still-unheralded Sigmund Freud in attendance. A major issue being discussed and debated was whether or not hypnosis could be used to suggest that a subject carry out serious criminal acts, such as murder.

Reading about the First International Congress of Hypnosis, a landmark in the history of hypnosis, had a special meaning to me. My colleagues in hypnosis had honored me and my contributions by naming me overall International Chair of the 14th International Congress of Hypnosis, held in 1997. I experienced Levingston's account as humbling. It allowed me to "walk" among legendary greats, giants who provided the foundations for what would become both psychoanalysis and modern hypnosis.

The central focus of Levingston's opus is the murder of Toussaint-Augustine Gouffé by Michel Eyraud and Gabrielle Bompard, and the subsequent pursuit and trials of the malefactors. Michel Eyraud was a con-man and rogue who ran a small business that was probably a front for criminal activities. Eyraud presented himself as a boulevardier, which allowed him to meet and associate with affluent men about town, whom he tried to involve in various schemes. Like many in that era, he had acquired some knowledge of hypnosis. Gabrielle Bompard was a willful young woman, estranged from a conservative family that had tried without success to rein in her less than decorous behavior. She had run off to make a life in Paris. Bompard was an experienced hypnotic subject who could demonstrate major hypnotic phenomena with ease, but who defied any suggestions she did not like. She appears to have supported herself through questionable activities until she obtained a job with Eyraud. In short order, she became his mistress and partner in crime.

Toussaint-Augustine Gouffé was an affluent minor official and major man-about-town. He had a mistress, but according to his diary, he also bedded another twenty-plus women every month. Eyraud indicated to Gouffé that his attractive young mistress had tired of him, and had noticed Gouffé. He arranged for them to meet. When Gouffé arrived at Bompard's apartment, she behaved seductively until Eyraud, concealed behind some drapes, slipped a noose over Gouffé's neck. The pair robbed Gouffé, concealed his body in a burlap bag in a trunk, and left the trunk

far out in the country, where it remained undiscovered for a period of time.

The crucial information that ultimately played a valuable role in my quest to understand Freud's abandoning hypnosis began to emerge from Levingston's detailing of the attention the media accorded Bompard and Eyraud while they were on the run, and after their capture. Their flight across Europe and thence to the United States, Central America, and the Caribbean was followed by the newspapers and magazines of the day, elevating them to celebrity status. They parted ways in America. Bompard returned to France with a new lover. She insisted that she was innocent of any wrongdoing. Eyraud had put her under hypnosis, she claimed, and forced her to comply with his evil schemes. Eyraud was arrested in the Caribbean when he was recognized by a man he had tried to fleece.

Young, attractive, petite, and vulnerable in appearance, Bompard presented herself as the helpless tool of Eyraud's evil designs. Artists' impressions of the murder of Gouffé appeared in print. Bompard appeared on the covers of magazines, looking youthful and innocent. Her representation of her plight was congruent with the beliefs of the Nancy School of Hypnosis, which were very prominent in the minds of the scientific community and the public.

Eyraud attracted attention as well. His ability to remain ahead of the police by seducing a series of women who allowed him to live with them and hide out to evade capture led an admiring French press to describe him as a "legend," a man with tremendous power over women.

Early in 1891, Eyraud met his fate at the guillotine. While the French courts demonstrated a keen interest in understanding of Bompard's "hypnosis" defense, she, too was found guilty. However, while the public image of Eyraud was that of a rogue with hypnotic skills and tremendous power over women, there was sufficient sympathy for this attractive young woman and her tale of being used by that rogue that she evaded execution and received a lenient prison sentence.

Throughout much of 1890 Eyraud and Bompard had been front page news across Europe and all English-Speaking nations. Some modern commentators have offered rather hyperbolic statements to the effect that they were the "Bonnie and Clyde" of their era. From the time

Bompard turned herself in, the media had presented the public with a narrative in which she was a naïve young woman who had been made the unwilling tool of an evil hypnotist.

At last, it was possible to put together some pieces of the “Cold Case” puzzle on a preliminary basis. *Trilby* had not suddenly emerged from nowhere to become a smash literary success. du Maurier capitalized masterfully upon world-wide fascination with the Bompard-Eyraud relationship as told by Bompard and her supporters to a sympathetic media. The character of *Trilby* was clearly derived from a sanitized version of Gabrielle Bompard, and the character of Svengali constructed from an unsanitized version of Michel Eyraud.

The first serialized chapters of *Trilby* were published early in 1894. They became a world-wide sensation. *Trilby* was rewritten as a play by Paul Potter, and first performed in America in the spring of 1895. British impresarios saw the play in the United States and obtained rights to present it abroad. *Trilby* debuted in England in the fall of 1895, performed in several cities by several theatrical troupes. Also, that fall the previously serialized chapters of *Trilby* were published as a complete novel, illustrated by du Maurier himself.

No precise date has been linked with Freud’s 1895 abandonment of hypnosis. Nor can we discern with precision the dates during which Freud experimented with forehead pressure.

What we do know is that since approximately 1890, hypnosis was frequently and increasingly placed before the public in a negative light. The Nancy school’s emphasis on the power of suggestion and the helplessness of the hypnotized subject fed into public and professional mistrust of hypnosis. Although representatives of the Paris school were frequently able to embarrass representatives of the Nancy school, and did so at Bompard’s trial, a belief in the malign power of hypnosis became firmly entrenched in popular thought and urban legend.

The fictional Svengali exerted a powerful deleterious impact upon the public image of the hypnotist. From the moment of his debut, the hypnotist became an iconic figure of evil, and hypnosis became suspect rather than welcomed. After studying the representation of hypnosis in popular culture, Barrett (2012) observed that whenever the presence of a

hypnotist is announced, the audience or reader should suspect evil.

It is difficult for today's readers to recreate the emotional world of the Eastern European Jew. In an era rife with anti-Semitism, Svengali linked hypnosis and evil with being Jewish, specifically, with being an Eastern European Jew. Associated with his life in Vienna, Freud is often seen as an assimilated German Jew. However, his parents had relocated from an Eastern European home, from the same area which was the home of the fictional Svengali.

Jack the Ripper was active in 1888. Three of the men suspected of being the Ripper were thought to be Jews. Armed with neither data nor mercy, the British press treated them with extreme malice. Some sources refer to incidents of violence against Jews.

In 1894, the Dreyfus Affair was a notorious major news story that would polarize French opinion over a period of many years. Alfred Dreyfus, a French army officer of Jewish ancestry, was court-martialed on fraudulent charges and sent to Devil's Island. His crime appears to have been performing admirably on tests that allowed him to rise to ranks and positions from which many superiors and peers had wished to exclude Jews. Although exonerated years later, polarized opinions about the Dreyfus Affair played acrimonious roles in French discourse for years. At the time of Freud's abandoning hypnosis, Dreyfus was wrongly imprisoned on Devil's Island, and his defenders were under attack. Freud's mentor Bernheim, a man with Jewish ancestry, was among them. But it is not clear whether Bernheim was involved in the Dreyfus affair in the years germane to my argument.

Freud, Anti-Semitism, and Freud's Abandonment of Hypnosis

Sigmund Freud lived in fear that his ideas and accomplishments would be diminished or neglected because he was a Jew. He abandoned hypnosis at a moment when public anti-Semitism was rampant, and when the reputation of his chosen field of study was under attack in the court of public opinion. Although Freud offered many superficially plausible arguments for his decision, much about them is suspect. Those offered close to the time of his decision do not fare well when subjected to close scrutiny. While Freud speaks of learning about certain shortcomings of

hypnosis in the process of his own work, most of what he speaks of learning were put forward by Bernheim, and had been referred to by Freud (1888) in his preface to his German translation of a Bernheim text. Many of Freud's complaints about hypnosis were put forward only many years after he had abandoned its use. It would be 1905 before he would first postulate a sadomasochistic basis for the patient's relationship with the hypnotist, and 1921, three years after the death of Bernheim, before he put forth his most damning and dramatic denunciations of hypnosis and the hypnotist.

Earlier, I observed that the hypnotist as described by Freud in 1921 bore little or no resemblance to those with whom Freud had studied. However, this depiction of the hypnotist would be quite meaningful and familiar to contemporary readers. In 1921 Freud presented his reader with the portrait of a hypnotist whom no one had encountered in the legitimate healing professions, but whom culturally aware individuals could recognize at once. Freud portrayed the hypnotist with a sketch of Svengali! This is a remarkable moment. Freud, who never acknowledged awareness of any aspect of the highly anti-Semitic *Trilby*, now advanced the specter of Svengali as the centerpiece of his attack on hypnosis! The image of hypnosis most frequently referenced by psychoanalysts to express their misgivings about hypnosis had been drawn from a fictional character. Svengali did not create a school of hypnosis, but he did inspire the creation of some of the most memorable villains in modern fiction and motion pictures. The first and greatest, of course, was Count Dracula. Bram Stoker, author of the 1897 best-seller, *Dracula*, acknowledged that he has based his vampire, a skilled hypnotist with some Semitic features, on Svengali.

Toward a Denouement

Had Sigmund Freud published his most negative critiques of hypnosis as the reasons for his 1895 abandonment of hypnosis at the time of his decision, there would have been no reason to engage in a long-term effort to understand why he acted as he did. He would have been seen as making a series of strong statements that offered cogent explanations for his turning away from an approach so clearly fraught with potential for misadventure. But that is not what he did. Instead, he offered a series of rationales that were left unchallenged long enough to be accorded

unquestioned validity. Freud's thinking in these matters lacks the incisive brilliance of his usual arguments. Instead, it demonstrated an unconvincing quality suggestive of a quick excuse for running out the door. Freud did not make his most dire accusations until a quarter of a century later, after most of the major figures of hypnosis in the 1890s had left the scene. The gratuitous denigrations of hypnosis in his 1921 article seem more like efforts to drive a final nail into the coffin of the hypnosis he hoped his psychoanalysis would supplant than an exercise of reasonable scholarship.

Again, Freud did not take his strongest stances until he the major figures of an earlier hypnosis were not there to contradict him. And, when he did, he called upon the qualities of Svengali, a fictional character from a book he failed to acknowledge at the time of his abandoning hypnosis. It is worthwhile considering the possibilities that Freud's depreciation of his own abilities as hypnotist, a curious statement in a man not known for modesty, a statement called into question in the arguments above, may represent a defensive posture. It is as if Sigmund Freud is saying, indirectly, to an often anti-Semitic world sensitized to the image of a dangerous Jewish hypnotist, "You see... I, Sigmund Freud, am not like Svengali. I lack the power to dominate others and to make others do my bidding. I do not possess the magical Mesmeric potency of animal magnetism that would make me a dangerous and predatory Jewish monster like Svengali."

These are among the reasons that lead me to suggest that Freud's fear of anti-Semitism was a major factor in his abandoning hypnosis when he did, and as abruptly as he did, shortly after having published major hypnosis-related contributions. Both the retroactive nature of his most trenchant critiques of hypnosis and his failure to mention the contemporary issues with which he had to contend suggest in the one case, a need to avoid a major confrontation with others in the world of hypnosis, and in the other, a flagrant apparent dissociation from the anti-Semitic forces that surrounded him, and from which he feared disfavor and attack.

Although it would be preposterous to assert that Freud was oblivious to the Dreyfus affair or the impact of *Trilby*, that point could be argued were it not for the fact that Freud's 1921 portrait of the hypnotist is a clear "tribute" to Svengali. The enormity of this portrait may not be

apparent to contemporary readers unfamiliar with the lingering impact of Svengali and unable to appreciate *Trilby* in its historical context. Perhaps it would be easier to appreciate for contemporary readers to imagine instead being offered a word picture of the typical psychiatrist, and that finding that this “typical” word picture describes the behavior of a psychiatrist who is a major presence in *The Silence of the Lambs* (Harris, 1988), Hannibal “The Cannibal” Lecter, M.D.

Whether by design, defensive style, or both, Sigmund Freud experienced an era replete with landmark events of an anti-Semitic nature that threatened to impact him and his career, but he did not leave an account of how he experienced them. It is as if he had developed a dissociative shield against what threatened the safety of his personhood. More specifically, the societal rather than intimate form of relational trauma experienced and feared in connection with anti-Semitism may have inspired a protective wish not to see and not to be affected by toxic events in his world, and to distance himself from them as best he could.

It would appear that Freud’s abandonment of major aspects of hypnosis may have been more defensive than truly scientific. If so, psychoanalysis owes a cringe-worthy debt of gratitude to Michel Eyraud and Gabrielle Bompard, George du Maurier, and to the anti-Semitism through which their impacts were transmitted. Plainly put, in 1895, hypnosis was no place for an ambitious Jewish professional fearful that hatred of who and what he was would undermine his career and his contributions. Freud appears to have made a rapid and superficially plausible exit from an imperiled position. Anti-Semitism and cautious regard for his own safety and career offered powerful incentives to turn his attention elsewhere. Years later, with his psychoanalysis firmly established and likely opponents gone from the scene, Freud felt secure enough to look back and try to hammer a final nail into the coffin of the hypnosis that had nurtured his own discoveries.

Again, had Freud leveled against hypnosis in 1895 the charges he would later voice, there would be no reason to raise the question of what was on Freud’s mind when he abandoned hypnosis. But his reasoning was not powerful, and his departure was rapid. Further, had Freud addressed the impacts of *Trilby*, the Dreyfus Affair and anti-Semitism openly at the time, or even in private correspondence, their omissions from his

consideration would not be so flagrant and striking.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that with regard to these matters, Freud avoided either acknowledging them or becoming involved in them. As noted above, he appears to have worked assiduously to keep them at a distance. As in a vertical split, they existed, but for Freud's predominant self-state, they were not handled in a normal manner.

Closing a Cold Case

Although I am sure that there is much more to be learned about these matters, for a number of pragmatic considerations I feel that I have reached an imperfect, but "good enough" closure. The solution to "The Mysterious Case of the Suspiciously Silent Psychoanalyst" appears to reside in Sigmund Freud's adopting a self-protective stance that functioned on the basis of the belief that acknowledging and/or addressing the traumatic and hurtful forces by which he was surrounded would create unacceptable risks. He appears to have hoped that by holding on and avoiding trouble, these problems might pass.

It was only as I looked over the last draft of this paper that I realized that Freud's reaction to anti-Semitism in the early and mid-1890s was reminiscent of my findings in a study of revictimization (1989). I found that what abused individuals learn from their mistreatment is not how to avoid it, but how to better accommodate to it and improve damage control. Freud kept on trying to figure out how to live more safely in the traumatic environment of an anti-Semitic land rather than to escape it. My mind reviewed how that adaptation would express itself in a CCRT, or Core Conflictual Relationship Theme as per the work of Lester Luborsky (Luborsky & Crits-Cristoph, 1998). Would this pattern prove repetitive, and pop up elsewhere?

I often sensed a "ghost" by my side as I worked on some parts of this paper. No some ethereal entity... Just the memory of a conversation over half a century ago with an elderly analyst who had practiced in Vienna before World War II. I remember the conversation and the man quite well, but I do not recall his name.

Here is an excerpt from a memoir in progress:

Some readers whose stance toward Freud tends toward uncritical admiration may consider the entirety of my research and thinking about Freud's abandonment of hypnosis profoundly disrespectful of a great man whose contributions are heroic landmarks in man's efforts to understand the human mind. With that in mind, I will offer two replies, neither a defense.

The first? My admiration of Sigmund Freud and his work survives my findings.

The second is that I actually knew a European analyst who had known Sigmund Freud in Vienna. He had participated in some of the earliest efforts to encourage him to escape the looming menace of the Holocaust, and remained involved in offers to assist him and his family to relocate. He was among my parents' circle of medical refugee friends, all frequent visitors to our home when I was young, and before they "got on their feet" in the USA. To his misfortune, he was most famous among both his peers and my friends for his terrible, ill-fitting toupee.

I had not seen him for many years. Then, we were reintroduced at the Shivah for another physician who had just passed away. He had heard I was considering going into psychiatry. He reminded me that he was a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. He wondered whether I was considering psychoanalytic training. At that time, I had no idea of what psychoanalytic training really meant. Rather than reveal my ignorance, I switched the subject ... "What kind of a man was Sigmund Freud?" I asked.

He sighed. He had known Freud for several years. He had participated in a number of efforts fellow analysts made to encourage Freud to leave Vienna. He made it clear that he was not a person of prominence in psychoanalysis. He mentioned some more prestigious analysts who were involved, but at the time, their names meant nothing to me. As a young man, he loved psychoanalysis. He venerated Freud. He wanted Freud to be safe, both because he cared about him, and because he wanted him to be able to continue his work and his contributions. He had been included in these efforts because he had useful personal connections abroad. He had helped many escape the growing horror of the Holocaust. He had already decided to leave continental Europe once the last members of his family had reached safety. As he spoke, old feelings came alive in his face

and voice. He wiped his eyes.

Freud, he said, was brilliant ... But Freud was a man of ideas, with great ambitions for those ideas. He could be incredibly stubborn, even out of touch with mundane reality. Freud would not believe what he did not want to be true, even as evidence amassed to the contrary. He would become defensive. He did not want to change his mind.

“It was not just about the Nazis,” he said. Outside of his consulting room, Freud often misjudged people, sometimes to his detriment. “A *Menschenkenner*, he was not,” he said. “Smart people ... are not smart about everything.” He was already in America by the time Freud finally left Vienna. “We celebrated that wonderful news!” his face glowing with a broad smile. At this point, our conversation was interrupted by the rabbi beginning the service portion the Shivah. It was never resumed.

The Sigmund Freud described by a man who had known him for eight years was the Sigmund Freud I found in my own research: brilliant, driven, stubborn, determined to prevail, and valuing ideas and defensive of ideas to the point of dismissing relevant facts and practical concerns. That is the Sigmund Freud who could let an anti-Semitic world swirl around him, and take dramatic intrapsychic defensive measures that allowed him to dismiss what he chose not to deal with for as long as he could.

That is the Sigmund Freud to be found in my writing.

(Kluft, *Mostly Uphill*, in preparation)

Closing Remarks

Today, we understand that mistreated individuals and beleaguered minorities often rely upon dissociative defenses to survive under difficult and threatening circumstances. Dissociation in its many protective forms is preeminently a defense against relational and PTSD Criterion A trauma (Kluft, 2022). It may be difficult to appreciate that the founder of our profession, notwithstanding his brilliance, his world-wide fame, and his living in one of the most advanced, cultured, and sophisticated societies in the world, nonetheless lived his life as a member of an ill-treated minority, under siege by forces of darkness and hatred long before the Holocaust. He drew upon psychological defenses characteristic

of the oppressed, the very forms of defense toward which, on a conscious level, he had held such a dismissive attitude for the majority of his career. What protected him and his functioning in some ways in the face of ongoing strain trauma created profound vulnerabilities in others, leaving him with such a profound difficulty in perceiving the imminence of potentially lethal stress trauma, the malignant exacerbation of dangers he long tried to keep at a distance. Holding fast to his belief that he could continue not needing to attend to what he did not think he should need to face nearly cost him his life.

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The Seeds of Anti-Semitism: Theological and Historical Roots

Gerald J. Gargiulo

All three Abrahamic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam teach that there is only one God. Simultaneously, as we know, their adherents have killed fellow believers who professed something different than their particular interpretations. Jewish history stands as the least violent in this tradition. If we wish to obtain a deeper understanding of the antisemitism that has sadly flourished in the West, it is helpful to study its roots in the theological and consequent historical rifts between Christians and Jews.

That the Jews, for most of the past two thousand years, were confined to second class citizenship in Christian Europe is well documented. Jews, as we know, were limited to living in ghettos, needing permission to buy houses, to marry, among many other humiliating practices. All such practices came to tragic expression when Hitler took power in Germany. The Nazi goal went much further than past practices, however, its goal was to create a new consciousness—a new society—free from the pervasive presence of the Hebrew Scriptures and all the contributions of Jewish culture in art, politics, music, science etc.¹ Germany, it was believed, would reverse the integration that Jews had achieved² and would change history the way the Jews and their Scriptures had changed history. Nazi Germany would erase the Jews to inaugurate a new humanity, unsoiled by any submission to Jewish contributions and/or values. The Jewish body represented all of what such beliefs wished to repudiate. German narcissistic needs would triumph over the chosen people.³

¹See Confino; *A World Without Jews: The Nazi Imagination from Persecution to Genocide*.

²See the two-volume work: *The House of Rothschild* by Niall Ferguson for an appreciation of the progressive integration of some Jews into European society. Both texts are well researched and well written.

³Many Protestants and Catholic clergy, as well as laity, opposed the Nazi/German persecutions—many lost their lives. That Pope Pius XII ordered that

I am not extensively exploring the theological roots of anti-Semitism.⁴

I would like to offer a grounding of anti-Semitism in terms of the convictions held within some early Christian communities. I am limiting my reflections primarily to what some contemporary scriptural scholars can tell us about such early Christian beliefs and consequent anti-Semitic sentiments.

What we have learned from scriptural studies is that there were many different vying theologies and practices within the early Christian communities. Many different beliefs about who Jesus was as well as his teachings were evident from the very beginning (complicated, at times, by Gnostic and Manichean doctrines)⁵. What is not commonly known is that initially the primary Christian community was centered in Jerusalem, with James, Jesus's brother, as its head. James, and the followers in Jerusalem, understood Jesus within a Jewish context. They awaited *God's imminent* judgment—as Jesus had preached. Concurrently Paul, a Pharisee, along with others, spread the message about Jesus, in both Jewish and Gentile communities in the Mediterranean basin. The Jerusalem community, under James's leadership, was recognized, as I mentioned, as the head of any such movement. What we know is that James was willing to allow for non-Jews, who wished to follow Jesus, to dispense with circumcision and dietary laws, without compromising Jewish moral teachings.⁶ As I have mentioned, it was Paul, a Pharisee, outside of the James' Jewish Christian community, who was one of the primary theological interpreters of Jesus as Christianity would come to understand him—that is, the transcendent Christ. Paul's teachings

³(continued) Jews be given baptismal certificates (some found shelter in monasteries) is common knowledge; yet his public silence as Jews were being hounded, persecuted, and killed is a troubling and puzzling enigma.

⁴For anyone interested see: R. Reuther's *Faith and Fratricide: The theological roots of Anti-Semitism*.

⁵For anyone wishing to read some of the alternate gospels in the early Christian communities see: *After the New Testament* (100-300CE) edited by Bart D. Ehrman.

⁶For many centuries there existed the *Ebionites*, that is, Jewish Christians who followed Jewish law and practices and who believed that Jesus was the Messiah sent by God for the salvation of the world. (See Ehrman (2010) p191ff.

contributed to the enigmatic doctrine of the Trinity.⁷

A crucial turning point in the history of Christianity, and consequently Jewish/Christian relations, occurred when the Romans plundered and destroyed Jerusalem in 70 CE, killing over 60,000 inhabitants and destroying the newly completed Temple. Christianity was severed from its Jewish roots; it was to flourish from then on only within a Roman context. Christian scriptural writings would reflect that change, i.e., it was the Jews who killed Jesus, not the Romans—an obvious error that served the narcissistic needs of the early Christian communities. Such a tactical missionary approach was secondary, however, to the mindset of most of the earliest converts who became followers of Jesus. For example, the destruction of Jerusalem was not understood as a politically motivated retaliation by Rome for the ongoing and persistent Jewish rebellions. Rather, it was theologically interpreted as an unequivocal sign that God himself was punishing the Jews for rejecting their Messiah, echoing many similar interpretations in the Hebrew Scriptures. (All this within the common belief that God's final judgment on the world was imminent—that is, Jesus would return shortly. Such a conviction was both Jesus's teaching and Paul's belief.)

The four Gospels, among many others, e.g., the Gospel according to Thomas, were written over a period of years by unknown authors. They were meant to convey the “good news” of salvation. They were not and are not primarily historical documents. The various writers, most of whom we do not know, did not understand history as we understand that term today. The stories and events that are related in the various scriptures are intended to convey a moral teaching and/or a particular interpretation of Jesus. Mark's Gospel was written the closest chronologically to the life of Jesus (c 60 CE), while the author of John's Gospel is the farthest away (c 90–95 CE). It is in John's Gospel where Paul's interpretation of a transcendent Jesus holds sway and where, as well, there are repetitive statements about the Jews' rejection of Jesus. Within such a framework, the history of anti-Semitism can be read as a narcissistic competition—a fratricidal history,⁸ a splitting and a projection of the bad self onto the unbelieving and Christ-rejecting Jews.

⁷I am greatly indebted to Reza Aslan's *Zealot*. This text is a well-researched and engaging study of the life of Jesus and the era soon after his death.

As mentioned, there were many different interpretations as to what Jesus' message meant and who he was. There were other Gospels, such as the Gospels of Peter or Thomas, the various Gnostic Gospels as well as many other writings that were suppressed by the early Church. Bert Ehrman's controversial *How Jesus Became God*, along with the works of such scholars as Crossan, Mack or Aslan, give us a better picture of Jesus the man. Following the works of such scholars, it is important to note that Jesus, except as found in the Gospel of John, never makes a claim to divinity. The statement "I and the Father are one" is understood as his willingness to do whatever his father wished. In the judgment of many scholars such a claim of divinity, when he walked the earth, would have been impossible for him—he was a good Jew.

Jesus was against the corrupt money preoccupations of the high priests, the consequent commercialization of the Temple, the proliferation of rules and regulations that made God and the experience of worship a distant object rather than a present reality. He called for repentance and caring, even for a stranger, i.e., the parable of the good Samaritan. Ultimately, he spoke to a spiritual renewal—focusing on the need for the personal over the formal, the individual over tradition. He was a healing itinerant preacher announcing *the imminent presence* of God's kingdom on earth.

All the four Gospels were written in Greek. The Gospel of John particularly reflects Greek thought, in its appreciation of the transcendent Christ. Its content, however, reflects the failure to appreciate that the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth were distinct from the belief in the transcendent Christ. Tragically, as I have mentioned, this Gospel mirrors the growing distance between Jew and Christian. It is as if many of the early Christians emotionally and intellectually missed the obvious—Jesus, as the Christ, is a belief of faith. Consequently, it assumes a personal response—an act of faith—it is not a consequence of listening to Jesus' teachings, or the message that he was seen and experienced as alive after he was crucified. Such a belief is obviously an act of faith. Given

⁸Augustine used the story of Cain and Abel to assert that the Jews must not be persecuted since they were serving God's purpose—the Biblical reference is the prototypical story of fratricide. Jerome, the translator of the Bible into Latin, took a more negative view.

the mindset of many of the early believers, the ever-present narcissistic phantasy of possessing the truth, and the ever-present conviction of the imminent ending of the world—the Jews’ refusal to believe—was interpreted by many followers of Jesus as just that, an obstinate refusal, as if Christian belief was a self-evident reality. When the Temple was destroyed the early Christian community interpreted that as God’s judgment for their rejection of Jesus. Against such convictions, it is difficult to argue.

With the statement of Jesus as divine (Council of Nicaea in 325 – called by Emperor Constantine), the separation between Jew and Christian became irreversible. The participating bishops struggled, fought, and debated very different formulas in their articulation of Jesus as divine. One of the most common and popular formulas was that of Arius, whose belief made Jesus divine but not co-equal with God. When orthodox Christianity became the new state religion, under Constantine’s mandate, Jews and other religious minorities were de facto second-class citizens. What had been done to Christians by the state was now done to the Jews by the state, as well as by many Christians. A tragic history unfolded—ghettos, social and legal discriminations multiplied—the fruition of the bad self over the moral teaching of Jesus.

Belief became, all too often, a test and a weapon rather than an invitation. Difference was not welcomed, it was forbidden in Nazi Germany, it is not accepted in many places today.

Democratic consciousness is a hard-won achievement.

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Perspectives on Anti-Semitism

Helene Bass Wichelhaus

From an early age I was aware of the impact of anti-Semitism. I came from a committed Jewish background, with many Holocaust survivors in our family.

I focused on anti-Semitism in my doctoral work, which stemmed from some cases in my clinical work. At that time, I became connected with Dr. Judith Kestenberg, who was interviewing child survivors of the Holocaust. A major aspect of this study was a focus on the impact of Holocaust trauma on child development. I became co-chair of this study, now housed at The Hebrew University and Yad Vashem in Israel. Our findings have been published. I am still involved with this study, The Study of Organized Persecution of Children.

Definitions

The term “anti-Semitism” first emerged in 1879 in Germany as a “euphemistic substitute for ‘judenhass’, Jew hatred” (Prager and Telushkin, p. 199). It was coined by Wilhelm Marr, an anti-Jewish spokesman of that time. This term is actually a misnomer because anti-Semitism has nothing to do with Semites. The term evolved from a scholarly confusion in the previous century, when the word Semite was used to connote race as well as language.

According to Bernard Lewis, the Semites were never a race but were an ethnic group (Lewis, p. 50). The homeland of these Semites was probably the north Arabian desert, but they migrated into the Fertile Crescent and, through the Red Sea, to the Horn of Africa (ibid.). As an ethnic group, the Semites share some degree of racial homogeneity and language (ibid.). However, the Middle East of ancient times was peopled by other civilizations whose languages were diverse. One such group was the Canaanites, whose language dates back as far as the middle of the second millennium B.C. (ibid., p. 52). According to Lewis’ research, the Hebrew language was a derivative of Canaanite. Indeed, there is mention of the land of Canaan in the Biblical story of Abraham’s origins. In the

Bible, the Israelites are referred to as speaking “the language of Canaan” (ibid.). The other division of Semitic languages was Assyro-Babylonian, which became obscure and fell into oblivion by the sixth century B.C.

Lewis writes, “The Arabs are *by a long way* (italics mine) the last of the Semitic peoples to appear with a speaking role on the stage of history” (ibid., p. 55). The spread of Arabic by the Muslim prophet Muhammad and his followers brought linguistic unity to the countries that it influenced. It is the most widely spoken and written of Semitic language (ibid., p. 56). The second remaining Semitic language, but stemming from another people and ethnic group, is Hebrew. Surviving as a sacred language by Jews everywhere, Hebrew was revived within the last one hundred years by the early settlers in Palestine. It is now the official language of the State of Israel, which has as its second official language that of Arabic.

Anti-Semitism, in the context of this thesis, is defined as “attitudes and actions against Jews based on the belief that Jews are uniquely inferior, evil or deserving of condemnation by their very nature or by historical or supernatural dictates” (Grosser and Halperin, p. 5). It is a severe prejudice which goes beyond the boundaries of the prejudgment that is an underlying factor in prejudice (Ackerman and Jahoda, p. 3). It involves stereotyping and stereotyped thinking which

is distinguished from the prejudgment only by a greater degree of rigidity. Prejudgment occurs wherever facts are not available. But stereotyping is a process which shows little concern for facts when they are available (ibid., p. 4).

Ackerman and Jahoda propose that the psychological aspect underlying any definition of anti-Semitism as a prejudice is the presence of “a pattern of hostility in interpersonal relations which is directed against an entire group, or against its individual members; it fulfills a specific irrational function for its bearer” (ibid., p. 4).

For Prager and Telushkin, the term anti-Semitism does not connote either racial or ethnic prejudice, although it may share some aspects. They feel that the presence of *hatred* in the persecutor must be understood as being essentially different from that of prejudice. “This hatred must be understood as being very different from a prejudice” (Prager

and Telushkin, p. 25). They postulate that anti-Semitism is a response of hatred directed towards Jews and Judaism.

For Jean-Paul Sartre, anti-Semitism is defined as a “passion”, which emerges as hatred (Sartre, p. 10). He writes that

for the anti-Semite, what makes the Jew is the presence in him of “Jewishness,” a Jewish principle analogous to phlogiston or the soporific virtue of opium. We must not be deceived: explanations on the basis of heredity and race come later; they are the slender scientific coating of this primitive conviction (ibid., pp. 37–38).

There is a “metaphysical principle” that the anti-Semite magically applies to the Jew, which is that of doing evil. In turn, this makes the Jew on the level of the Devil. For the anti-Semite, hatred is therefore necessary because “the Jew is assimilable to the spirit of evil” (ibid., p. 40).

For Yehuda Bauer, anti-Semitism connotes many levels of meaning, usually related to a specific period in history. He writes,

It is one thing to talk of religious hostility or racial discrimination or murderous intent such as that of pogromists in Tsarist Russia. It is quite another thing to talk about social discrimination... . Accusing Jews of Christ-killing is one action, but it is another to translate that into burning people at the stake —though the latter may derive from the former. Nazi anti-Semitism and current Soviet anti-Semitism are—one ought perhaps to add, “thank God”—quite different things (Bauer, p. 2).

Bauer takes an interesting point of view towards those who emphasize the emotional component in defining anti-Semitism. He states that prior to the emotional component developing, there must be an intellectual component. “I believe the key to any contemporary investigation of Jew hatred is that *anti-Semitism will always be an intellectual or ideological movement before it becomes a mass phenomenon*” (ibid., p. 3). Bauer relates this to the powerful influence of thought over the acceptance of reality (ibid., p. 4).

Rudolph Loewenstein defines three essential aspects in anti-Semitism, which he applies to behavioral patterns. He writes that these are

(1) an attitude of personal vigilance and distrust of Jews, which may crystallize into overt and obsessive dislike; (2) Judeophobia—a mixture of hatred, fear, contempt, and disgust for Jews; (3) a “delusional” or “paranoid” form of anti-Semitism, the victims of which are convinced of the existence of a world-wide Jewish plot for the enslavement and destruction of the Aryan world (Loewenstein, pp. 16–17).

Thus, Loewenstein makes a case for the connection of anti-Semitism and emotional disorder.

Literature Review

Scholars from varying fields have written about anti-Semitism. In the following material, these ideas will be described so as to broaden the understanding of anti-Semitism in its environment, where it affects both individuals and groups, and where it stems from both individuals and groups.

Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin, both historians, describe their understanding of anti-Semitism as being a hatred directed at Jews and Judaism. They describe four basic reasons for anti-Semitism, of which the first is the hatred of Judaism and its challenge. Describing that Judaism is divided into three components of “God, Torah (laws and teachings), and Israel (Jewish nationhood)” these authors claim that each is a target for anti-Semites (Prager and Telushkin, p. 27). The God of the Jews, being the only God in the world, demands certain moral obligations to be fulfilled. Anti-Semites target the Jews because the legitimacy of other gods and the morality that is practiced is threatened. They write that

a basic element of antisemitism is, therefore, a rebellion against the thou shalt and the thou shalt not introduced by the Jews in the name of a supreme moral authority. One explanation for the antimonotheism roots of antisemitism is offered by the contemporary (non-Jewish) social psychologist Ernest van den Haag: “Fundamental to [anti-Semitism] . . . though seldom explicit and conscious, is hostility to the Jewish belief in one God, a belief to which antisemites very reluctantly converted and which they never ceased to resist. . . . One cannot dare to be hostile to one’s all-powerful God. but one can be to those who generated Him. . . .” (ibid., p. 28).

Prager and Telushkin posit that the Christian belief in the divinity of Jesus, which is contrary to the Jewish idea of monotheism, brought additional hatred to the Jews because

the Jews came to constitute the one group in the Christian world to deny the fundamental tenet, the defining characteristic, of Christianity, the divinity of Jesus. The Jews' monotheism which dictated this denial *has been the single most important factor* in Christian anti-Semitism (Prager and Telushkin, p. 80, italics mine).

This rejection of a basic tenet of the neighboring peoples has continually provoked hatred towards Jews. It is evident even in the Soviet Union, where the Jewish dissidents deny the basic tenets of Communism “just as their ancestors challenged the deities of ancient Rome or the divinity of Jesus” (ibid., p. 31). To continually deny what is reversed and worshiped by others engenders anti-Semitism.

Prager and Telushkin's second focus is Jewish law, which they feel is an additional component that solidifies the hatred towards the Jewish God. “The first aim of Jewish law is to have the Jew express his affirmation of God and denial of other gods in daily actions” (ibid., p. 32). Many additional laws dictated how Jews should live their lives, which was contrary to or different from their neighbors. “Had the Jews removed themselves from society, or been social failures, while adhering to their distinctiveness, they would have provoked far less hostility” (ibid., p. 33). The Jews' emphasis on performing the good deeds according to Jewish law was seen by many gentiles as a “denial of salvation through Christ” (ibid., p. 34). The fact that so many Jews are not currently so observant of Jewish law does not mitigate against these authors' argument because

thousands of years of observance continue to influence their behavior. The generally higher quality of Jews' lives, as exemplified by the stability of the family life, significant lower rates of intoxication and wife beating, higher education, greater professional success, much less violent crime, and greater communal solidarity, has been due solely to millennia of adherence to Jewish law, and has provoked profoundly ambivalent reactions from non-Jews (ibid., pp. 34-35).

The Jewish nation, the third source, provides for a major source of anti-Semitism as connected with Zionism and racism.

In the age of religion, the Jews were offered equality on the condition that they abandon their religion and convert... In the new age of nationalism, the Jews were offered equality on the condition that they abandon their national identity and adopt the majority's national identity. In both ages opponents of the Jews have delivered the same message: cease being Jews (*ibid.*, pp. 36–37).

Nowadays, many nations seek to deny the right of Israel to live as a nation. Therefore, they do not call themselves anti-Semites, but anti-Zionists. “But the major difference between antisemites throughout Jewish history and today's anti-Zionists is only which component of Judaism each has found most intolerable (*ibid.*, p. 37).

Prager and Telushkin focus on the chosen people idea as a fourth basis for anti-Semitism. Defining the chosen people idea as the belief that God chose the Jews to spread ethical monotheism, these authors point out that this does not confer anything more than obligation and suffering. “The Jews are chosen only to complete a task” (*ibid.*, p. 43). The chosen people idea has been interpreted negatively because it connotes superiority, which engenders hostility and hatred. The chosen idea and other distinct aspects of Jewish life are thought to have had a pronounced effect upon other people. So seriously was the Jews' chosenness taken by the Christians

...that among the first beliefs adopted by them was that the Church had taken over divine election from the Jews. The Church leaders did not deny Jewish chosenness; rather they so believed in it that they sought to appropriate it to themselves (*ibid.*, pp. 40–41).

A scholar of Near Eastern studies, Bernard Lewis, concludes that anti-Semitism is a new force in the Arab world, compared to its long history in Europe. Lewis, tracing the history of anti-Semitism throughout Christianity, compared it to the emerging Arabic anti-Semitism of modern times. His thesis is that Arab anti-Semitism became increasingly virulent as Israel became a dominant force in the Middle East.

The philosophical and literary anti-Semitism of Christendom is an expression of certain deep-rooted and persistent fears and accusations. These ... are for the most part unknown to the classical Islamic world. The Jews under the Muslim rule received little praise or even respect, and were sometimes blamed for various misdeeds. They were not, however, accused of being inherently evil or conspiring to take over the world. It was not until many centuries later that this kind of paranoia began to infect the Muslim world (Lewis, p. 127).

The basis for this long history devoid of major anti-Semitism is that “the outstanding characteristic ... of the Jews as seen and treated in the classical Islamic world is their unimportance” (ibid., p. 126). Lewis observed that even with the rise of modern Arab anti-Semitism, there is “the absence... —with few exceptions—of the kind of deep, intimate hatred characteristic of the classic anti-Semite in Central and Eastern Europe and sometimes elsewhere” (ibid., p. 257). Nevertheless, the Arab anti-Semitism is quite powerful.

The presence of anti-Semitism in the Arab world now is traced by Lewis to the change in image of the Jew in the world. The Jew was no longer a minor presence, to be tolerated at best, after the Israeli war victories. Lewis writes,

Most of all, the sense of [Arab] outrage, as is clearly shown in countless speeches and writings, was due to the identity of those who inflicted these dramatic defeats in Muslim Arab armies and imposed their rule on Muslim Arab populations. The victors were not the followers of a world religion nor the armies of a might imperial power, by which one could be conquered without undue shame—not the Catholic kings of Spain, not the far-flung British Empire, not the immense and ruthless might of Russia—but the Jews, few, scattered and powerless, whose previous humility made their triumphs especially humiliating (ibid., p. 289).

It was due to this tremendous narcissistic injury to Arab pride and tradition that Arab anti-Semitism emerged. The Arabs then adopted the Nazi-type anti-Semitic material. The groundwork for this was laid during the Second World War, where contacts were made between Arab

leaders and Nazi officials (Lewis, pp. 140–163). The end result is that Nazi material has been woven into the highest intellectual discussions and publications. Lewis writes of this as follows,

Since 1945, and in many regions for long before that, explicit antisemitic literature was published and read only within the lunatic fringes of society, and its influence has in recent times been minimal. This can no longer be said of the Arab world. The volume of anti-Semitic books and articles published, the size and number of editions and impressions, and eminence and authority of those who write, publish, and sponsor them, their place in school and college curricula, their role in the mass media, would all seem to suggest that classical antisemitism is an essential part of Arab intellectual life at the present time—almost as much as happened in Nazi Germany, and considerably more than in late nineteenth century France, where the clamor of the anti-Dreyfusards was answered by at least equally powerful voices in defense of reason and tolerance (*ibid.*, p. 256).

There is frequent use of the many old forms of anti-Semitic attacks taken from the West, such as inferior racial characteristics, world domination and conspiracy charges, and ritual murder accusations. Thus, the old forms of anti-Semitism have been incorporated into drab propaganda and intellectual life. They do not, however, have the type of impact that the two-thousand-year-old Western anti-Semitism has. This does not mean, however, that the form and impact are less virulent.

For Shmuel Ettinger, a scholar of modern anti-Semitism, the overriding motivation of current Soviet anti-Semitism is to provide the Russian people with a negative portrait of the Jew, in much the same manner as a scapegoat. An underlying motivation is to diffuse the hostility engendered by the dictatorial government towards the Jews as a target.

The role assigned to the Jews within these ideological arguments, that of evil throughout history, the main opposition to all the positive trends in history, constitutes a real threat to Jewish existence. As long as the Soviet government keeps an iron grip on the population of the USSR, including all its constituents, it is difficult to believe that social or ideological upheavals could give rise

to far-reaching changes. But I foresee, with dread, a development that many predict as well, the fall of the Soviet government. If this development does not come about, the first to fall victim to the counter-revolution will be the Jews of the USSR who will be presented as the confirmed enemies of the Russian people (Ettinger, pp. 21–22).

For Ettinger, the main motif of Soviet anti-Semitism derives from the long history of Western and Russian anti-Semitism. What has become a particularly forceful theme relates to the chosen people idea. Ettinger describes the thinking of this motif as follows:

According to these propagandists, Zionism is a racist ideology, for it is based on “Judaic” principles which claim that the Jews are a chosen people. The term “a chosen people” means that the Jews may enslave, oppress and exploit other peoples with the aim of ruling the world. There exists an international conspiracy of Jews whose purpose is to make themselves rulers of the world (ibid., p. 15).

One such variation of this theme is that the Jewish Zionists cooperated with the Nazis to achieve the goal of the establishment of the State of Israel. Many other variations are promoted in this type of propaganda, such as the idea that the white collar positions in the USSR are held mainly by Jews. Ettinger traces this to an acute underlying class division between the lower class peasants and the urban intellectuals. “Matters have come to such a pass that among the lower classes it is popularly believed that the rulers of the USSR are mainly Jews. There were even those who claimed Brezhnev was a Jew” (ibid., p. 18).

Irwin Cotler, speaking on International anti-Semitism, at a conference entitled “Anti-Semitism: Threat to Western Civilization” on October 27, 1985, described eight components in modern anti-Semitism. He described that the classical formulation, where Jews are denied the right to live in a free society, is replaced by the new formulation, where Israel is denied the right to live in the world as a country.

Cotler delineated eight components of the new anti-Semitism. The first is political anti-Semitism, which finds expression in delegitimizing the Jewish people and Israel. This is seen in the United Nations’ numerous

resolutions declaring Zionism is racism. There is a silence of the world community to these numerous resolutions, which becomes a prisoner, permeating the formula “Zionism is racism” into “Zionism is Nazism”. The second component, ideological anti-Semitism, occurs where the negative stereotypes of the past, such as Nazism, find contemporary counterparts. Therefore the Zionist, seen as racist, is seen also as a supporter of apartheid. The third is the public-legal character of anti-Semitism. This is not just propaganda, but formalized resolutions, as in the U.N. Cotler described the increased number of anti-Semitic incidents that emerged in Canada and Great Britain, following the passage of these U.N. resolutions. The fourth is the political-legal variant of anti-Semitism, which results in denial to Jewish particularity, in whatever form, in having equal access to international law. On a substantive level, this results in the obsessive condemnation of Israel. Among his many examples, Cotler cited how the Israeli delegate was denied the right to speak at the Copenhagen Conference on Women in 1980. The fifth is political anti-Semitism as a double orb. Cotler cited examples of politicians who feared the impact of disapproval of anti-Semitic nations, and voted accordingly. One such member of the U.S. Senate changed his vote because he feared certain reprisals. The sixth area is economic anti-Semitism where international repercussions are imposed on companies that do business with, hire, or promote, Jews. The seventh is the dimension of anti-Semitic terror. Cotler cited a study in which over 50 percent of all terrorist acts between 1980-1984 in Europe were against Jews or Jewish establishments. The eighth is a political-ideological- judicial anti-Semitism. Cotler here referred to groups that wish to “steal” the Holocaust with revisionistic views. Therefore, Jews are seen as collaborating with Nazis, converting the idea of a death camp to a recreational center, in order to get reparation money to build the State of Israel.

The philosopher and writer, Jean-Paul Sartre, writing after the Holocaust, reflects upon the issue of anti-Semitism in society. Obviously concerned about the nature of anti-Semitism, Sartre states that anti-Semitism does not have the right to exist “within the category of ideas protected by the right of free opinion” (Sartre, p. 10). Opinions or ideas that are aimed at extermination and/or suppression of others should be seen as passions having underlying hatred. Sartre’s understanding of anti-Semitism is that of a necessary scapegoat and target

for society's deep hatreds. "Far from experience producing his idea of the Jew, it was the latter which explained his experience. If the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him" (ibid., p. 13). For Sartre, the idea of the Jew is essential to understanding anti-Semitism. The idea of the Jew is incorporated by man, via his free choice, into anti-Semitism. When the anti-Semite adopts one of the negative stereotyped ideas of the Jew, he is projecting his hatred onto a psychologically needed target. "Anti-Semitism is a free and total choice of oneself, a comprehensive attitude that one adopts not only towards Jews but toward men in general, toward history and society; it is at one and the same time a passion and a conception of the world" (ibid., p. 17).

A special characteristic is that it is unprovoked by actual events in reality, existing more in the minds of men. "But ordinarily hate and anger have *provocation*: I have someone who has made me suffer, someone who condemns or insults me. We have just seen that anti-Semitic passion could not have such a character" (ibid., p. 19). False reasoning appears to be a state of imperviousness, which is taken to a height of producing fear and terror in others. The anti-Semite "has chosen to find his being entirely outside himself, never to look within, to be nothing save the fear he inspires in others" (ibid., p. 21). The Jew becomes the living representative of Satan, free to do all evil. The anti-Semite can blame all evil on the Jews.

The anti-Semite is afraid of discovering that the world is ill-contrived, for then it would be necessary for him to invent and modify, with the result that man would be the master of his own destinies, burdened with an agonizing and infinite responsibility. Thus he localizes all the evil of the universe in the Jew (ibid., p. 40).

Sartre explains that the anti-Semite does not seek to rebuild society but merely to purge society of its so-called evil. In the process, sadism towards Jews can be promulgated.

But since Evil, to the anti-Semite, is incarnated in unarmed and harmless men, the latter never finds himself under the painful necessity of being heroic. It is *fun* to be an anti-Semite. One can beat and torture Jews without fear

Sartre postulates that because of the sadistic nature of the anti-Semite,

he must surround himself with Jews. Viewing this psychoanalytically, Sartre states that the anti-Semite gains pleasure by these contacts with his potential victims because of “a sort of inversion of their sadism; they take pleasure in keeping under their eyes the living image of this people whom they execrate” (ibid., p. 48).

Sartre includes as sadistic the sexual aspects of the relationship between anti-Semite and Jew. He writes that the term “a beautiful Jewess” has

a very special sexual signification, different from that contained in the words “beautiful Rumanian”, “beautiful Greek”, or “beautiful American” This phrase carries an aura of rape and massacre. The “beautiful Jewess” is she whom the Cossacks under the Czars dragged by her hair And the special works which are given over to accounts of flagellation reserve a place of honor for the Jewess. But it is not necessary to look into esoteric literature ... [because] the Jewess has a well-defined function in even the most serious novels. Frequently violated or beaten, she sometimes succeeds in escaping dishonor by means of death, but that is a form of justice; and those who keep their virtue are docile servants or humiliated women in love with indifferent Christians who marry Aryan women. I think nothing more is needed to indicate the place the Jewess holds as a sexual symbol in folklore.

A destroyer in function, a sadist with a pure heart the anti-Semite is, in the depths of his heart, a criminal. What he wishes, what he prepares, is the *death* of the Jew (ibid., pp. 48–49).

The theme of the annihilation and inversion preoccupies Sartre, to the point that he considers anti-Semitic acts as reflecting the primitive ritual of human sacrifice which assures the favor of the gods. In becoming an anti-Semite, a man reflects his inhumanity. “Anti-Semitism, in short, is a fear of the human condition” (ibid., p. 54). Sartre concludes that

contrary to a widespread opinion, it is not the Jewish character that provokes anti-Semitism but, rather, that it is the anti-Semite who creates the Jew. The primary phenomenon, therefore, is anti-Semitism, a regressive social force and a conception deriving from the prelogical world (ibid., p. 143).

For Sartre, anti-Semitism is a barometer of the spread of Evil in the world. Therefore, to counteract Evil, the world must be willing to accept that the fate of the Jews is a barometer of the fate of the world. No one can be secure as long as Jews fear for their lives.

Nathan Ackerman and Marie Jahoda's study *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation* was a research study of anti-Semitic patients in treatment in the U.S.A. Published in 1950, it was based on therapists' and analysts' data on their patients, without direct contact between the authors and their patients. From this study, the authors collated their findings in a description of the psychodynamics of the anti-Semite. Not surprisingly, the authors found that anti-Semitism covers a range of pathologies, from neuroses to psychoses to character disorders. What is surprising is that they found the absence of deep depression in the cases studied. "In this broad range of diagnoses and vague symptoms, however, one type of disturbance becomes conspicuous through its absence. None of the cases manifested a genuine, deep *depression* (Ackerman and Jahoda, p. 25). This is attributed to the apparent contradiction of excessive self-blame concomitant with projection onto the outside world. The authors note that this does not preclude "a depression reaction before or after anti-Semitic manifestations in one and the same individual. Such alternate patterns of depressive moods and outbursts of anti-Semitism were indeed reported in a few cases" (ibid., p. 26).

Ackerman and Jahoda found certain emotional predispositions to anti-Semitism, such as anxiety; confusion of the concept of the self; unsatisfactory interpersonal relationships; conformity and the fear of the different; impaired reality adaptation; and impaired conscience development and repression. They summarize their lengthy discussion on each of these predispositions as follows:

Each of these individuals is plagued by pervasive anxiety. Deeply confused in his own self-image, he derives no strength from his personal identity with which to face a menacing world. His personal relationships are shallow and unsatisfying. His group relationships are characterized by an exaggerated surface conformity, beneath which lurks a primitive, untamed hostility. Within his group the slightest indication of nonconformity appears as a threat.

Outside his group, differences are exaggerated. Lacking a basis of genuine identification, he tends in a compensatory way to define his group status by reference to qualities he does not actually possess. He achieves only a partial adaptation to reality, and is unable to develop spontaneous and genuine personal relationships. His conscience is underdeveloped and unreliable, his repressions incomplete and inefficient, thereby necessitating recourse to the laborious tasks of conscious repression (*ibid.*, pp. 39–40).

(The authors note that their portrait of the anti-Semite is similar to Jean-Paul Sartre's in his writings.) These emotional factors do not appear as isolated traits *per se*, but emerge in a psychodynamic interrelationship within the personality.

The emotional predisposition cannot produce the entire picture, which Ackerman and Jahoda recognize. They sought to understand the genesis of these predispositions, which were described in their findings. The first, the relationship between the parents of the anti-Semite, revealed poor marital adjustments in every case.

At best, only the semblance of a respectable family union was preserved through conformity to conventional standards. Basically, there was no warmth, affection, or sympathy between the parents; and what little evidence of the sexual adaptation between the parents is available indicates that sexual relations were unsatisfactory (*ibid.*, pp. 43–44).

They describe sharply contrasting personalities in the parents. "Even where such basic differences were not understood by the children, the fundamental hostility between the parents was inescapably felt" (*ibid.*, p. 44). Children often felt these differences stemmed from the different groups and backgrounds the parents came from, which was understood as the tangible basis for the parental difficulties.

Such an emphasis had, from the child's point of view, the apparent advantage... . They at least provided a name for the lack of ease, warmth, and unity in the family ... [namely] difference in group membership (*ibid.*, pp. 44–45).

The second factor concerns the relationship of the patients as children.

Among the factors that affect the predisposition to anti-Semitism are rejection and narcissistic exploitation of the child. This child becomes skilled in pretending to be submissive, while aggression and rage lie underneath. Excessive compliance during the anal stage results in aggressive derivatives emerging in the later stages of development. The third factor concerns the oedipal struggle where there is an incomplete resolution, characterized by “incomplete incorporation of the parental images” (ibid., p. 49). This produces “lifelong indecisiveness and confusion as to sexual identity”, resulting in a sense of weakness, which is defended against by an attack on the Jews, perceived as a weak group (ibid.).

Ackerman and Jahoda also describe the major ego defenses that were prevalent in the patients they studied. They include rationalization as an aspect of each of the other defenses. In projection, the anti-Semite finds his *modus operandi*. “From the psychoanalytic point of view, the character pattern in such persons favors ‘acting out,’ seeking the relief of emotional tension through impulsive expression, as an attempted solution of inner conflict (ibid., p. 56). It is reinforced by the negative stereotype of the Jew for over two thousand years.

For the anti-Semite, the Jew is a living Rorschach ink-blot. His alleged and sometimes actual qualities are so manifold and so inconsistent, so ambiguous and so indeterminate, that the anti-Semite sees whatever he needs to see in the Jew (ibid., p. 58).

With the use of denial, in an interplay with projection, a vicious cycle is formed. This emerges as a result of the failure of projection and the recourse to denial. The process itself creates increasing anxiety.

Anti-Semitism appears to serve the purpose of fortifying every step in the defense pattern. A denial sounds more convincing when it is substantiated by the rejection of an external group which is alleged to have those qualities which the anti-Semite wishes to renounce or deny in himself (ibid., p. 62).

The authors describe that an underlying component in these defenses may be a wish to conform.

Having submissively denied parts of their own individuality, such persons feel deep resentment against anyone who does not do

likewise. They demand that other persons should conform to the same restrictions ... [which are] a result of partial self-denial (*ibid.*, p. 63).

Another defense was social aggression as a substitute for anxiety, where the aggression is utilized in the service of denying one's passivity. "For at least that limited time during which they try to intimidate others, they may escape the need to face their own anxiety" (*ibid.*, p. 63). This is culturally tinged with the acceptability and availability of the Jew as a target in any given society. In the culture of America in 1950, Ackerman and Jahoda find that for the most part this defense is not fixed, but remains labile, with alternations between overt anxiety and withdrawal. The defense of avoidance of contact, or withdrawal, oscillates with direct attack.

Like straws in the wind, these anti-Semites are tossed about because of their inability to make a clear-cut distinction between their own selves and the surrounding world... Lacking well-established internalized standards they are likely to affiliate themselves with groups which give them pseudo-strength by providing outlets for their hostilities (*ibid.*, p. 65).

Closely associated with these defenses is that of opposition, linked to the use of social aggression as a substitute for anxiety relief. Other defenses include displacement, reaction formation, compensation, and introjection.

What compensatory mechanisms aim to achieve in the sphere of social status, introjection attempts on the psychic level. Introjection ... is an attempt to take into oneself what appears to be desirable in other persons (*ibid.*, p. 68).

These people seek to "borrow" an identity, "partly by introjection, but perhaps mainly by imitation, they build up a borrowed identity" (*ibid.*).

David Terman, a psychoanalyst, writes about anti-Semitism from a Kohutian point of view. Kohut's understanding of the Self and narcissism is that the traumatized Self, with its resultant narcissistic rage, produces "arrogance, intolerance, insensitivity, prejudice, bigotry and relentless revenge" (Terman, p. 18). The concept of narcissistic rage is based on

underlying feelings of entitlement. When an injury to the self occurs in the immature personality, “the sense of the entitlement of the injured is proportional to the insensitivity of the perpetrator” (ibid., p. 19).

Transferring this to the concept of the group ideal, Terman postulates that the Jew was the perpetrator who did not accept the Christian’s ideals. This triggered the narcissistic rage of the Christians.

In the long history of western Christendom, the Jew became the very symbol of the invalidator of the Ideal—questioner, free-thinker, dissenter... . Traditionally, the target of narcissistic rage from the injury to Christianity, the Jew was the suitable object of the German’s rage over their shattered national pride. The German Reich, adhering to an Ideal both post-Christian and pagan, was, however, willing to annihilate the offending separatist: it had no further need for Jewish witness.

Anti-Semitism is a symptom of a historical process in which humanity’s reach for a universal binding ideal has failed (ibid., p. 24).

Otto Fenichel attempts to understand the mass psychology of the people. He reviews the idea that anti-Semitism gives the masses a means to satisfy “these two contradictory tendencies at the same time ... [namely] the rebellious tendency through destructive actions against defenseless people, and the respectful tendency through obedient action in response to the command of the ruling powers” (Fenichel, 1946, p. 337). Although this scapegoat theory is essentially correct, Fenichel postulates that it is not sufficiently deep enough. His idea is that the Jews’ history of being a different type of people makes the others feel that the Jews are therefore capable of doing anything imaginable. This issue relates to the history of the Jewish people, particularly to their survival. “Subsequently, their strangeness gave the impression of something archaic, of something left over from ancient times—which the non-Jew himself had overcome...” (ibid., p. 339). Psychologically, there is an equation of foreign equaling hostile. In addition, “one’s own unconscious is also foreign [and] foreignness is the quality which the Jews and one’s own instincts have in common” (ibid., p. 341).

Fenichel connects this with Freud’s ideas about “the uncanny.” The uncanny events seem to prove that something improbable can be true after all. He writes:

To the average person, a murderer, in particular a parricide, or someone guilty of incest is uncanny, because each of us has felt such impulses—and later repressed them. Conversely, a person or race which is any way uncanny, is capable of murder and incest. [Therefore] the Jew with his unintelligible language and incomprehensible God appears uncanny to non-Jews, not only because they cannot understand him ... but even more so because, somewhere in the depths, they can understand him very well, for his customs are archaic, that is, they exhibit elements which the no—Jews once had but lost later (ibid., p. 341).

Fenichel points out that the oppressed Jew is seen as having an endless vengeance. The anti-Semites, as well as those in power over the Jews, cannot imagine that the Jews do not harbor a vast storehouse of revenge for their oppressors.

They recognize archaic, deep features in their behavior, and they know how revengeful they themselves would be... . That which they had believed to be overcome appears to rise again and again like a hydra, and they try to cut off its heads (ibid., p. 342).

The oppressors and anti-Semites attempt to deal with their disavowed instincts and fears via contempt, disregard and projection (ibid.). What makes this an uncanny phenomena is that the seemingly defenseless Jews overcome their oppressors, somehow managing to rise again.

An additional aspect contributing to uncanniness is the Jewish religion itself. Fenichel postulates that the God of the Jews, totally without any concrete image, reflects upon archaic fears of looking at the forbidden object, which is a universal. Fenichel understands that this relates to a number of unconscious derivatives. First, “the sight of God (among primitive people the sight of the king, his representative) means death” (ibid., p. 343). The next aspect relates to the idea that what is forbidden to be seen must be “terrible, however inspiring—an ugly sight” (ibid.). Fenichel reflects on the third aspect of God, as being wonderful, beneficent. Therefore, the God of the Jews has an uncanny aspect in its double nature, which merges with “the double character of wonder and fear, inherent in foreigners ... in terms of the feeling one has for strange gods. ... (ibid.).

Because it can be unbearably difficult to have these double feelings at the same time, people have divided loving and hateful aspects of God into two parts, “their own God, who is good and beautiful, and the strange one who is wicked and ugly” (ibid., p. 344).¹ Fenichel writes that “many religious systems are dualistic. They have a good and bad principle... ” (Fenichel, p. 344). This is usually separated into God who is good and the devil who is evil. It is the devil, seen as more uncanny than God, who symbolizes strangeness, revenge and differences.

The devil is always suitable as a carrier of the projection of one’s own instinctual impulses; he is murderous, dirty, debauched, a tempter, and a deceiver. It is clear to the anti-Semite that the Jewish God, and thus the Jew, is the devil, the anti-Christ, the wicked principle directed against God, which crucified God. The devil, too, characteristically is despised and dreaded at the same time (ibid., p. 344).

For non-Jews, the fear is that the Jew, representing the devil, will attempt to change them, either by magic or by death and resurrection, into Jews.

Fenichel focuses on the aspect of circumcision, which Freud associated with anti-Semitism (Freud, 1909). Reviewing the idea that the uncircumcised fear a revenge in the form of circumcision, Fenichel traces this to an archaic initiation ceremony that has aspects of the uncanny. It certainly relates to fears of being castrated by those who are circumcised. Thus, the revenge can be seen in sexual terms.

The Jews will do something to the little girls of other races in the same way that they do something sanguinary [or] sexual to the little boys of their own race. Psychoanalysts are of the opinion, therefore, that circumcision, which is strange—yet familiar in unconscious depths—operates in the same way as the other customs which make the Jew appropriate as a devil-projection (ibid., p. 346).

For Fenichel, “the anti-Semite arrives at his hate of the Jews by a process of displacement, stimulated from without” (ibid., p. 347). In order

¹This is similar to the idea of splitting the good and bad aspects of the object (Mahler, pp. 117–120).

for anti-Semitism to become a mass movement, there must be two factors present which tend to interrelate. The first is the tradition of Jew as scapegoat; the second is the separateness of Jewish life within a host culture. Although Fenichel recognizes that these are not the only factors that must play a part, he is limited in his ability to delve further. He explains that the psychological explanation is limited but that further sociological, political and economic studies may provide further insights into the phenomena of mass anti-Semitism.

Stanley Rosenman, a psychoanalyst, reviewing anti-Semitism in German legends and the formation of Jewish identity, finds that the archetypal image of the living dead is applied and projected onto the Jews. The idea of the living dead has two aspects:

First, the person feels hobbled in living his life, depressed, not fully alive. Biological and social restraints generate a rage to kill the Parent-God responsible for these fettering conditions. The decadal fury is turned inward so that the person craves non-consciousness, even death, to release him from his painful conflicts (Rosenman, p. 244).

The idea of death is seen as appeasement or punishment for the wish to destroy God. This, in turn, produces further depression, intensifying the lifeless, dead feeling. The second aspect of the idea of the living dead relates to the presence of the uncanny. Here the archetypal images appear to dwell within the psyche, “like unwelcome guests, with no independent sources of life, just devouring their host’s life [like] ghostly apparitions of the past that bedevil and cripple their host” (ibid.). These aspects are externalized onto the Jews, who are viewed as “parasitic, odious intruders of the homeland ... [where] Jews are [seen as] a necrophilic race that has lived past its time” (ibid.).

Rosenman states that in addition to this psychological externalization of the living dead, the anti-Semite seeks to create the conditions that make this a reality. The history of anti-Semitism, with its tortures and pogroms, certainly prepared the stage for the Holocaust. The anti-Semite imposes conditions “on the Jews that sap all desire to live, that make life feel like an imposed burden. [For example] Wiesel graphically describes how Jews were reduced to the living dead in the murder camps”

(*ibid.*). The anti-Semite is drawn to necrophilia as a defense against his own inner deadness and as an acting out of the underlying rage. He seeks to impose death rather than becoming dead. In addition,

The anti-Semite's conception of the Jew as yearning for death facilitates not only the defensive projection of the former's intrigue with death, but also the enactment of the loving-of-death cravings with the Jew as their object. Even when, as in the Middle Ages, ransoming kidnapped Jewish corpses, or during the Holocaust, enjoying household artifacts made from Jewish bodies, the victimizer can deny his exhilarated intrigue with death: it is the Jew who is the necrophile (*ibid.*, p. 245).

For Rosenman, the wish to annihilate is clearly present in the anti-Semite. It is seen as stemming from intrapsychic projections of the subject's own rage. What is unacceptable with the psyche is projected onto the Jews.

Erik Erikson discusses his ideas about anti-Semitism in his article on the psychodynamics of Adolf Hitler, whose anti-Semitism is seen as multi-determined, stemming from envy, projection, and Hitler's family background. Erikson emphasizes the brutality of Hitler's father and the passive-aggressiveness of his mother as promoting Hitler's predisposition towards anti-Semitism and violence.² Jews were seen as sub-humans, subject to inhumane treatment. Regarding Hitler's anti-Semitic dynamics, Erikson writes,

It is obvious enough that much envy was hidden in Hitler's fantastic overestimation of the Jewish "danger," embodied as it was in such a small part of the population, and a highly intellectualized one at that. But as we have said, the narrow German always felt endangered, denationalized, by information which exposed him to the relativity and diversity of cultural values. The Jew seemed to remain himself despite dispersion over the world, while the German trembled for the identity in his own country. In fact, these mysterious Jews seemed to be making of intellectual relativity a means of racial self-preservation. To some Germans, this was not understandable without assuming an especially devious chauvinism, a

²Alice Miller elaborates on his theme in her essay, "Adolph Hitler's Childhood: From Hidden to Manifest Horror."

hidden Jewish pact with Fate (Erikson, p. 353).

This latter idea, “the hidden pact,” has a relationship to the ideas of the Jews as the Devil and the chosen people. Erikson finds that these are similar to German chauvinistic ideation (ibid.).

Erikson’s understanding of anti-Semitism in Germany includes ideas on Jewish identity. “Jewry is a singular example of an old entity which clings to its identity—be it racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural—in such a way that it is felt to be a danger to emerging identities (ibid., p. 354). Erikson first finds that the ideals of the adolescent were represented in Hitler’s approach to the German people in that he appealed as an older sibling to a brotherhood or gang, rather than as a father to children. Taking this a step further, Erikson finds that the German’s adolescent-like mentality was threatened with castration by the circumcised Jews, with further derivative phobias relating to the spread of venereal disease.

In addition, Erikson examines Jewish identity from a dialectical approach, wherein two divergent trends express themselves, “dogmatic orthodoxy” and “opportunistic adaptability” (ibid., p. 354).

We may think here of types, such as the religiously dogmatic, culturally reactionary Jew, to whom change and time mean absolutely nothing; the letter is his reality. And we may think of his opposite, the Jew whose geographic dispersion and cultural multiplicity have become “second nature”: relativism becomes for him the absolute, exchange value his tool (ibid., p. 355).

Erikson traces these components in a brief analysis of three Jews whose ideas strongly impacted upon this century, namely Marx, Freud, and Einstein, attributing their genius to the dialectical integration of their culture and their Jewishness. “... These thinkers climaxed the cultural and scientific crisis of Europe not because they were Jews, but because they were Jews *and* Germans *and* Europeans” (ibid., p. 356). Erikson concludes that “strong eras and strong countries assimilate the contributions of strong Jews because their sense of identity is enhanced by progressive redefinitions” (ibid.). When this does not happen, as during periods of crisis or anxiety, the identity of a country is threatened by suggestions of further change, particularly from those of a defined other identity.

In their effort to find a platform of conservatism, they cling with grim single-mindedness to few absolutes which they hope will save them. It is at this point that paranoid antisemitism is aroused by agitators of many descriptions and purposes, who exploit mass cowardice and mass cruelty (ibid., p. 357).

Rudolph Loewenstein places the roots of anti-Semitic development during the latency stage of psycho-social development, when most children are given religious instruction. Relating to ideas of parricide, which the child has during his oedipal stage, Loewenstein posits that

on a spiritual level the young Christian benefits by the crucifixion. On a psychological, unconscious, level the crucifixion represents to him the culmination of the unconscious death wishes of his oedipal period. The Jew is held responsible for the crime from which the Christian reaps moral and psychological benefit in redemption from sin. Thus the Christian child learns not only that the Jews were essential to Christianity in the past; he learns that they can serve even now as the scapegoat for the personal sins of every Christian (Loewenstein, p. 41).

During the latency stage, the child's superego development receives reinforcement from this religious training. The child identifies with the Christ Child and associates God the Father with the older generation, because God was recognized first by the Jews. In the latency age child's mind, the Jews are identified with their own fathers. From here, it is only one step to the selection of the Jews as the object to be scapegoated. Loewenstein states that although the Christian religion can provide this prototype for hatred of Jews, it can also offer the means to overcome such hatred (ibid., p. 43).

The psychological effect of the teaching of the Crucifixion depends primarily on the level of emotional development of the child. For Loewenstein, the love and hate feelings towards the father are particularly crucial to the development of anti-Semitism. In addition, ambivalence towards the parents, the predominance of projection, and environmental factors, are predisposing adjuncts for the development of anti-Semitism. "A long tradition of anti-Semitism affords the opportunity to any individual in times of stress to concentrate all his aggressions on the Jew" (ibid., p. 297).

Loewenstein's main point is that there is an imprint left on the individual by tradition [which] has its parallel in the historical evolution of this tradition. The historical role of Israel in the birth of Christianity was the mainspring for all anti-Semitic feelings, which are based psychologically on the same forces activated in children of the contemporary world ... (ibid.).

Depending on the child's psychological make-up, the material can be channeled into anti-Semitic ideation and acts. In this way, there is a mutually interdependent role between Christians and Jews, called "cultural pairing," which Loewenstein feels is the underlying essence of the role religion plays in the development of an individual's anti-Semitism.

Dr. Mortimer Ostow chaired a nine year study of anti-Semitism, in which many prominent psychoanalysts as well as other guest participants (of which this writer was one), met for a total of 75 meetings (Ostow, p.12). Published in 1996, *Myth and Madness—The Psychodynamics of Antisemitism*, Ostow writes about the methodology the study drew upon.

Our methodology led us to the study of antisemitism in patients who had come to psychoanalysis for treatment of illness. We generally assume that the psychodynamics that prevail in illness are the same as those that prevail in health, except that in illness, satisfactory resolution is not achieved. Instead of realistic compromise or sublimation, a symptom ensues, or some other form of pathologic behavior. Similarly, we assumed at first that antisemitism could be understood as an externalized effort at solution of a conflict. To the extent that antisemitism is socially disruptive and inconsistent with usual concepts of ethical behavior, it could be considered an inappropriate response and hence pathologic. We soon realized however that in certain segments of society, antisemitism was encouraged, and within that segment, socially compliant. That being the case, we had no basis for considering it pathologic or even anomalous unless we assumed that our own views of socially desirable are absolute and universally true. Accordingly, we revised our views, seeing antisemitism now simply as an aspect of human behavior that we in our study group considered undesirable... . Reprehensible, barbarous, horrible, and degraded, yes, but pathologic, perhaps not. On the other hand, it was also true

that antisemitic prejudice might attempt to resolve conflict or to control affect by externalization, by displacement or by projection, thereby pathologically distorting reality. Delusional antisemitism is pathological no matter in what society, at least to the extent that delusional thinking on any subject is pathologic for that society (ibid., pp. 16-17).

Ostow's comprehensive coverage of aspects of antisemitism, viewing historical, cultural and mythological aspects, is deeply informative. It is interesting to note that, in his conclusion, Ostow writes, "Among most antisemites, we found that their irrational hatred was the expression of primary process thinking, that is, thought that is driven by feeling and not subjected to the discipline of reason, logic, or reality testing" (ibid., p. 176).

Veering from the strictly psychoanalytic perspective, Ostow concludes that the rising anti-Semitism at that time predates its growth in social media as it exists today.

Unfortunately, we cannot rely on the press. Although they do not speak with a single voice, there is often enough unanimity to make their prejudices sound convincingly like objective reality. The anti-Israel bias shown by many writers and television personalities suggests that a suppressed antisemitism has been released by the transition of Jews from powerless victim to a people able to look after itself militarily. International behavior that is ignored when it is exhibited by others, is magnified in the case of Israel. Although courageous demythologizing is a weak response, it is one of the few that we have and must be encouraged (ibid., p. 178).

Phyllis Chesler expanded on this in her updated version of her book, and her ideas are summarized as follows:

The essence of the new Anti-Semitism, Chesler explains, differs from the old in the way in which the center-to-hard left has taken up the cudgels, thereby making anti-semitism (which includes the unalloyed hatred of the Jewish State) acceptable, even required, for those who hold themselves out as anti-colonialist, anti-racist, anti-imperialists.

The new anti-Semitism is the marriage of the evil far-right to the slaving far-left. It is ugly and it is increasingly ubiquitous (Marcus, 2015).

Thus, it can be seen that anti-Semitism can be seen through psychoanalytic understandings, as well as other lenses. At this time, anti-Semitism has expanded its influence and requires our ongoing vigilance to protect the Jewish people from this scourge.

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Freud's Vienna Circle, Psychoanalysis, and Antisemitism

Pamela Cooper-White

Freud's insistent atheism—and his somewhat contradictory, obsessional return to the topic of religion throughout his cultural writings—are both well documented. In a letter dated Oct. 9, 1918 to the Swiss pastor-analyst Oskar Pfister, he described himself as “a completely godless Jew.” (Meng & Freud, E., 1963, p. 63). This phrase was not merely a double negation (as both godless and Jew) of the dominant Roman Catholic religion of fin-de-siècle Vienna, but also served as a more complex signifier: in childhood an identity formed in a humanistic Judaism, and a growing identification with its intellectual and racial heritage against the backdrop of increasing antisemitism.¹ Freud's cultural writings on religious themes are well known: first, the essay “Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices” in 1907 (Freud, 1959b), and then more famously, *Totem and Taboo* in 1913 (Freud, 1955b), *The Future of an Illusion* in 1927 (Freud, 1961b), and *Moses and Monotheism* (1964) in 1939 (Freud, 1964), as well as a host of lesser known essays, speeches, and correspondence mentioning both religion in general, and his own Jewish heritage in particular (e.g., Freud, 1959a/1926).²

Less well known, however, are the attitudes toward religion among the men—and eventually women—who joined him once a week to reflect on a wide range of implications of the new psychological science: psychoanalysis. There has been no in-depth exploration of the treatment of religion by this “Wednesday Night Psychological Society”—Freud's immediate circle of psychoanalysts in Vienna—with the exception of

¹Following Ostow (1996), I prefer to use the spelling “antisemitism,” rather than the more conventional “anti-Semitism.” Ostow has argued, “other terms that have been proposed, such as Jew-hatred or anti-Judaism, have not replaced it. I shall spell the term without capitals and without a hyphen, thus indicating my rejection of the racial implications of the term [Semite].” (p. 14).

²For an excellent, critical overview re: Freud and religion, see Hewitt (2014).

Otto Rank and Theodor Reik whose work is still familiar to some specialists (e.g., Merkur, 2013). In general, there has been much less scholarly interest in Freud's Viennese circle as a whole than in Freud himself, and statements about the group have tended toward generalizations. (Mühlleitner & Reichmayr, 1997, pp. 73–74) Peter Gay (2006) in his comprehensive critical biography of Freud concluded that “Freud's view of religion as the enemy was *wholly shared* by the first generation of psychoanalysts. The attempts of some later psychoanalysts to reconcile psychoanalysis with religion would never have found the *slightest sympathy* in Freud and his colleagues.” (p. 533, emphasis added)

In my recent book, *Old and Dirty Gods: Religion, Antisemitism, and the Origins of Psychoanalysis* (2017; see also Richards, 2019), I investigate Gay's premise based on my research as a senior Fulbright scholar at the Sigmund Freud Museum in Vienna in 2013–14, beginning with the research question: What religious themes appear in discussions and writings of Freud's Wednesday Night Psychological Society? I began with the minutes of this group recorded by Otto Rank from 1906 until Rank's departure from Vienna in 1915 for military duty during WWI (Nunberg & Federn, 1962). In addition, rich sources included the journal *Imago*—the groups' journal for cultural or “applied” psychoanalytic writings—followed by an examination of other published works, correspondence, and memoirs from members of Freud's Viennese circle prior to World War II.

Freud and his circle often engaged in wide-ranging, interdisciplinary discussions during their Wednesday meetings, which then often were expanded into published writings—including forays into history, biography, anthropology, archaeology, philosophy, the paranormal, and—especially of interest for this project—the study of religion across time and culture. A number of early analysts who were either members of Freud's Vienna circle or had a close relationship to it, published monographs and volumes of collected essays on religion. The works of Ernest Jones, Oskar Pfister, Theodor Reik, Otto Rank, Geza Roheim, Sabina Spielrein, and of course C.G. Jung (before and especially after his famous split with Freud), are prime examples of this literary productivity in the realm of psychology and religion.

TWO THESES: The Expected Result and the Return Of The Repressed

The First Thesis: Complexity in the Viennese Analysts' Views on Religion

So, I entered the project with one research question in mind: What religious themes appear in the discussions and writings of Freud's Wednesday Night Psychological Society? My hypothesis was that their views might be more complex and less strictly conforming to Freud's views than was assumed by previous scholars. The primary sources did, in fact, confirm a rich and often more complex view of the attitudes toward religion among Freud's early followers than has generally been recognized. I have detailed many examples of this in the book, but to summarize as briefly as possible, the members not only followed Freud's psychoanalytic-anthropological method of applying oedipal interpretations to ancient civilizations' ritual practices, as in Freud's (1955b/1913) *Totem and Taboo*, and his critique against the repressive moralistic teachings of the hegemonic Viennese Catholic Church. At times they also expressed quite original ideas about a positive role of religion in advancing the sublimations and compromise formations necessary for civilization—a modification from Freud's (1961a/1930) *Civilization and Its Discontents*, and quite different from his (1961b/1927) *Future of an Illusion* in which Freud had actually posited religion as an enemy. They believed that there was the *inverse proportion* of neuroses in devout believers vs. freethinking secularists, and even—in the case of the Pastor Oskar Pfister, making an argument for psychoanalysis as compatible with a liberal and non-repressive version of Protestant Christianity, freed from the constraints of moralizing dogma. Capturing well the mix of orthodoxy and creativity that characterized psychoanalysis from its beginnings with the Wednesday Night Psychological Society, Paul Federn—one of the earliest and most longstanding members of the Vienna Society—shared the following recollection in tribute to Freud at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute in 1948:

Freud...foresaw that many shades and deviations and derivations necessarily would develop...Only in this respect, are we "orthodox"; but we are open to every change which is progress without

abandoning the established truth and the principles confirmed by our scientific method (Federn, 1948).

A Second Thesis: Antisemitism and the Return of the Repressed

These first findings would have been more than enough to say “mission accomplished” based on my initial research aims. A second, unanticipated thesis emerged, however, that I believe is even more significant as a result of this study: *that the surrounding atmosphere of antisemitism, even before the rising horror of the Nazi movement, stands at the fons et origo of psychoanalysis.* Antisemitism shaped the first analysts’ ethical sense, and was formative in their theory as a desire to analyze (from the underside) what lay beneath every surface of the human psyche. Obviously there is no one impetus behind the development of psychoanalysis, and to claim antisemitism as a singular root cause would be reductionistic. Yet, with its curling tentacles, it is one of the most pervasive—as well as sometimes denied—social forces in 20th century Vienna, and could not have failed to suffuse the thinking of Freud’s circle in some ways, both consciously and unconsciously.

I greatly appreciate Dr. Richards’s stressing the importance of context as well as childhood antecedents in Freud’s atheism, and the increasing animosity he felt toward religion throughout his life. At the same time, I view this animosity as bound up tightly with the repressive Austrian Catholicism that cast its shadow over everyone in Vienna, and was inextricably intertwined with Habsburg power over political life, but also economics, careers, class, and education. This longstanding Austrian and eastern European antisemitism was made more virulent by the shift from a cultural and anti-Jewish religious hatred (the long history of which is well described in Dr. Terman’s paper) to a pseudo-scientific racist ideology beginning in the late 19th century and accruing to itself the appearance of a modern professional “truth.” Antisemitism thus constituted an ancient and swelling ocean of hatred in which the first psychoanalysts, almost all of whom were Jewish (Mühlleitner & Reichmayr, 1997, pp. 85–88), had to swim throughout their entire lives. It took constant vigilance to survive, much less succeed, in its dangerous waters. My thesis, then, is that above and beyond all the other themes discovered in the Wednesday Night Society’s discussions of religion,

then, *antisemitism stands as a “total context,”³ an ineradicable, overarching reality that could not have failed to influence these firsts’ analysts’ discoveries and explorations—and without which their ideas, especially concerning religion itself, cannot be fully understood.*

I came to this realization in a visceral way while walking from my apartment in Leopoldstadt to the Freud Museum in the more affluent neighborhood of Alsergrund. I became aware that symbolically I was tracing Freud’s footsteps across the Danube Canal, from the eastern European Jewish ghetto to the upwardly mobile Ninth District. These two neighborhoods had contained two of the largest proportions of Jewish inhabitants in Vienna since the waves of immigration from Eastern Europe in the 19th century and before, but they were very different Jewish populations with differing cultural and spiritual lives.

Of course the Holocaust itself was the culminating event—or, more accurately process—by which longstanding religious and cultural hatred and envy toward the Jews as “Other” became systematized as a “science” of racial inferiority and ultimately extermination. Eliza Slavet (2009) has argued against the post-Holocaust inclination to downplay racial interpretations of Jewishness and antisemitism, making the case that the ways in which antisemitism operated by the twentieth century was (and is) indeed racism, and that the social construction of racial identity tends to reproduce what it indoctrinates. She writes, “Rather than repressing the racial elements of Jewish definition, Freud suggests that a vigilant scrutiny of these elements is crucial if there is to be any hope of controlling these ‘peculiar’ forces rather than being controlled by them.” (p. 191) Following Boyarin (1997), Geller (2006, 2007), Gilman (1991, 1993), and others, she points out that Jewishness, along with misogyny and homophobia as they were intertwined at the turn of the twentieth century, generated a racial representation of Jewishness and Judaism that could give rise “to *both* ethnic pride and racial hatred.” (p. 15) “[R]ather than focusing on only the racial, genealogical, and bodily elements of Jewish identity or on the intellectual and abstract concepts of

³Term from sociolinguistics and anthropology, as the encompassing surround of a culture, its practices and language(s), which may appear only partially in the subjective consciousness of individuals.

⁴See also Slavet (2010); Aron & Starr (2013), pp. 236–244.

Judaism, Freud's work compels us to explore the relationship between the two." (Ibid.) In 1930, Freud himself declared in the preface to the Hebrew translation of *Totem and Taboo* that if a secular Jew were asked "what is left to you that is Jewish, he would reply, 'A very great deal, and probably its very essence (*Hauptsache*)'." (Freud, 1955b/1934:xv)

Concentrated in the historically Jewish neighborhoods, one can find to-day—especially when looking for them—small brass plaques commemorating individuals and families who lived at a specific locale and then were deported to their deaths in the Holocaust. These plaques called "*Stolpersteine*" ("Stumbling Blocks") were first created by German artist Gunter Demnig in 2009 as calls to remembrance. (Demnig, [n.d.]) Demnig quotes from the Talmud: "a person is only forgotten when his or her name is forgotten." The engravings generally begin with the words "*Hier wohnte...*" ("Here lived...") and end with "*gemordet*" ("murdered"), the place if known (usually a concentration camp) and year. The idea of stumbling stones is also a reminder of an old slur that if a person stumbled on the street, a Jew must be buried there. This slur has been re-appropriated to signify the importance of being stopped in our tracks, to notice, and to remember.

All over Vienna there are memorials to the victims of the Holocaust. Their sheer ubiquity is a statement of the horrific extent to which entire Viennese neighborhoods were impacted not only by the final genocidal months and years, but also by the centuries-old pervasiveness of the antisemitism that allowed the Nazis to flourish and the evil to spread like a wildfire through both Vienna and the Austrian countryside. Perhaps to walk the city as a foreigner myself allowed me to search out these many monuments with less ambivalence because my eyes not covered by blinders of familiarity—or (as much?) denial. Or perhaps because of the endemic racism in my own North American context, combined with personal observations of antisemitism in my childhood and young adulthood, I was primed as a Christian of partial German descent to see these visible memorials, and to seek them out, either as an act of righteous remembrance, an act of penance, or both. In any case, the palpable sense of Viennese antisemitism as a climate, an atmosphere, was something that I no longer just knew from reading *about* it books, but came to *know* (both anew and again, like Freud's "return of the repressed") at a

visceral level. I had seen its not-so-subtle signs with my own eyes, and I felt its miasma on my own skin.

Nor is antisemitism unique to Austria; it is likely worse today in some other central and eastern European countries (as I observed during travels in 2013–14, 2015; cf., *Mikanowski, 2012*). But in keeping with my research focus on Vienna, it became clear to me (both through reading history but also reading the newspaper, the culture, and the comments of acquaintances), that the Holocaust is a memory which throughout Austria is still fraught with social denial, amid public calls for remembrance. Until as recently as 1991, when in a speech to Parliament Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky publicly called the Austrian people to responsibility for the atrocities of the Holocaust, the official and popular view tended to coincide in a concerted effort to deflect all blame onto Germany. (Wise, 1991) Images of Austria as occupied state, and Austrians as victims themselves of Nazi aggression, were repeated, mantra-like, in an effort to absolve Austria from its own violence toward the Jews and other groups slated for expatriation—and then, extermination.

Today there are laws against a former Nazi party member serving in the government, and Holocaust denial speech, neo-Nazis, and hate crimes are officially banned. There have been official efforts at restitution and remembrance. However, a “soft” denial, coupled with ongoing antisemitism, persists in the general culture at large. I have met older Austrians whose families were in Vienna during the war, and the usual response to any query about the Nazis or the Holocaust is an acknowledgement that yes, the Austrians were complicit, but: “Not everyone approved. My family certainly did not!” If so many families “did not,” then who were all those people in the cheering throngs on the Heldenplatz giving Hitler a triumphal entry into Vienna? One sardonic (typically Viennese) joke that circulates about this rewriting of history is the saying, “Oh no, they weren’t cheering. On that day on the Heldenplatz, they were just all waving their hands and shouting at Hitler ‘Go away!’”

A friend who moved to Vienna from Germany over 30 years ago commented that in those earlier days she sat next to an older woman on a park bench, and after exchanging polite greetings, the woman grumbled that there were too many “*Ausländer*” (“foreigners”). My friend

replied, “I’m actually an *Ausländer*—I’m from Germany.” The woman stated flatly, “Oh, I don’t mean you. I mean the Jews.” While such comments may be made less readily to strangers these days, people I know and trust acknowledge that antisemitism and racism (mostly referred to as xenophobia) persist. There is a strong anti-immigration and anti-Islamic mood (as well as fairly small counter-protests which I saw around the university).

Following a scandal implicating leaders of the conservative coalition in 2019, the far right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) has experienced some decline in popularity from its peak in 2016. The liberal president Alexander van der Bellen has a sizeable lead going into the upcoming election in October, 2022—however, the far-right today captures up to 1/5 to 1/4 of Austrians’ popular support as of summer 2022, still stoked by anti-immigrant and ethnic nationalist appeals to “*Heimat*” (“homeland”).⁵ A slogan of this right-wing, anti-immigration movement, “*Pummerin statt Muezzin*” (“the cathedral bell, not the Islamic call to prayer”), echoes the sentiments expressed in the earlier nationalist movement at the turn of the 20th century that led to National Socialism: keep Austria white, German-speaking, and Catholic.

Memento Mori

My morning and evening walks took me past two contrasting monuments. One, planted in a narrow park along the east side of the canal, was a soot-darkened and apparently untended but very ornate miniature chapel dedicated to the memory of Johann Nepomok Hummel. A plaque indicates that it was placed there by the then *Bürgermeister* (mayor), Karl Lueger. Lueger was elected in 1895 by the first explicitly antisemitic political party, the Christian Socialists, and installed in 1897; Hitler regarded him as a model leader. He is considered a symbol of the rising antisemitism at the turn of the century in Vienna, and his name was (mostly) removed in 2012 from the portion of Vienna’s most public street, the *Ringstrasse*. Once called the “Karl Lueger Ring,” it is now the *Universitätsring*. Yet at least one subway entrance to the busy

⁵Latest news and polls are summarized at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Austrian_presidential_election and Freedom [Party of Austria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_Party_of_Austria)—Wikipedia.

Schottentor station near the University still bore his name in January 2014, (while I was living in Vienna), and the University letterhead on my teaching contract retained the older street name. His statue still stands in the Dr. Karl-Lueger Platz on the other end of the Ring.⁶

In his desire to create a modern German city, Lueger planted over a dozen structures throughout Vienna, with his name prominently displayed. The largest monument is an enormous Baroque-style church, the *Dr.-Karl-Lueger-Gedächtniskirche* (“commemoration church”) dedicated to St. Karl Borromäus, and still serving as an active Roman Catholic place of worship. It is planted squarely in the center of the *Zentralfriedhof*, or central cemetery, where numerous luminary Viennese musical, literary, and historic figures are buried. So Lueger casts a large shadow over Vienna to this day. His name and presence are still widely tolerated, without critical reflection on the antisemitism he represents. The little chapel I passed daily embodies the darkness and obscurity of this shadow. With its dingy stucco walls covered with graffiti, its interior locked behind heavy wrought iron gates and strewn with dirt and litter, it looks less like a monument to a saint or a statesman, than a haunted house: a *memento mori*.

Across the canal from Leopoldstadt, in the 9th district at the top of Berggasse, stands a very different monument in the small courtyard of a well-kept Catholic Church, the *Servitenkirche*. This monument commemorates all the victims of the Holocaust who lived on the adjoining street, Servitengasse. The memorial consists of a collection of skeleton keys, each with a name tag for one of the Servitengasse victims. The keys represent both the mundane business of daily life, and its violent disruption—as well as serving as symbols of homes inhabited and wrenched away.

Walking daily between Lueger’s uncanny chapel and the Servitengasse memorial, as well as all the other Holocaust memorials throughout Vienna, it became utterly clear to me that even if the first analysts had never written a word about antisemitism, their work, their sense of

⁶A pressure group from University for Applied Arts and the Jewish Museum, Vienna, has organized to transform the Dr. Karl-Lueger Platz into a monument against antisemitism and racism in Austria. (Krem, 2010).

identity, and their very lives, were marinated in this bitter reality, and it could not have failed to have an impact on their creative thinking. Although there is, in fact, very little actual discussion of antisemitism recorded in the minutes of their meetings, their writings and memoirs as a whole—taken together with historical accounts of Austrian political and cultural history—tell a more complete story.

My research at the Freud Museum and on the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society's early thoughts on religion, raised antisemitism and the Holocaust to the forefront of my own consciousness in new ways. Although I was raised in Episcopal and Methodist churches, and currently serve as an ordained Episcopal priest, my hometown on the north shore of Boston had and continues to have a large Jewish community. My friends' grandparents still bore tattooed numbers on their arms. For me, therefore, the Holocaust has never been abstract. I have perpetually been drawn to study Freud and his circle because the history of psychoanalysis is a perspective from which one can try to make sense of the irrational—both personally and in social and political movements. It is also a perspective haunted by religion as a much-contested subject. The rise of overt antisemitism and the fusion of church and state at the turn of the twentieth century in Austria, together with Freud's adamant embrace of his Jewish heritage while utterly rejecting religious belief, make for fascinating research. And it is research that troubles the waters.

Psychoanalysis, Antisemitism, and the Holocaust

The Holocaust was a shattering of history, and has been investigated in every generation since with ever-deepening insights about the multi-generational impact of trauma (e.g., Davoine & Gaueillièrre, 2004; Kuriloff, 2014; and Laub, 2015). Only recently have psychoanalysts begun to unpack the effects of the Holocaust on the analysts who escaped, on the institutes that received them, and even on the shaping (or mis-shaping) of postwar psychoanalytic theory (e.g., Harris, in press, 2022; Kuriloff, 2014; Fisher, 2009; and Prince, 2009). My project has been slightly different, though related. The impact of the Holocaust should never be underestimated, but it is my contention that because it was, in Bettelheim's words, such an "extreme situation" (Bettelheim, 1991), the long prior history of antisemitism in itself may become subsumed in its glare. I want to argue that in addition to the Holocaust itself, the decades—as

well as centuries—of antisemitism that led up to it, are not incidental but are central to the development of psychoanalysis.

Freud's Jewishness has already been well examined as a dynamic factor in the development of psychoanalysis. There was great complexity in the early analysts' unconscious dynamics of Jewish identity vs. the desire for assimilation into a culture that bore an indelible mark of Christianity—both as individuals and as a group. As the conspicuousness of antisemitism waxed and waned with various regime changes within the Habsburg monarchy and the Austrian state, the desire for assimilation or a distinctive identity also fluctuated. There was no single Jewish attitude or perspective. As Klein writes with regard to histories that tend to characterize “the Jews as a single, homogeneous whole, with characteristically Jewish experiences,” much complexity is lost in such generalizations. (Klein, 1985:xv) The Jews can become an abstraction which conceals and obscures the crucial differences among them, such as the diverse reactions to antisemitism that led some Jews anxiously to hasten their assimilationist efforts, and led others (fewer) to dissimilate and redefine their Jewishness. (Ibid.)

Freud's and the early analysts' attitudes toward assimilation also changed over time. Their eventual assumption of a more isolationist stance, combined with a sense of intellectual and political superiority, was simultaneously a point of pride, a compromise formation between denial of the full extent of their oppression, and a posture of conscious defiance. As Klein (1985), Oxaal (1988), and Gilman (1993) have pointed out, historians have tended to fall in two camps regarding the influence of Judaism on the development of psychoanalysis. On one side of the divide, which Oxaal (1988) calls “ethnic minimalism,” there are those who see Judaism as a fact of life for the Freudians, but otherwise peripheral to their theorizing in contrast to their German intellectual identity—for example, Peter Gay, who wrote,

The claim for the Jewishness of psychoanalysis based on its materials or its intellectual inheritance have proved to be without foundation. The claim for an elusive Jewish quality that somehow, mysteriously, informed Freud's work, a claim he seems to have endorsed, is too insubstantial to carry the weight some of his biographers have put on it...[I]t remains an impassioned, wishful guess,

nothing more.” (Gay, 1987, emphasis added)

Frank Sulloway (1992), in *Freud, Biologist of the Mind*, was explicit about demythologizing Freud in order to reach a “mythless history” (contra Klein, 1985:xvi; Gilman, 1993:5–6), and went to considerable lengths to debunk what he labeled as the prevailing “myth” of antisemitism in Freud’s Vienna. (Sulloway, 1992: 6, 463–465, 491; cf., Ellenberger, 1970:418–464)

On the other side, “ethnic maximalism,” are those who emphasize the influence (direct or indirect) of Jewish intellectual thought, religious heritage, and social situation on Freud’s ideas (e.g., Aron & Henik, 2010; Brickman, 2010; Cushman, 2007; Geller, 2007; Gilman, 1993; Klein, 1985; Reijzer, 2011; Robert, 1976; Said, 2003; Slavet, 2009, 2010; and Yerushalmi, 1991) including a hermeneutical disposition reflecting Talmudic scholarship and learned argumentation (Bloom 1987; Frosh, 2005; Ostow, 1982; Yerushalmi, 1991)—a trend that began even in Freud’s lifetime (Roback, 1929). Others have exegeted vestiges of kabbalistic mysticism (Bakan, 1990/1958; Ostow, 1982; Eigen, 1998, 2012; Merkur, 2014; Aron & Starr 2010; Starr, 2008), identification with Moses as the heroic herald of a promised land of freedom wedded to Enlightenment rationalism and cultural assimilation (Robert, 1976; Bergmann, 1982), and, as well, Freud’s own frank rebellion against continual antisemitic obstacles (Frosh 2005, 2010; Robert, 1976). Ostow (1982) points to ways in which Judaism and psychoanalysis share mutually reinforcing elements: a belief in the power of knowledge, a position of dual marginality (social marginality as Jews and academic marginality as psychoanalysts), a place to struggle with internal conflicts at the interface with a non-Jewish world, and finally psychoanalysis as a deepening approach to the understanding of Jewish religion. (pp. 1-44)⁷ More recently, the late Philip Cushman (2007) has again likened the psychoanalysis to the Jewish method of midrash. (Cushman 2007; Aron 2005) Lewis Aron and Libby Henik (2010) go so far toward the realm of Jewish spirituality as to state, “[f]or psychoanalysts, the human being, created in the image

⁷Michelle Friedman, MD, also notes that “this comparison is reinforced throughout modern psychoanalysis with the *Standard Edition* taking on similar status as the Torah as the foundational text—the written law, so to speak, on which the oral tradition is founded.” Personal communication 13 Feb. 1027.

of God, is like a holy text, subject to ongoing and interminable analysis and interpretation.” (p. 17)

David Meghnagi (1993) views psychoanalysis as a product of and “event within” fin-de-siècle Judaism, contemporaneous with and influenced by the conflicts in vision between Zionists and the Jewish socialist reformers. Over against Kafka, who viewed psychoanalysis as relevant only for Jews caught in the political struggles of the early twentieth century, Meghnagi views psychoanalysis as a “third answer” between Zionism and socialism, a depth understanding of the dynamics, structures, and motivations that create injustice in the human condition.

John Murray Cuddihy (1974) viewed psychoanalysis as an outgrowth of the failed social assimilation of Jews within Gentile culture in fin-de-siècle Vienna. Cuddihy proposed that Freud’s notion of the “importunate id” and, as well, the Oedipus complex, had their origins in the shame of the assimilated Jewish bourgeoisie toward the *Ostjude* (the “importunate Yid”) (p. 18)—and, more personally, Freud’s shame and anger at his father’s seeming cowardice over the incident with the antisemite in the street (Freud, 1953/1900:197)—an argument addressed by Richards in this volume.⁸ By transforming the moral opprobrium of social deviance, offensive behavior, and “*kvetches*” into a science of mental illness, Cuddihy claimed that Freud’s theory, by pathologizing Jewish cultural differences, was an attempt to distance the cultured professional Jew from his eastern European counterpart—and his own pan-German identity from that of his Galician, Chasidic parents. (Cuddihy, 1974, pp.7–8, 19; Gilman, 1993)

Beller (1989) points out that scholars do not even agree on the degree of exposure to Jewish religious traditions Freud received in his childhood home. (p. 86) Freud himself later regretted not being trained to read Hebrew fluently as his father had been, and the household seems

⁸Aron (2007) in a brilliant bit of exegesis also links this incident of being knocked off the road to Freud’s heroic discovery of “his own ‘royal road’” (dreams as the *via regia* to the unconscious), in contrast to Jewish humiliation on the Edomite king’s highway where Israelites were forbidden to walk (Numbers 20:17), and the crossroads where Oedipus killed the stranger who pushed him off the road—who would turn out to be his father, King Laius.

to have been run mainly along secular Jewish lines (Rizzuto, 1998, p. 30).⁹ However, Freud's well documented fascination with and lifelong reference to Jewish figures in his writings and correspondence, as well as Rizzuto's detailed discussion of his relationship to his father, his father's Talmudic scholarship, and the family bible. Richards in this volume further challenges Freud's demurrals and affirms the admixture of bible, Talmud, and Enlightenment *Haskalah*¹⁰ Enlightenment values in his childhood home, existing side-by-side with his mother's suppressed Jewish piety and his grandmother's Galician Jewish heritage and Yiddish language. All the evidence points to a justification of the idea that Freud's thinking was influenced by his Jewish heritage and identity.

At minimum, as Beller affirms, the two major traditions of *education* and *ethics* that evolved from the earliest times within Judaism, and became life-sustaining in eastern European ghetto life, were central among Freud's lifelong values. Already in the late eighteenth-century the rabbi Moses Mendelssohn had created a rationalist Enlightenment movement within Judaism, called *Haskalah*, in which the study of science was encouraged as complementary rather than antithetical to religious belief (pp. 91–92; Salberg, 2007/2010, p. 7). Beller (1989) elaborates on the centrality of ethics in Judaism, and in particular the democracy and social justice that characterized European ghetto life, as a deep-rooted set of communal values that inspired Jewish involvement—and leadership—in the movements for social justice and in Marxism in Vienna in the twentieth century. (pp. 86–87) Enlightenment values of rationality and equality further strengthened this commitment to social justice among Jews in Europe after the seventeenth century. (pp. 104–143) The commitment to a comprehensive humanistic education set a distinctive stamp on all the analysts, and informed the deeply held Socratic assumption that the unexamined life is not worth living.

⁹Rizzuto is here quoting a letter of Freud to Roback, 20 Feb. 1930. Gay (1987) also quotes Freud, "It may interest you to hear that my father did come from an Chassidic background... My education was so un-Jewish that today I cannot even read your inscription, which is evidently written in Hebrew. In later life, I often regretted this lack in my education." (p. 132)

¹⁰For more on *Haskalah* and its influence of German *Bildung* (character-building education), and the intellectual Jewish Salons of the 19th–20th centuries, see Beller, 1989, pp.88–105.

Klein (1985) further frames the question of the importance of Judaism and Jewishness to the early analysts in terms of a tension between the particular and the universal. As much as assimilation was an important social aim, there was also a countervailing impulse toward maintaining Jewish distinctiveness and establishing a Jewish intellectual subculture that was neither *Ostjude* nor German. Klein proposes that the Jews' position between full emancipation in the eighteenth century and the horrors of the twentieth century functioned as a liminal space, in which their particular situation simultaneously created both an impetus and a constraint to creativity. Psychoanalysis was a response to the particular situation of these socially ostracized but economically well-established Jewish intellectuals. It offered new insights for living their lives in a subculture of intellectual excitement and social reform, within the larger culture of antisemitism. These insights were fortifying for the members of their subculture—but also, generalizable to others: Klein writes, “The meaning of Jewish integration must be understood in both of the ways assimilated Jews of this period understood it: as a reconciliation of hostile social differences that would directly benefit Jews, and as a *unifying, universal, moral ideal that would benefit all humanity*” (p. xvi, emphasis added).

The picture is more complex, of course, than either a dismissal or an elevation of the Jewishness implicit in psychoanalysis as a theory or a movement. As much as assimilation was an important social aim for most educated Jewish professionals, there was also a countervailing impulse toward maintaining their distinctiveness and establishing a superior Jewish intellectual subculture. (Klein, 1985, p. xv) Through *Bildung* (“character building education”), they aspired to be German in their cultural ascent—not Austrian or Viennese. All bourgeois children, Jewish and Gentile, received a humanistic *Gymnasium* education and visited the museums, concert halls, and other great cultural landmarks along

¹¹Beller draws a distinction (contra Schorske, 1981: 141, 149) between Jewish and “native” Austrian bourgeoisies. The Jewish upper middle class embraced the values of education, high culture and social justice (now secularized but not abandoned), while the Austrians prized the trappings of social strivings but still preferred the *Heuriger* (local pub) to the literary coffee house (p. 183), and sought careers in bureaucracy rather than the professions of medicine, law, or banking.

the *Ringstrasse*. But for the Jews this was a matter of serious interest, not merely a social formality. (Beller, 1989:187).¹¹

Yet Jewishness in itself is, of course, not identical with antisemitism. By 1902, the year the Wednesday Night Society was founded, Freud's inner circle had become more disillusioned about grand Enlightenment ideals, and more willing to join together under two interlocking bonds of distinctiveness: psychoanalysts against the psychiatric mainstream, and Jewish intellectuals against the hegemony of Catholicism and antisemitism. The fact that they were an oppressed minority contributed to a feeling of intellectual freedom, as Freud himself noted in his comment to the *B'nai B'rith* (also quoted by Richards in this volume): "Because I was a Jew I found myself free from many prejudices which restricted others in the use of their intellect; and as a Jew I was prepared to join the Opposition and to do without agreement with the 'compact majority' ... " (Freud, 1959a/1926) The early analysts had less to lose in terms of power and prestige in the society at large, but also more to gain from the intellectual freedom which they had appropriated for themselves. On the other hand, the internecine conflicts among the Jewish members of the group before World War I were all the more intense because so much was at stake—other avenues to success had been relinquished by becoming a card-carrying member of Freud's inner circle due to the economic and political lid that was kept on Jewish advancement, and the growing public hatred (interlaced with fear and envy) toward Jewish professional success.

The very long shadow of antisemitism *itself*, and not just Jewish intellectual roots as the "ethnic maximalists" have argued, must therefore be located as a *catalyst at the very origins of psychoanalytic theory and practice—both in terms of what the first analysts saw (that no one else was seeing), and what they failed to see*. This is not to say, of course, that antisemitism was the *only* factor in the development of psychoanalysis. The emergence of a science and a hermeneutic of the unconscious was overdetermined like everything else. Psychoanalysis incorporates a rich, complicated tapestry of sources and influences. *Yet the core realization of psychoanalytic thought—that there is always more beneath the surface appearances of reality, and that this "more" is among other things affective, memory-laden and psychological—cannot fail to have had something to do with the experiences of the first Jewish analysts in their position of marginality and oppression.*

The Influence of Antisemitism

Antisemitism, as a belief system saturating the dominant culture of Western Europe, perforce delineated the Jew as “Other.” Jews in different contexts at various times embraced this outsider position as a safe enclave, or sought to escape it through assimilation. But their view was always one from the margins, a view that Gentiles did not share or even perceive. As postcolonial theory has taught us,¹² the view from the margins is often more acute and penetrating than from the mountaintop of privilege. (Contra Gay, 1987, pp.146–147)¹³ Comparing Freud to other “great revolutionaries” of thought, Isaac Deutscher (1968) declared to the World Jewish Congress in 1968,

as Jews they dwelt on the borderlines of various civilizations, religions, and national cultures. Their mind matured where the most diverse cultural influences crossed and fertilized each other. They lived on the margins or in the nooks and crannies of their respective nations. Each of them was in society and yet not in it, of it and yet not of it. It was this that enabled them to rise in thought above their societies, above their nations, above their times and generations, and to strike out mentally into wide new horizons and far into the future. (pp. 26–27)

As Dutch psychoanalyst Hans Reijzer (2011) has observed, “When people live between two cultures, they think dialectically and see society dynamically.” (p. 25)¹⁴ The Jews of Austria could speak and understand

¹²The postcolonial literature is vast, and still expanding. A classic text is Bhabha, 1994. Other foundational texts from a more psychoanalytic perspective include Fanon (2004/1961; 2008/1952); Said (1979); Spivak, (1998). For overviews see also Young (2003); Jaydeep Chakrabarty (2015). Said (2003) reads Freud’s *Moses and Monotheism* through a postcolonial lens in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in *Freud and the Non-European*. Nuñez (2022) is currently developing postcolonial approaches to psychoanalytic theory and practice.

¹³Contemporary historians of psychoanalysis have used the term “optimal marginality” to describe the acuity and creative genius from a marginal status, which has arisen within psychoanalysis from Freud to the present (summarized in Aron & Starr, 2013, pp. 8–9, 29).

¹⁴Reijzer also citing Deutscher (Ed.), (1968), pp. [25–41].

the language and culture of both oppressed and oppressor, and they also could not but view and judge themselves through the lens of the dominant culture. In his culture shock during his first visit to the Wednesday Night Society, the famous Swiss psychiatrist C.G. Jung viewed the Viennese analysts as “cynical” (Bair, p. 119), but in their own context that was simply what came of being awake to the societal dynamics into which they were born. It was part and parcel of surviving in a hostile climate.

Yearning for acceptance and assimilation was one psychic force, which sometimes engendered both denial and hope. Realism and the knowledge of danger was a countervailing force. The former—the assimilationist story that psychoanalysis is a western science—is the narrative told most often. The latter—the subversive knowledge of oppression—is the uncanny truth of trauma, which returns again and again in disguised form, but can never remain entirely repressed. (e.g., Freud, 1955c, p. 239) The total context of antisemitism, and the first analysts’ efforts to resist its penetrating logic of denigration, could not have failed to inform and shape their ethical sensibilities and their vision of social justice. Moreover, this experience infused them with a psychic need to analyze what dark secrets lay beneath the human psyche—of which sex and aggression were perhaps the most powerful in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Vienna. Thus antisemitism had an indelible impact, not only on their personal and professional lives and aspirations, but on the very formation of psychoanalytic theory.

Social Implications for Psychoanalysis

Taking into consideration years of mounting fear, the eventual terror of forced migration, and an aftermath of often intense survivor guilt, psychoanalysis was riddled at its origins with an often repressed but uncanny return of an innumerable crowd of unladen ghosts. Beginning with Freud’s Viennese circle, and continuing on from the first generation of analysts in Europe across the globe, psychoanalysis bears a multi-generational wound—antisemitism and the Holocaust are its deepest scar and stain, a persistent, still largely unmetabolized trauma at the heart of the discipline.

One consequence of all this unmetabolized trauma may be that of all the psychotherapeutic disciplines, psychoanalysis has been among the slowest to recognize the impact of *context* on the psyche—both at the level of

individual patients' sufferings, and at the level of society. This has been accomplished in contemporary iterations of psychoanalysis, including the recuperation of formerly exiled thinkers such as Sándor Férenzi. Contemporary relational analysts (e.g., Aron and Starr, 2010; Altman, 2009; Benjamin, 1988, 2017; Cole, 2005; Cushman, 2007, 2015; Harris, 2009; Holmes, 2016, 2017; Leary (2000); Mitchell, 2004; Suchet, 2017, and White, 2002, 2004; among many others) have begun to bring to the attention of psychoanalysis as a field to issues of race, class, gender, sexuality, and politics. Increasing attention paid to race, gender, and power by the "Tavistock" school of unconscious group relations based originally in London on the work of Wilfred Bion (1961). This re-turn toward context begs the question how context really did matter to the first historic generation of psychoanalysts, and should recall that historic, immersive reality of antisemitism—and especially its slow but inexorable creep toward genocide in the 1920's and early 30's—into our present awareness. While cautioning against comparing contemporary events directly to the Holocaust, Jeffrey Goldberg (2015), Editor-in-Chief of *The Atlantic*, asked in the year prior to Donald Trump's election to the U.S. presidency, "It is not 1933. But could it be 1929?" There is much water now roiling under the bridge since Trump's presidency, and a foreboding, concomitant rise in antisemitic violence that continues escalating to this day. (Antidefamation League, 2022) Christian nationalism shares many of the same feverish cult beliefs as seen in the rise of the Nazis (Cooper-White, 2022), and the very same group dynamics and blind adherence to a fanatical leader of which Freud (1955b/1921) forewarned in his still salient *Group Psychology and the Dynamics of the Ego*.

The present volume of this journal is an important contribution to this movement to attend to social and political context as determinative of psychic life. It is certainly my belief that the social and the political infiltrates the earliest substrates of consciousness in childhood through both conscious and unconscious parental desires and anxieties, and is further reinforced (or at times contested) in the course of psychological development.

Conclusion

This has been my plea for a while now as I continue to study the early history of psychoanalysis, religion, and the ravages of antisemitism and the

Shoah: Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel, who died just a little over a year ago, was known for his passionate exhortation that we must never forget the horrors of the Holocaust, lest we repeat them. Wiesel's words were powerful, but only a little over seventy-five years after *Kristallnacht*, few Americans, especially those outside the Jewish community, know or remember what that was, much less how it might still be relevant today. We appear to be immersed in a period of history in both the United States and Europe that feels eerily similar to the emergence of hate speech, violence, and demagoguery that preceded the Holocaust in Europe. (How) can psychoanalysis with its deep appreciation for the impact of history—especially buried history—help facilitate Wiesel's project of staying awake in the face of rising terror?

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Response to Arnold Richards's "The Need Not To Believe: Freud's Godlessness Reconsidered"

Henry Friedman

I am pleased to have been asked to discuss Arnie Richards's article, "The Need Not to Believe: Freud's Godlessness Reconsidered." Not only is it a tour de force on Freud's relationship to his Jewish origins, but it also serves as a stimulus for many of us to consider the role of our religious and ethnic backgrounds in our development as psychoanalysts. Tip O'Neill, the formidable Speaker of the House for 10 years, used to say that all politics are local, an observation that seems relevant to this article and more specifically to what has motivated its author to research this detailed and gripping account of what he sees as Freud's fundamental tie to Judaism. This article, I believe, has been on and in Arnie Richards's mind for a long time. As he says, during his training, which took place during the time when psychoanalysis was synonymous with a disregard for all religious belief and a distancing from a reputation as a field dominated by psychoanalyst from Jewish backgrounds, he was deemed an outsider because of his determination to keep his involvement with Judaism alive in his psychoanalytic persona. Anyone who reads this article will absorb from him a sense of how important Judaism is to him and how determined he is to not allow Freud to escape from his background as an individual raised in Jewish traditions. I am writing this response to express my opposition to what Arnie wants to prove about Freud, the man, and Freud the originator of psychoanalysis. Arnie wants, in his own way, to describe Freud's assimilation as a desperate attempt to extricate himself from Jewish traditions by joining with the more cosmopolitan society that existed around him in Vienna as somehow not real. To me it's as if he wants to keep Freud within the fold of his, Arnie's, beloved Jewish tradition.

The idea that Freud was often if not always in a struggle to escape the grasp of Jewish rituals and beliefs seems not only plausible but proven by Arnie's scholarship. Where I differ with him comes from our personal differences; our lives as lived, his with an intense identification with

being Jewish and mine with an equally intense identification with being a thoroughly American atheist who has lived in a religious and ethnically free zone for his entire life. Arnie's description of Freud's assimilationist aspirations seems accurate; it could be a description he would make of me. I share with Freud a definite discomfort with Jewish rituals. Hebrew, Yiddish, keeping kosher, lighting candles on Friday evening, are all practices that I have never practiced and have felt no affiliation with them. I suspect that Arnie's position on all things Jewish is on the other end of the spectrum of Jewishness. When I read Arnie's account of Freud's struggle to free himself from Jewish traditions, I am struck not only with the similarity with my position on being liberated from them but with Arnie's desire or need to explain Freud's need not to believe as somehow a defensive escape on Freud's part. This is my central argument with Arnie's otherwise impressive scholarship in this paper.

Something strikes me in Arnie's perspective as simply missing the point about those individuals who are able to free themselves from a belief in the existence of God and the dominance of religious rituals. This is my deeply held personal value system. Unlike Arnie, I feel that this is a legitimate outcome for all those who attempt to face life without the support of a belief that softens the reality of life inevitably ending in death. Freud not only achieved this, but he also framed his personal belief in a brilliant argument proving that religious belief is based upon childhood fantasies. In *The Future of an Illusion* and *Moses and Monotheism*, Freud aggressively attacks all religious belief as a product of the infantile mind's fantasies. How is it possible that Arnie judges these contributions negatively, finally concluding that they are poorly written or strident in tone, when to me they rank among some of Freud's most important and incisive insights about humanity?

The answer involves the differences in background and orientation towards Jewishness between us. I do know that Arnie has retained a strong identification as a Jewish psychoanalyst. His involvement with Jewish organizations and his concern about Freud's attitude towards Jewish traditions seem all of a piece. His mission, as expressed in this article, is to anchor Freud's godlessness and hostility to Jewish traditions as somehow inauthentic, or, more precisely, as requiring analysis with a perspective of penetrating beyond the surface of its meaning. The purpose of this article is to establish that Freud was rebellious, but not really

able to assimilate fully. I maintain the very opposite; any individual like Freud can feel the imprisonment of religion and its traditions and rituals. Many people raised in one of the major religions can free themselves from that background by simply discontinuing attending religious services and declaring themselves no longer an observant Catholic or Mormon, for instance, but as Arnie Richards recognizes, this is different for Judaism. For Arnie, as for many Jewish individuals, Judaism is more than a religion, it is a culture that must be maintained. Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust may make it seem that people who assimilate and disavow the importance of their Jewish faith can be seen as a “self-hating Jew,” a label that is often attached when people of Jewish background insist that they have little or no use for Judaism or for any other religion. In the disavowal of Jewishness, it is particularly important that no other religion be embraced. The Jew who converts perhaps does feel an antagonism to one’s Jewish background. Freud, however, was distancing himself from all religious beliefs; his aim was to break down the barriers of Jewish separatism while insisting on the importance of scientific knowledge as what should unite us as human beings. His search for a universal bond between those educated in science was basic to his invention of psychoanalysis. The incompatibility between psychoanalysis and religious belief of any sort has troubled many of Freud’s followers in psychoanalytic communities. The appearance of anti-religious values in the United States has appeared to burden many analysts of Jewish backgrounds. It is far from unusual to find Jewish psychoanalysts who insist on circumcision and attend a synagogue regularly.

As a psychoanalyst with firm atheist values, I can testify to the hostility that announcing a distance from Judaism evokes not only in Jewish colleagues, but in patients, as well as non-Jewish friends. The insistence on keeping me Jewish as Arnie wants to keep Freud, can be obvious, and oppressive. The acknowledgment that I was never bar mitzphahed evokes wonderment in many when it is acknowledged as something to be proud of rather than it being a cultural loss.

My personal experience resonates with what facts Arnie brings to light about Freud’s godlessness. His refusal to be married in a religious service, his not wanting to stand under the traditional Jewish wedding cover, and his frustrating his beloved wife about lighting sabbath candles on Friday evening, are all so close to my own experience in the United States, a

country far more accepting of freedom from religion than the Austria of Freud's, that I cannot help but feel my understanding of Freud's relationship to his Jewishness is closer to what Freud achieved than what Arnie is asserting in this article. There is so much valuable history in this paper. Arnie's research on Freud's personal life brings new material to our attention, but in the end his desire to place Freud as too angry, too rebellious to be considered a legitimate, simply enlightened individual, causes me rather profound discomfort. Is freedom from religion not possible for Freud, or for that matter for me, in the history that Arnie Richards constructs? That would seem to be the case and that is why I have crafted this lengthy protest against his arguments designed to make Freud's objection to all religious belief to be exaggerated, and in his view defensive. In my view there is nothing to analyze about such a decision on Freud's part and certainly not on mine. Arnie Richards has indeed reconsidered Freud's godlessness, but in his reconsideration I believe he does a disservice to Freud as a unique thinker and a brave human being.



Comments on IJCD, Volume Number Two, Issue Number Two: Jew-hating: The Black Milk of Civilization

Merle Molofsky

Anti-Semitism has existed for millennia, and Jews, Jewish culture, Judaism as a religion, Jews as part of a nation, have existed even longer. I am fascinated by the question, who is Sigismund Shlomo Freud? He commonly is known as Sigmund Freud, an Austrian Jewish neurologist who created the discipline of psychoanalysis. He was born in 1856 in Freiberg, Moravia, part of the Austrian Empire, where only 3% of the population was Jewish. His family moved to Vienna four years later.

Sigmund Freud was a major cultural figure who lived in the 19th and 20th centuries CE, and contributed to a world-wide cultural phenomenon of exploring the complexities of the human mind through the art, science, and philosophy of his creation, psychoanalysis.

From his earliest years growing up in a Jewish family in the Austrian Empire, first in Moravia, then Vienna, remaining in Vienna as he studied medicine at the University of Vienna, he lived with a consciousness of having two culturally different identities, Jewish and Austrian, yet interwoven. His name itself reveals the tension between those two identities. Sigismund is a variation of the name Sigmund, the hero of the Volsunga Saga in Norse mythology, valorized in the music of Richard Wagner in the opera *Die Valkyrie*. The name Sigmund means Protection through Victory. Shlomo is the Hebrew name, rendered in English as Solomon, the wise King Solomon of the Torah, whose name means Peace.

The Norse hero Sigmund pulled a sword out of a rock that was planted there by the god Odin, similar to the Anglo-Saxon King Arthur pulling the sword Excalibur from a rock. Solomon also wielded a sword, in a sense, when in his wisdom, when asked to settle a dispute between two women who claimed one baby, he offered to cut the baby in half, giving each woman half a baby. Of course the real mother did not accept the offer, proving she was the baby's mother.

Thus we find two ancient heroes, Sigmund and Shlomo, each famous in his myth for using a sword, and one Jewish child growing up in Austria, named for each hero, trying to reconcile his two cultural identities. What sword would young Sigismund Shlomo need to cut the Gordian knot of his identity, and his search for meaning, truth, and the unknown? First and foremost, he had his intellect.

As he struggled with this cultural divide, immersed in the literatures of European culture, he also faced another struggle as he developed a new theory, psychoanalysis, a theory of the mind that encompassed symbolic process, unconscious process, fantasy, and conflict. As a Jew in a Christian Europe that represented the epitome of advanced intellectual cultural achievement, he found himself burdened with the dread of pervasive anti-Semitism that he assumed would denigrate his great intellectual achievement as “Jewish science”.

Arnold Richards speaks of three “three distinct strands in Freud’s Jewish identity: his commitment to the ideal of *Bildung*; his response to the anti-Semitism of his time; and his ‘godlessness,’ his ambivalence about the religion of his family, especially his father.” He makes an important contribution to understanding the importance of “these strands of identity” becoming “manifest in psychoanalysis”.

Bildung means a pervasive cultural milieu. Freud had to distinguish himself in the intellectual cultural milieu of a Europe immersed in anti-Semitism. Freud had to untangle himself from a “too Jewish” identity, while somehow clinging to the importance of his Jewish identity, and one way he did this was to deny that a major Jewish hero, Moses, was not a Jew, but rather an Egyptian, in his 1939 book, *Moses and Monotheism*. Yet perhaps he identified with Moses. He may also have identified with another Jewish hero, Joseph, who was an interpreter of dreams, solving the problems of a great king, a pharaoh. The meaning of the name Joseph may be significant. The Hebrew root of the name Joseph is two-fold: it means “added to” and “taken away.” Could Freud be like Moses, Jewish and not Jewish? And like Joseph, stolen from his family of origin, interpreting dreams, leading to Freud publishing *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1899?

Nathan M. Szajnberg eloquently speaks of five Jews, Einstein, Durkheim,

Boas, Fleck, Kuhn, along with Freud, sharing a common perspective: “For psychoanalysis too, for Freud, is an attempt to discover what is commonly human to all of us. What lies beneath; what we share. It is a *Weltanschauung*, a world view, as well as a treatment and theory of mind.”

How did any of the Jewish intellectuals of Europe escape a world view that was deeply rooted in anti-Semitism? Szainberg explores this question with depth. As I read his comments about the attitudes and ideas of the anti-Semitic European intellectuals the Jewish intellectuals encountered, I thought immediately of Richard Wagner in particular.

In 1850, Richard Wagner published an essay, “Das Judenthum in der Musik” (“Jewishness in Music”), under a pseudonym, K. Freidedank (Freidedank means Free Thought).

Wagner wrote the essay to “explain to ourselves the involuntary repulsion possessed for us by the nature and personality of the Jews, so as to vindicate that instinctive dislike which we plainly recognise as stronger and more overpowering than our conscious zeal to rid ourselves thereof.”

He claimed that Jews weren’t capable of speaking European languages properly. He was horrified by the sound of Jewish speech, hearing an “intolerably jumbled blabber”, a “creaking, squeaking, buzzing snuffle”. He thought Jews were incapable of expressing “true passion”, which makes them unable to create song or music. He also states:

“Although the peculiarities of the Jewish mode of speaking and singing come out the most glaringly in the commoner class of Jew, who has remained faithful to his father’s stock, and though the cultured son of Jewry takes untold pains to strip them off, nevertheless they show an impertinent obstinacy in cleaving to him.”

Henry Zvi Lothane wisely addresses the distinction between Judaism as a religion, and the perception of Jewishness as a racial category. He poignantly addresses his own experience: “When I lived in Russia and Poland until the age of 15 I was seen as a race. Later I became a Jewish citizen of Israel. In 1963 I came to America and became a religion”. I was stunned by his use of the word became, “I became”. He “became” what he was seen to be. Now, the question of anti-Semitism can be focused on

who is defining who? Shall Jews be defined by non-Jews' perceptions of Jews, of Jewishness? Can Jews just be Jews, and, beyond being Jews, can Jews just be people, just be humans? As Lothane reviews essential anti-Semitic historical events, he concludes his remarks with a look at the dire situation that the Freud family found themselves in during the Holocaust. To an anti-Semite, Jews are never just people, just human. They are defined as the "other", to be despised, mistreated, persecuted, destroyed. In his concluding paragraph, Lothane says, "It was the ostracized and banished Wilhelm Reich who in 1933, in *Mass Psychology of Fascism*, Cassandra-like warned the Jews about the Nazi danger. Many Jews in Austria and German failed to heed this warning." How devastating!

Richards's careful delineation of a semantic issue regarding the term "anti-Semitism" resonates with Lothane's careful delineation regarding Judaism as a religion and the perception of Jewishness as a racial category. Richards identifies the first use of the term "anti-Semitism" as an intellectual construct offered by a Jewish scholar in 1860, and then its use in 1880 as a "badge of honor" in a pamphlet, "The Triumph of Germanicism over Judaism". He notes the effect of Jews being designated as "other", and evokes the schoolboy Freud who, when taunted by classmates, felt he belonged to an alien race.

Is there a difference between "anti-Semitism" and "Jew hatred", two terms describing the same phenomenon? Yes. The term "anti-Semitism" seems slightly neutralized by its not using the words "Jew", or "Judaism", or "Jewishness". It offers what seems to be an intellectual approach, linking the "Semitic" Middle Eastern languages to what otherwise might be perceived as pernicious disdain, hatred. "Jew hatred" means what it means, a description of full emotional intensity, pure hatred.

Szainberg outlines a two-millennia history of anti-Semitism, as he says, "before Christ, before Mohammed and well before Hitler". As I considered this age-old history, I thought of a recent book, *Deciphering the New Antisemitism*, edited by Alvin H. Rosenfeld, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2015. How new could anti-Semitism be, I wondered, as I began reading the book. I published a review of the book in *The American Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 2017, Volume 77, and I began by saying, "This impressive book, offering essays by 19 authors

on the topic of the recent upsurge in virulent anti-Jewish hostility, is daunting, not by sheer size, which is considerable, but by the very fact of its existence, the very fact of what must be its focus the worldwide rise of a pernicious, persistent anti-Semitism.”

There always are new incarnations of old tropes, such as the calumny of the blood libel. It is important to acknowledge that non-Jews have challenged these scurrilous beliefs. In 1946, Jean-Paul Sartre published a powerful indictment of anti-Semitism, *Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration of the Etiology of Hate*, in which he used a concept that was developed by Sigmund Freud, a concept essential to psychoanalysis, *projection*, to describe the mental processes of people who are possessed by anti-Semitic hatred. He explores the fantasies embedded in these projections. The anti-Semite has abandoned reason and is mired in passion, the passion of hatred. This resonates meaningfully, and oddly, with Wagner’s anti-Semitic hatred, when he said that Jews were incapable of expressing “true passion”.

I found myself saddened when I read Szainberg’s commentary about Freud’s concern with the “stiff-necked Jews” inducing anti-Semitism, and his further elucidation that the “stiff-necked Jews” took pride in their survivals, that they thrived wherever the Diaspora has taken them. Further, what has benefitted the Jews benefits non-Jews! “And we thrive not only for ourselves but for humankind’s benefit—in *Wissenschaft*”.

It was not easy to be a Jew in Freud’s Vienna, Freud’s Europe, whether a secular professional intellectual Jew or an Ostjuden orthodox unassimilated Jew. Yet, to be a secular Jew familiar with, indeed, immersed in, European “high” culture, was to be eager to participate, to both contribute and reap the rewards of engagement with European intellectual life. Freud found himself confronting the fact that indeed he was a Jew, a Jew who needed to stand proud, to claim his Jewishness, while he also felt a need to hide his Jewishness.

Freud was his father’s son, Shlomo ben Yakov, the son of a Jewish man whose hat was thrown into the mud by an aggressive non-Jew. He was the son of a Jew who was supposed to submit. He yearned for the approval of, the validation from, the non-Jewish elite. He felt the need to keep psychoanalysis safe from the accusation of being a “Jewish science”,

something that would degrade pure Aryan science. He wanted Carl Gustav Jung to be his crown prince, to smooth the acceptance of his profound, creative work by the non-Jewish elite. And he remained a Jew, finding himself in exile in England, but safe, while Europe began to exterminate the Jews, while his own sisters were killed by the Nazis, safe until he died in 1939, but not killed by Nazis.

Daniel Benveniste, responding with depth to Arnold Richards's consideration of Freud in the *Bildung* of Europe, of Freud as Jew, explores the many aspects of Judaism that Freud repudiated or was drawn to despite his fears. He readily identifies the obsessive aspects of ritualistic religion, and the overwhelming power of mysticism, the oceanic feeling that Freud may have known and yet didn't want to know. He makes it clear that Freud repressed his own oceanic feeling, his infantile yearnings for his mother's love. This leads me to wonder, was being Jewish associated with unrequited yearnings, with obsessional demands, with a family that will be forever outsiders? Both Richards and Benveniste underscore Freud's Oedipal struggle to be more heroic than his father, to stand up to anti-Semitism. This is all the more poignant when we consider the degree of anxiety Freud felt about being Jewish. Could he ever stand up to the intellectual anti-Semitic snobbery he feared would toss his brilliant discoveries into the designated garbage heap of "Jewish science"?

Benveniste points out Freud's pride in being able to rise above the prejudices that limit intellectual exploration. Alas, was Freud's commitment to reason, to intellectual excellence, a manifestation of his fear of Judaism itself, the emotional pull of mystical Jewish experience?

When Benveniste discusses Freud's observations about sibling rivalry, and the conflictual feelings of loving and hating one's sibling rival, he evokes Jung's own rivalry with Freud. Thus there is no safe ground. It is dangerous to be Jewish in Europe, and European non-Jews are afraid of Jews.

Richards and Benveniste remind us of *Totem and Taboo* and *Moses and Monotheism*, of the dangerous power of the father. In the Europe of the Austrian Empire, in the encounter of Christian and Jew, who is the father and who is the son? Who poses a threat to another? If Judaism is father to Christianity, should the son supplant the father? Should a "new

testament” replace the ancient tradition of Torah, of Judaism? If Jews are greatly outnumbered by Christians in Europe, is the majority the powerful father, and the minority the frightened, subservient child?

As we follow Benveniste’s elucidation of Freud’s relationship to Judaism, and thus, to God, he offers us a fascinating idea, honed by his mentor Nathan Adler and his religion professor Frederic Spiegelberg, that God may be our narcissism. How empowered do people need to feel? Is anti-Semitism the culmination of European narcissism? Is Christianity a source of narcissism, and does the existence of Jews lead to a dread that Jews could kill Christianity, since the worst thing said about Jews is that Jews killed Christ, the source of every blood libel story?

David Lotto addresses Richards’s emphasis on Freud’s acute awareness, from childhood on, of the dangers of being a Jew in a German culture. He goes on to explain that many factors influenced Freud’s dislike of religion in general. First, Freud valued science, rationality. Lotto identifies “the commitment to the scientific view of the world, which is logically inconsistent with religion which was that scientific Psychoanalysis could stand as a bulwark against antisemitism”. He then points out that whatever were identifying aspects of religious Jews, their garb, their behavior, fed anti-Semitic feelings among Europeans. And third, religious fervor among Christians led to anti-Semitism, to hatred of those Jews who were “Christ-killers”.

This reminds me of two episodes from my own life. Two of my three children were born in 1962 and 1964, and, in 1965 an Italian-American Roman Catholic relative took my baby son to visit another Italian-American Roman Catholic relative of his. The relative who brought my son there said, “The pope just said that the Jews are not responsible for the death of our Lord Jesus. So this little baby is not to blame for killing our Lord Jesus.” The response to that statement was, “I don’t care what the pope said. All the Jews killed Jesus.” The father of these two adults once introduced my father to his own father, and said, in Italian, “Sam is a Mazza-Christo, but he’s still a very nice man”. Mazza-Christo is a dialect form of the Italian phrase “Morto Christo”, which means Christ-killer. My father understood a little Italian, because when his own father, who was a plasterer, first came to the United States, he found work as a plasterer in construction, and learned Italian, thinking he was learning English.

Indeed, religion is easily a platform for prejudice, for bias, and in Europe it was a powerful platform for anti-Semitism, and all the discrimination and violence that is associated with anti-Semitism.

The epithet “Christ killer” is a driving force that has been linked for centuries with the horrific calumny of the blood libel. These blood libel stories led to violence against Jews all over Europe.

A case in point: In British Isles folk lore, there is a well-known blood libel tale, which became a folk song, Child Ballad 155. The song has various titles, “Sir Hugh”, “The Jew’s Daughter”, “The Jew’s Garden”. It tells the story of a young noble Christian boy, Little Sir Hugh, who is playing ball with friends. The ball bounces into the garden of a Jewish family. The “Jew’s Daughter” comes out of the house and invites Little Sir Hugh to come into her garden and fetch his ball. He is reluctant, but she lures him in with offers of fruit, and then, takes him into the house, where she stabs him in the heart, “like a sheep”. Note the word “sheep”. Think of the phrase “Lamb of God”, “Agnus Dei”. Who killed the Lamb of God? The crucifixion of the Lamb of God of course is the most rabble-rousing element of the blood libel.

The folk song is a retelling of a story that was thought to be true, the story of a little boy who became known as Little Saint Hugh, a “martyr”, who was found dead in Lincoln, a city in Lincolnshire, in the 13th century CE. It was thought that he was ritually murdered by the Jews, for his blood. The passions of Jew hatred were easily aroused. Many Jews were persecuted, and quite a number were killed.

The power of the blood libel is heightened by the medieval European Christian interpretation of the Biblical story of the Exodus. As told in the Torah, Moses is trying to convince Pharaoh to free the Hebrew slaves. The Egyptians wound up enduring 10 plagues. Oh, the horrors of that 10th plague, the slaying of the first born. How did the ancient Hebrews protect themselves from that dire 10th plague? How did each family keep the Angel of Death from their door? A lamb was slain, and its blood was smeared on the lintel of the door. A lamb was sacrificed. The lamb’s blood saved the Jews from death.

How might a medieval Christian hearing the story of the blood of a lamb being used to save the lives of Jews interpret that story? Who is the

Lamb? Who is the Lamb of God, Agnus Dei? Jesus. Thus the interpretation of the Biblical story was that Jews killed a lamb for its blood, the Jews killed Jesus.

Often enough, Passover and Easter coincide on the calendar. Jews are celebrating the story told in the Book of Exodus, their freedom from slavery, and Christians are celebrating the story of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus. Jews are celebrating, drinking wine and singing, while Christians are mourning the death of Jesus, a death attributed to the Jews. The tensions arising during these spring holidays are exacerbated by an elaboration of the blood libel story related to Passover, i.e. that Jews kill Christian children for their blood, to use their blood to make matzoh for their celebration. Easter was all too often an occasion for a pogrom.

Lotto's examination of Freud's intense dislike for America, for American culture, is a wonderful application of Freud's own psychoanalytic theory of projection. Lotto points out that what Freud most disliked in American culture is "Americans' alleged preoccupation with making money and using dishonest methods to acquire wealth are uncomfortably close to the traditional antisemitic accusations made about Jews". Of course, Freud's theory of projection applies to all prejudice. The accusations against Jews over the centuries in Europe are obvious projections. And, contemporary accusations in Europe that Israel, meaning the Jews of Israel, is an apartheid country practicing genocide against the Palestinians, that Israel is a Nazi state, is also a projection. "We weren't Nazis, we didn't colonize South Africa and practice apartheid, we didn't practice genocide during the Holocaust, the Jews do that sort of thing, we don't!"

In his contribution, David Terman, like others, provides a useful overview of anti-Semitism over the millennia, and also provides a context for a psychoanalytic approach to what otherwise might be considered a topic for other disciplines, such as history or sociology. He points out that psychoanalysis is used to understand the mind of an individual, yet, all groups are composed of individuals. He uses a self-psychology framework to consider the individual needs of the self as an individual self identifies with a particular group, and he emphasizes shared ideology. Indeed, a shared ideology can provide powerful impetus for individuals

to adhere to a group. They feel strengthened by that shared ideology.

As I considered Terman's thesis, I thought immediately of the power of Hitler's "Sieg Heil" uniting people with fragile egos, and of the American ideologues' cries of "Jews will not replace us", people with fragile egos all too readily believing that Jews want to replace a "superior race of white Christian Americans" with "inferior races", with immigrants, particularly "non-Aryan" immigrants, and with African-Americans.

Terman prefers the concept of narcissistic rage, which precludes the possibility of empathy, to the concept of projection, as the primary factor of group malevolence.

Terman explores the narcissism of the original Hebrews in Biblical times, the enslaved Hebrews in Egypt, as a source of group identity, of group bonding. He considers the vicissitudes of the emergence of a cohesive identity among the ancient Hebrews, and the formation of a powerful group ideal. I struggled with this concept, since I felt threatened in my own sense of identity, my own sense of group belonging. Yet I persevered. I read on.

As I read, I was struck by Terman's deep devotion to accurate historical description, and to his willingness to consider complexity, which I found intriguing. When he focused on territorial belonging, I found my mind relaxing. He points out that, "As a dissenting religion, Judaism was unique, in that it could not be confined to a territory of its own". Islam and the varieties of Christianity may have been opposed to each other, but by and large they were ensconced in their own territories, their own nation-states. Thus, in Christian Europe, "the Jews remained an irritating and sometimes frightening presence".

Terman offers a compelling idea, that anti-Semitism represents a failure, as it is an historical process in which the wish to achieve a unifying ideal has not found success.

And yet... I want to argue with this conclusion. There are many cultural groups throughout the world that have faith in their own unifying ideals, but do not try to violently eradicate those who disagree. Of course, there are those who indeed try to impose their own ideals on other groups. Even so, not all of those resort to discrimination or violence. Sometimes

they are content to proselytize, or to persuade through reason, offering facts, relying on logic. Or they may even try to lead the way by example.

What forms of prejudice have been as consistent and enduring as anti-Semitism? Perhaps others that I have never learned about, but none that I have yet seen. Why me? Why not? Why not! Because whether it is “me”, the group I belong to, it is evil by definition. Evil may not be a psychoanalytic diagnostic category, but it sure describes anti-Semitism!



Do The Children Know?

Merle Molofsky

Once again we parse the color of night,
the sounds of darkness, and hope for light.
Once again we feel a chill that sounds
like lightning, once again old wounds
begin to bleed anew. The hounds of war still bite.

Name a miracle. Not the candles, not the oil.
Name the miracle that stops oppression,
name the miracle that says, this patch of soil
is free. And so am I. And so are we.

Children, watch the candles glimmer,
watch them flicker, watch them glow.
No more mischief. You puff your cheeks to blow
the candles out. Your life is in the flame.
Each candle bears a name
of another child, a child like you.

The miracle is that we still remember.
We still remember, we still exist.
Each one of us a warm reminder
that we never will become
names on a list
that defines us only as a scattering of ashes.

The miracle is the blessing of the candles
by hands that bless the miracle of each child,
each child a spark of the future
tonight, and every other night,
sometimes meek, sometimes mild, sometimes wild... .



Afterword

Arnold Richards

I am very grateful to Merle Molofsky for her masterful summary of the papers in this issue. I am also grateful to David Lotto, who proposed the subject and got it started with his response to my paper. I am sure everyone will be impressed with the depth of the scholarship of these contributions and their breadth as well. Jew hatred is not a thing of the past. It is very much in the present, and a concerted effort needs to be made to prevent it from having a future.

Anti-Semitism caused Freud to identify more as a Jew, as in his response to Peter Vierek's father. On the other hand, anti-Semitism made Heinz Kohut deny that he was a Jew, unlike Freud. Freud, as is well known, was very concerned that psychoanalysis should not be considered a Jewish science. On the other hand, it is a fact that his first 18 disciples all were Jews. Jones and Jung were the first non-Jews to take up psychoanalysis. And not only were the original 18 all Jews, they, their parents, or grandparents, were all from Galicia.

We need to consider why Galicia was the cradle of psychoanalysis. It couldn't have been the water! I believe it had to do with the clash of ideological sensibilities: Hasidism emotionality, Misnagedim intellectuality, Haskalah rebelliousness, and Kabbalah mysticism. Some may question whether there is a mystical component in psychoanalysis, but it is the fact that Freud maintained that if he had to do it over again, he would've studied thought transfer rather than psychoanalysis. We look forward to the responses to these contributions that we will add after the issue is launched, and may be included in the book that will follow.



Holes in the Doorposts

Arnold Richards

My contribution is about the death of Yiddish and Yiddish culture in Eastern Europe. My focus is on the death of Yiddish writers, poets, playwrights, novelists, and essayists. I will present three groups of writers. First, those who wrote before the Holocaust and established their reputation before the Churban. Second those who survived WWII and the German genocide of the Jews and culture and continue to write, albeit for a much smaller audience but for an interested Yiddish literate audience no less. This included Isaac Beshevis Singer, his brother Jacob, Gladstein, Shalom Ash, Chaim Grade, Mani Leib, David Persky, and others. The third group, for which my paper is a kaddish are those Yiddish writers whose works are not known because they had not “made it” before 1940 and were murdered by the Germans.

I write this because of my felt connection to the Yiddish world of Eastern Europe. My mother was born in Galicia, my father in Podolia. Both spoke Yiddish and even though my mother was from Austro-Hungary and my father from Russia, their towns were very close to each other, 50 km on either side of the border and their Yiddish was similar in accent and phraseology. My grandmother who lived with us and died when I was five and a half spoke Yiddish and I learned Yiddish from her. I could speak and read Yiddish from an early age. My earliest lexical memory is reading the Forward in 1939 when I was five that Freud had died. Beremter Profesor is geshtorben. A famous professor died.

I started Yiddish school when I was seven in 1941 and continued until I was twelve. So the works of the writers that I write about were in the curriculum of the school: Sholem Alechem, I.L. Pertz, Mari Lieb, Mendele Mocher Sforim. (All devout secular Jews,) every Saturday we had singing, so we shouldn't go to synagogue. I remember a Saturday morning in 1942 when our singer teacher, Sholem Secunda, taught us a song he had just written—Donna, Donna, Donna. We put on many plays for a large audience of parents.

Witnessing the death of Yiddish language and culture:

This was the end. This was the sum total of hundreds of generations of living and building of Torah and piety, of free thinking, of Zionism of Bundism of struggles and battles, of the hopes of an entire people—this empty desert. I looked around me at what had been the Jews of Warsaw. I felt one hope and, I feel it now. May this sea of emptiness bubble and boil, may it cry out eternal condemnation of murderers and pillagers, may it forever be the shame of the civilized world which saw and heard and chose to remain silent. (Goldstein, B., 2005)

To bear witness to the Holocaust is to look both ways. We must acknowledge heartbreaking destruction and loss, but we must also celebrate the enduring power of life. Not every individual witness is privy to both perspectives, however. Some witness only destruction; some are themselves destroyed. Some witnesses come so close to destruction that they can endure their experience only by separating as much as possible from what they have seen, keeping it to themselves and passing it on (if at all) as a tale told at a remove. Some manage to continue to grow even with traumatized roots; they put out new shoots and look to the future. Destruction and creation—witnessing includes both. So when Nancy and Marilyn asked me to contribute to this volume a personal view of what the Holocaust meant to Yiddish culture, I found myself contemplating that tension between absence and presence, death and life, destruction and creation. I grew up in a family that did not hide what was happening, which allowed me to be openly interested. At the same time, I saw the intensity of pain the events of the thirties and forties caused in my family and my community, and I learned to appreciate why some people felt the need to separate themselves from it, and why others were disconnected from it by fiat, because their parents couldn't bear to engage with their experience intimately enough to pass it on.

I think that my choice of profession had a lot to do with my own issues about coming to terms with the past. I'm a psychoanalyst, committed to helping people find ways to discover and tolerate their own histories (whatever they may be) so as to be free to build their futures. I grew up bi-lingual in Yiddish and English in Brooklyn, New York and have been involved since 1978 with YIVO, an organization dedicated to the

preservation of Yiddish language documents and cultural history I served as Chairman of the Board of Directors between 1987 and 1990. I have gained an expansive, intricate, and very privileged view, not only of the catastrophe of the Holocaust, but of the extraordinarily creative ways that the Jewish people had found and continue to find to develop.

In this essay I act as a witness to honor the history of Yiddish culture and memorialize some the writers and poets who were killed. There is absence where a vast wealth of literature and a tradition formerly flourished.

Traveling to Krakow: Holes Where Mezuzahs Used to Be

In the early 1980s I traveled to Krakow with a YIVO group for a special showing at the Jagiellonian University there. That exhibit gave rise to the collection published as *Image Before My Eyes: A Photographic History of Jewish Life in Poland, 1864–1939*. (Dobroszycki & Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, eds. 1977) and also to Josh Waletzky's 1981 documentary of the same name. There was an official opening ceremony for our contingent, followed by a tour of the displays documenting Jewish life in the Polish territories before the Holocaust. The Polish visitors to the exhibit, of all ages, responded to the photographs as if they were archeological documents, records of an ancient civilization. They didn't seem to feel any close connection between these pictures and their history—in some cases, their lives. But to those of us from YIVO it was a moving and gripping evocation of the vibrancy of Jewish life in Poland not so very long ago—certainly within our parents' memories, and for many of us, our own.

I thought about this as we drove from Krakow to Warsaw, stopping off to visit the formerly Jewish villages—the shtetlach—we passed through along the way. On the doorposts of houses formerly occupied by Jews there were nail holes you could see and touch, ghosts of mezuzahs that were no longer there. But it wasn't all that long ago that they had been there, and I felt the connection acutely, looking at those photographs in Krakow, and walking through those once Jewish, now Polish, villages. My mother came from a village like these. She spoke the language that the people who lived here spoke; she read the books that the people who lived here read. I read them too. We had them at home while I was growing up in Brooklyn. My father's story is different, but that's part of the point of my assignment for this volume, which is to bear witness to the

fate of the Yiddish literary culture in Eastern Europe from a personal point of view, in the context of my own history.

A Brief Bio

I grew up in Brooklyn in the thirties and forties, hearing and reading about the Holocaust in English, Yiddish, and Russian. My parents’ marriage was a microcosm of the sociological stew that was Eastern European Jewry. They came from towns that are very close together on the map, and their Yiddish was very similar. But my father spoke Russian and my mother spoke Polish. My father’s family had been more or less integrated with the Russian world for generations—his great-grandfather, who was killed in the Crimean war, was the only Jewish noncommissioned officer in the Russian army, and his grandfather was manager of the Russian estate of an absentee Polish landowner. My father graduated from a Gymnasium where he had been excused from religion classes because he was Jewish. My mother came from an Orthodox shtetl family; her family kept Kosher, and the schools there were traditional kheyders (footnote—definition). My mother left Galicia with her family in the 20s. She was eleven years old. She worked as a milliner and learned English in night school. My father came here by himself in 1924. He was a Bolshevik atheist, who joined the Russian revolution and became a librarian in the Red Army. It was the job of the librarian of each unit of Trotsky’s army to drive the horse and the cart full of books for the soldiers to read. That was my father’s job. Guns weren’t enough, Trotsky thought. You had to know Marx too.

My earliest lexical memory dates from 1939. I was five, reading the *Yiddish Forward*, and there was a picture of a bearded man and a caption: **“Barimpta yiddisher professor geshtorben.”** Freud had died. Yiddish culture was an integral part of my growing up, as I know it was not for many Jewish children at the time. But it wasn’t until I was an adult that I became really aware of the magnitude of what had been lost.



Yiddish: A Lost Language

So let me start with the language in question, Yiddish. The origins of Yiddish aren't absolutely clear, but it's thought to have arisen in the 10th or 11th century, in the Rhineland, the fruit of generations of migration back and forth between Palestine and Europe after Rome destroyed Judea in the first century A.D. It was an inclusive language, open to elements of the various other Jewish linguistic traditions that intersected with it, and so it grew in time into a communicative thread that connected a lot of Jews of very different backgrounds.

But its universality—as a language, and as the marker of a traditional and separate Jewish culture—was on the wane long before the Holocaust. There were various reasons for this, but they mostly had to do with pressures for assimilation. Convenience was one of these pressures. Yiddish was still the main, and often the only, language of the provincial Jews living in shtetls in the Pale of Settlement. Many of these people for religious reasons kept themselves apart from the “secular” world, and perpetuated their isolation with the traditional religious kheyder education that followed a curriculum centuries old. But an increasing number of Polish Jews spoke Polish as well; it was a necessary tool for doing business with the Poles. My mother's father by traditional lights was a rather worldly person, and he spoke German as well as Polish and Yiddish

Some Jews just wanted to feel like part of the world that surrounded them; this was true all over Eastern Europe and elsewhere. The great Sholem Aleichem wrote in Yiddish because his audience spoke and understood it. But he wanted his children to be part of Russian civilization and Russian society, and to them he spoke Russian. Fear was another reason for assimilation and the thinning out the population of Yiddish speakers in Eastern Europe leaving it less concentrated than it had once been. In the wake of the financial crisis that followed the Panic of 1873, pogroms became more frequent within the Pale of settlement. Times were hard after the booming mideighteen-hundreds and in some quarters the Jews were blamed for it. This was the same period in which the term anti-Semitism came to prominence with the publication of a propaganda pamphlet by Wilhelm Marr in 1879, *Der Weg zum Siege des Germanenthums über das Judenthum* (*The Way to Victory of Germanic over Judaism*). Many Jews felt the need to distance themselves from

the distinguishing cultural, religious, and linguistic markers that made Jews so easily recognized—and so easily demonized. Another reason was pride. Yiddish was kept very carefully under wraps by many of the Jewish urbanites who settled in Europe's great cities, or who grew up there as the children of immigrants, and wished to assimilate themselves as perfectly as they could to their cosmopolitan surroundings.

Sigmund Freud was an example of this. Like many Austrian Jews, he aspired to membership in what he saw as a great cultural tradition, and certainly this possibility was becoming ever less remote as the Enlightenment progressed. But every movement that Freud and Jews like him made toward establishment culture meant a movement away from the culture of their parents. They were ashamed of their parents—with their odd dress and odd appearance and odd language—and guilty for being ashamed. I think that Freud's much-vaunted "godlessness" had as much to do with embarrassment as with religion. His wife's grandfather was the chief rabbi in Hamburg, and he didn't want his status as an enlightened Jew in sophisticated Viennese society to be undermined by identification with those scruffy and primitive Jews from the shtetl. He unabashedly acknowledged his prejudice against them, saying once of a play about Yochanan the Prophet that "I'd rather be the Jew in the tuxedo than the Jew in the caftan" (Grinwald 1941).

Freud later said that it was anti-Semitism that made him a Jew: "My language is German. My culture, my attainments are German. I considered myself German intellectually, until I noticed the growth of anti-Semitic prejudice in Germany and German Austria. Since that time, I prefer to call myself a Jew." [Gay, Freud, 988, p. 448]. But some prosperous German and Austrian Jews actually came to blame the shtetl Jews for the Holocaust, believing that it was their foreignness that attracted such dangerous attention. I heard this said by German Jews in the United States and by some of the Viennese psychoanalysts who I knew in New York City. They didn't recognize this as anti-Semitism themselves, nor did they recognize that the very success that they thought would insulate them had made them envied, and that when hard times returned again in the thirties envy contributed a great deal to conventional anti-Semitism and support for Hitler's Final Solution.

Sociological factors like these shaped the Yiddish literary and intellectual

world, in which the traditional, the assimilationist, the religious, the worldly, the political, the highbrow, the trashy, and the avant-garde were all represented. Assimilationist pressures and temptations being what they were, the halcyon days of the 1930s would likely have been the peak of Yiddish literary culture even if there had never been a Holocaust. But while they lasted, they were glorious. If not for the destruction this literary tradition would have influenced development of the arts for generations to come.

Eastern Europe before the war was rich with gifted poets, novelists, playwrights, journalists, historians, artists, musicians, and philosophers. In 1931, Poland had the highest percentage of Jews anywhere, more than three million of the 17 million Jews worldwide, about 18%. I'll be using Poland here as a focus, partly because it was home to the greatest number of Jews in Europe, and partly because its cities were centers of the Yiddish literary life that I'll be discussing. Poland's Yiddish literary culture was the largest and most active in the world; it was the only country in which successful Yiddish authors could support themselves by writing. Isaac Bashevis Singer has talked about the intellectual life of Warsaw, its newspapers, the coffee houses where patrons could sit and talk about the great Yiddish and Western writers for hours at a time. Many of those great writers died before World War II—the likes of Y.L. Peretz, Sholom Aleichem, and Mendele Mocher Sforim, who has been called the grandfather of Yiddish literature. These men were read everywhere within the Pale of Settlement, and I read their work myself as a child here, in my Yiddish school. At home we had a bound set of the collected works of Sholom Aleichem, and a volume of Peretz as well.

By 1906 there were five Yiddish dailies in Warsaw with a circulation of 100,000; and double that circulation by the end of the decade. They serialized the work of Yiddish writers, and published theater reviews and schedules. There were Jewish literary magazines. There was an Association of Jewish Writers and Journalists in Warsaw, and a PEN club in Vilna. So Yiddish speakers in Eastern Europe between the wars had plenty to choose from. Readers could find everything from serious novels to avantgarde poetry to escapist junk. Theater repertoires included not only musical comedies and tear-jerkers, but also drama, and performances in Yiddish translation of Shakespeare and such modern playwrights as O'Neill and Dreiser. (/Forgresert und farbessert/—"bigger

and better” “enlarged and improved” meant as a boast.) There were Yiddish movies, cabarets, and marionette theaters. A Yiddish version of the Pushkin/Tchaikovsky opera Eugene Onegin was produced in Vilna in 1920. Clearly not all of these offerings were by Yiddish authors or composers, but a vast number of them were, and the fact of the others attests to the appetite, and the cosmopolitan temperament of Polish urban Jewry.

Destruction

But, by the middle of the 1940s Yiddish civilization was almost completely destroyed by the Germans with the collaboration of Ukrainians and Poles. And the question to which I will address the rest of this paper is: What happened to the Yiddish writers? We can divide the Yiddish literati into groups according to the date of their deaths. The first group includes the early greats, who were dead by the time the war began. A second group survived the Holocaust and developed a Yiddish readership (significant, if dwindling) in the United States and Israel. Among these were the likes of Itzik Manger, Chaim Grade, and Abraham Sutzkever. There also had been a very creative and vibrant group of Yiddish poets called the Yunga, the young ones, who were developing an avant-garde Yiddish poetic sensibility. Some of these survived the war in the Soviet Union, but were subsequently killed by Stalin. In Joseph Leftwich’s anthology (1987) *Great Yiddish Writers of the 20th Century*, both of these groups are generously represented. Leftwich includes many of the early giants who died before 1940, including Y.L. Peretz, Sholom Aleichem, and Isidor (Yisroel) Eliashev. Among the postwar greats who survived the Holocaust, Leftwich includes, for example, Grade, Sutzkever, and Sholem Asch.

The group I want to speak of and memorialize here is barely represented among Leftwich’s 81 authors, or in any other anthology or classification that I know of. These are the Yiddish writers who were murdered in Eastern Europe between 1940 and 1945, particularly those who were not granted the time to fully develop their craft, or to establish enduring reputations. They were acclaimed and reckoned significant among the Jewish Eastern European literati of their time. But their work had not yet been disseminated widely, and it was lost, for the most part, when the audience of readers and play-goers who knew it best disappeared. It

is these writers who call up so poignantly the bittersweet awareness of what might have been.

Of the group who were murdered during the war years Leftwich included only three, and two of them were old men who had fully developed their skill and renown. Simon Dubnov, who wrote a many-volumed history of the Jews was killed by Germans in Riga in 1941 at the age of 81 and Hillel Zeitlin, the scholar, writer, and journalist, died in 1942 in the Warsaw Ghetto at the age of 72. Leftwich's third choice is the poet and critic Yisroel Shtern, who perished in Treblinka 1942 at the age of 46.

These three, however, are only a few of the dozens, perhaps hundreds, of Yiddish poets, novelists, playwrights, historians, philosophers, and journalists who were lost between 1940 and 1945, dying of starvation in the ghettos of Poland and the Pale, shot in the fields and forests of Russia and Lithuania, or otherwise murdered in concentration camps. They are only a few of the people whose names we don't recognize, whose productions we've never heard of, whose books aren't fondly remembered by our parents. They hadn't written enough, or written long enough, before the war to be known outside of their immediate community, and they didn't survive the war to promote their work afterwards to the world's tragically destroyed audience of Yiddish speakers, readers, and theater-goers.

Leftwich's list is sobering, and it's very hard to add to it. I hope I've made clear that this isn't because there wasn't much going on in the arts in Yiddish-speaking Europe. It's because the documentation of the period was decimated along with the people themselves. What little we know comes from material saved from the conquering Nazi armies by courage, guile, and luck, and then in some cases saved again from the tightening grip of Stalin. These efforts at preservation are yet another aspect of witness, and I'll mention two of them here: YIVO and Ringelblum.

YIVO was founded in Vilna in 1925 by Max Weinreich and other European Jewish intellectuals (Edward Sapir, Albert Einstein, and Sigmund Freud among the trustees) who wanted make available for study the history, language, and culture of the Jews of Eastern Europe before they were swamped by change and assimilation. YIVO sent

emissaries throughout the Pale of Settlement, to collect the stuff of the culture. Its initial mission was collection and scholarship, not preservation. But given what happened so soon afterward, their foresight turned out to be a great blessing.

When the German army took Vilna in March 1942, the Einsatzstas Rosenberg task force, started by Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg for looting the Jewish world of its cultural treasures, established a sorting center in the YIVO building. It was supposed to identify the most valuable materials there and ship the plunder to Rosenberg's Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question in Frankfurt. Rosenberg's functionaries could not distinguish between the gold and the dross, however. They impressed Jews who knew the material into this bitter task, but their unwilling accessories soon set their minds to saving YIVO's most valuable holdings. Dubbed *di papir-brigade*, the Paper Brigade, they disguised, removed, and hid as many important documents as they could. They were led by the poet Abraham Sutzkever and the writer and cultural historian Shmerke Kaczerginski, and they risked their lives to cache materials in the ghetto, in YIVO's attics, and with non-Jewish contacts for safekeeping.

In 1987, despite the ravages of war and Communism, a huge collection of YIVO materials that had been spirited into the hands of gentiles were discovered in a book depository the Lithuanian National Book Center. David E. Fishman has told this story in his book *Embers Plucked from the Fire: The Rescue of Jewish Cultural Treasures in Vilna* (YIVO, 2009). Perhaps most miraculously, or at least most ironically, the materials dispatched from YIVO to the Nazis in Frankfurt were discovered in 1946 by a US Army officer in a freight car at a railway siding outside of Frankfurt. These were sent to New York, and reconstituted as the American YIVO collection.

Emanuel Ringelblum the organizer of relief in the Warsaw Ghetto and of Oneg, the Warsaw Ghetto archive, tried to accumulate materials that would portray all facets of Jewish life from many different perspectives. He also wanted to document the destruction of Polish Jewry, to which he was an eyewitness. He and his colleagues collected questionnaires, memoirs, and interviews administered by amateur field workers, as well as input from professional historians and sociologists. David Roskies (*The*

Jewish Search for a Usable Past, Indiana University Press, 1999, p. 24) includes him among the eyewitness chroniclers of modern Jewish catastrophe. His work is an example of what Roskies calls “the Literature of Destruction,” another name for the tradition of witnessing that is the subject of this volume.

By some estimates, about half of what was written by Jews during this time was saved through the efforts of committed individuals like Ringelblum, who had opportunities to escape but who chose to remain the Warsaw ghetto to continue his work.¹: Ringelblum finally left the ghetto on the eve of the uprising, but he was discovered by the Gestapo and killed, along with his family and the Gentiles who had hidden them. The archive was maintained until February 1943. Two of the three Oyneg Shabes Caches were found after the war; the last is still missing. My mother was still alive at the time of the discovery of our YIVO materials in Vilna; when I told her about this discovery and the amazing accomplishments of the Papir-Brigade, she said in Yiddish, “Better they had saved fewer papers and more people.” That wasn’t within their power. But mindful of my mother’s comment, my intent in the rest of this piece is to speak of the Yiddish poets, playwrights, and novelists of Poland who were murdered between 1941 and 1945. In some cases at least, thanks to those who documented their lives and to those who courageously managed to preserve the documents, their names will live on.

Yet there are others whose names do not live on—whose names, even, have been lost, along with their lives and their work. Witnessing works both ways—we witness what is present, “before our eyes,” as the Krakow exhibition had it, and we witness also the fact of absence and the fact of the loss of the future. Some of these names are lost to us because it was not only the people who vanished, but those who knew them, as well. They too might have grown into greatness had their world not been destroyed. But like the mezuzahs that once graced the doorposts of village homes, they are gone; we can know that they were there only by the holes they left behind.

A Community Eradicated: Creative Voices Lost

Some of the holes in the doorposts are large and deep; some are small

¹https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emanuel_Ringelblum

and barely discernible. But they all attest to a community destroyed, to an irreversible loss of life and of creative force. What follows here are two lists. The first is a list of Yiddish writers murdered between 1940 and 1945 about whom a significant amount is known. I offer it to establish a more detailed picture of these people and the lost riches that can never be recovered. I will then follow with a Yizkor list, a list of remembrance, of those whose names we know but whose work we do not. All this material is excerpted from the wonderful YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe website (www.yivoencyclopedia.org). Anyone interested in this vanished world will find a visit there very rewarding. Yet the list still is not complete, and it never will be. Part of the tragedy we are witnessing here is the fact that we do not even have names for so many of these people, and yet surely many of them contributed in measure as full as those who are remembered. The names we do have, the ones I am memorializing here, are listed with the little information available about them on the YIVO site, at https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Yiddish_Literature/Yiddish_Literature_after_1800. My hope is that anyone with historical connections to this vanished civilization will look at that list, and offer to YIVO any further information they may possess, either of names that should be added, or of knowledge about the people who are already included there.

Mordkhe Gebirtig, poet and songwriter. Born 1877, Krakow. Died 1942, by random German fire while being marched to the Krakow train station for transportation to the Belzec death camp. Gebirtig is best known for his song “S’brent” (It is burning), which was written in 1938 in response to a pogrom, and became a favorite of the Jewish Resistance movement. The first collection of Gebirtig’s songs, *Folkshtimlech* (*In the Folk Style*), was published in 1920, and a second, *Mayne Lider* (*My Songs*), in 1938. In 1940 or 1941 he wrote *Atos fun nekome* (*A Day for Revenge*), a song about hope for the downfall of the perpetrators of the Holocaust.

Shimen Horontshik, novelist. Born 1889, Wieluń. Died 1939, Kałuszyn, a suicide, to forestall being murdered by German troops engaged in a pogrom. Horontshik lived in Lodz during World War I and in France and Belgium during the early thirties. He wrote eleven novels, five of which were primarily autobiographical. Two—*In geroysh fun mashinen* (*Amid the noise of the machines*, 1928), and *1905* (1929)—are set in the

lace-making district of Kalisz, where industrialism and capitalism are making inroads upon shtetl life. *Bayn shvel* (*At the threshold*, 1935/36) looks at the conflicts between Jews and Poles and among Jews themselves, as seen through his young eyes. In other novels he considered the damage to the Jewish way of life wrought by greed and the loss of moral structure.

Alter-Sholem Kacyzne, novelist, playwright, and photographer. Born 1855, Vilna. Died 1941, Tarnopol; killed with thousands of other Jews who were fleeing the German advance. Kacyzne's great two-volume novel *Shtarke un Shvakhe* (*The Strong and the Weak*) was published in 1929/1930; it dealt with the 1905 Polish uprising and the conflict between Bohemian Jews and the rising generation of Poles. He also wrote three plays, *Dem Yidns Opera* (*The Jew's Opera*), *Ester* (*Esther*), and *Shvartsbard* (about Sholem Schwartzbard, who assassinated the Ukrainian nationalist Symon Petliura in 1926).²

Kacyzne was probably one of the most prolific of the pre-war Yiddish writers in Poland, and considered by many the literary heir to Y.L. Peretz. Despite these accomplishments, he is better remembered as a photographer than as either novelist or playwright. In 1921 he was commissioned by the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society to photograph Jewish life in Poland, and his work was published regularly in the New York *Forverts*. (*The Forward*). Kacyzne's photographic archive in Warsaw was destroyed in the Holocaust, but the 700 photographs he had sent to New York are at YIVO.³

Yitzhak Katzenelson, poet, educator, writer. Born 1885, near Minsk. Died 1944, Auschwitz. Katzenelson was a major Hebrew and Yiddish poet, (called by some the Poet of Destruction). His first anthology of Yiddish poetry, *Die zun fargeyt in flamen* (*The sun sets in flames*) was published in 1909. He was a man of many accomplishments. He established a network of private Hebrew schools that continued until 1939, and for it wrote children's literature and Hebrew textbooks. He started a Hebrew theater company, and wrote plays on contemporary and biblical

²https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sholem_Schwarzbard

³<http://polishjews.yivoarchives.org/archive/index.php?p=collections/controlcard&id=22442&q=photogallery>

themes. He translated the poetry of Heinrich Heine into Hebrew. He published his collected Hebrew poems in three volumes in 1938. These were much darker in tone than his early work.

But at the time of publication the political situation made for poor distribution, and few copies survived the war. Later, however, they revealed Katzenelson to be what the YIVO Encyclopedia calls “the great eulogist in verse of the murdered Jewish people.” http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Katzenelson_Yitshak. In December 1939 Katzenelson escaped from Lodz, and became a central figure in the pedagogic and cultural life of the Warsaw Ghetto. He continued to teach, direct plays, and write, and he contributed to the underground press. Forty of his own works were composed in the Ghetto, including two long poems (Dos lid vegn Shloyme Zhelikhovsky [The poem about Solomon Zhelikhovsky] and Dos lid vegn Radziner [The Poem about the Radzhin Rebbe]). Both of these were about heroism in the face of death. He was now writing in Yiddish, seeking to reach the largest audience he could in his current circumstances. But in August 1942 his wife and two younger sons were deported to Treblinka, and his poetry turned very dark again. He took part in the first Warsaw Ghetto uprising and escaped briefly, but was caught and sent to a German detention camp in Vittel, France, and then to Auschwitz, where he and his son were murdered. In Vittel, Katzenelson wrote two of the Holocaust’s most important works: *Pinkas Vitel* (*The Vittel diary*) in Hebrew, and *Dos lid fun oysgehargetn yidishn folk* (*The Poem about the Murdered Jewish People*). These capture the terror, pathos, and rage of his people, and lament his own impending death.

Miryem Ulinover (nee Manya Hirshbeyn), poet and journalist. Born 1890, Lodz. Died 1944, Auschwitz. Ulinover was a prolific poet and active in Yiddish literary circles during the 1920s. Her first poems were published in Polish when she was 15. She also wrote in Russian and German. Her Yiddish work began to appear ten years later. Her best-known collection of poems is *Der bobes optser* (*My Grandmother’s Treasure*, 1922). There is disagreement among literary critics about whether Ulinover is a modernist or a naïve folk poet, and about whether her poetry is secular or religious. Kathryn Hellerstein writes in the YIVO encyclopedia that “Miryem Ulinover wrote poems designed by a modern sensibility that sought to preserve the folk diction, sayings, and customs of pre-modern Jewish life in Poland.” (Hellerstein 2010)

Oyzer Varshavski, novelist. Born 1898, Sochazcew. Died 1944, Auschwitz. Varshavski's first novel, *Shmuglars (Smugglers)*, published in 1920, is considered the finest example of Yiddish naturalism. It is a raw tale of Jews in a Polish town trying to make a living during World War I by distilling illegal whiskey and smuggling it into German-held Warsaw. Varshavski portrayed the implosion of shtetl life as it came into increasing contact with the outside world. In his study *In the Mirror of Literature: The Economic Life of the Jews in Poland as Reflected in Yiddish Literature (1914–1939)*, William Glicksman (1966) describes Varshavski's vision as the vortex of a world at the brink of an abyss. His second novel, *Shnit-tsayt (Harvest Time, 1926)*, was about shtetl life in the years between the outbreak of World War I and the beginning of the German Occupation. There is a tragic irony to Varshavski's last book, *Rezidentsn (Residences)*, which describes the efforts of various Jewish characters to escape the Nazis in occupied France. Varshavski settled in Paris in 1924, but after the occupation fled first to Vichy France and then to Italy, where he and his wife were seized and sent to Auschwitz.

Dvora Vogel, philosopher and art critic. Born 1900, Burshtyn, Galicia. Died 1942, together with her husband, mother, and small son, in the Lvov ghetto during the Great Action of 1942. Vogel was educated in Vienna, in Lvov, and then at Jagiellonia University in Krakow, where she completed a dissertation on Hegel's aesthetics. She was an accomplished academic as well as a writer; she taught psychology at Hebrew Teacher's Seminary in Lvov, and was a central figure in the Polish literary and artistic avant-garde. She corresponded widely with other writers in a circle of mutual influence. Her first volume of poems, published in 1930, (*Tog-figurn Lider, Figures of the Day*) are free verse poems on concrete and abstract themes. *Manekin Lider (Mannequin Poems, 1934)*, were openly constructivist in principle. Her work was little regarded in her time; if she and her audience had lived long enough to become familiar with the new literary forms, her literary fate would likely have been very different.

Grieving the Death of Writers Lost

Finding this list has changed what was intellectual insight to a profoundly emotional feeling. The sadness and sense of loss to all of us must

be overwhelming to me. The number and the details of who they were and what they had written follows.

(The following list identifies and briefly describes Yiddish writers who are not the subject of an independent biographical entry.)

Apshan, Herts (1886–1944), prose writer and journalist. Hertsl Apshan was born near Sighet, Hungary; as an adult he was a businessman and insurance agent in that city. After 1918, he lived in Romania. Apshan's depictions of Hasidic life in Transylvania were praised for their artist cobversations and soft irony. He was murdered in Auschwitz.

Aronski, (Zak) Moyshe (1898–1944), prose writer and educator. Born in Ovruch, Ukraine, Moyshe Aronski (originally Zak) graduated from Kiev University in 1930 and subsequently taught literature and history in Yiddish schools in Ukraine. From 1926, his prose appeared in periodicals in Kharkov, Kiev, and Moscow. Aronski enlisted in the Soviet Army and was killed in action. He published more than 15 novels and collections of stories about Jewish life in the Soviet Union.

Beylin, Shloyme-Zisl (1857–1942), scholar and folklorist. Born in Novogrodek, Belorussia, Shloyme-Zisl Beylin served as a crown rabbi in Rogachev (Belorussia) and Irkutsk (Siberia), and from 1920 lived in Moscow. Throughout his life he collected and studied Yiddish proverbs, songs, and children's rhymes and riddles; his studies appeared in Russian, German, and Yiddish scholarly and literary periodicals. Beylin's last collection of Yiddish folk jokes and anecdotes was ready to be published in 1941 but was not released because of the war. Some of his unpublished materials are preserved in the YIVO archives. He died in Siberia.

Dreyfus, Leybush (Leon; 1894–1941), prose writer, journalist, and actor. Born in Lwów, Leybush Dreyfus began to publish poetry in the *Po'ale Tsiyon* press in 1911. After World War I he went to Czechoslovakia, where he founded a traveling Yiddish theater company. He returned to Lwów and contributed short stories, essays, and poems to the Yiddish press under various pseudonyms. Living in Riga and Warsaw, Dreyfus edited Yiddish and Polish periodicals, published a novel about actors (*Kulishn* [*Behind the Stage*]; 1927), worked in theater and on the radio, and in 1939 returned to Lwów. He died in the Janów concentration camp.

Dua, Yankev-Kopl (1898–1942), writer and journalist. Yankev-Kopl Dua was born in Warsaw and attended a Russian school. He became involved in socialist politics and contributed numerous articles on art, theater, literature, and music to the left-wing Yiddish press. His novels about Polish Jewish history were reprinted in installments by Yiddish newspapers in the United States, Argentina, and South Africa. He was the main editor and author of *Groshn-bibliotek (Penny Library)*, which published popular brochures and produced numerous translations from world literature. Dua continued his literary work in the Warsaw ghetto; a German officer shot him on the street.

Dubilet, Moyshe (1897–1941), literary critic and educator. Born in Ekaterinoslav province, Ukraine, Moyshe Dubilet served in the Red Army during the Russian Civil War and later graduated from the Yiddish department of the Odessa Pedagogical Institute. He taught Yiddish language and literature in Yiddish schools and in 1933 began graduate studies at the Kiev Institute of Jewish Proletarian Culture, researching nineteenth-century Yiddish literature (Yisroel Aksenfeld, Shloyme Ettinger, Sholem Yankev Abramovitsh, Sholem Aleichem). Dubilet's collection *Kritishe artiklen (Critical Essays)* was published in 1939; in 1941, he enlisted in the Soviet Army and was killed in action.

Eliashev, Ester (1878–1941), literary critic, journalist, and teacher. Ester Eliashev was born in Kaunas, and studied philosophy at the universities of Leipzig, Heidelberg, Bern (receiving a doctorate in 1906), and taught at the Higher Women's Courses in Saint Petersburg. She returned to Kaunas in 1921, where she worked as a teacher and was a prolific literary critic and journalist. Eliashev died on the eve of the German invasion. She was the sister of Isidor Eliashev (Bal-Makhshoves).

F. Gilbert, Shloyme (1885–1942), prose writer and poet. Born in Radzymin, near Warsaw, Shloyme Gilbert began to publish neoromantic poetry and novellas in 1907. His first collection of stories appeared in Warsaw in 1922, followed by two additional books of poetry and drama inspired by religious and mystical motifs. He was deported from the Warsaw ghetto to Treblinka.

Glik, Hirsh (1922–1944), poet. Born in Vilna, Hirsh Glik began to write under the influence of his older friends from Yung-Vilne; he issued his

first publications in 1940. Glik is famous for his ghetto poetry, especially the “Partisaner lid” (The Partisan Hymn; 1943), which became a symbol of Jewish resistance.

Goldshteyn, Moyshe (1900–1943), prose writer. Moyshe Goldshteyn was born near Siedlec, Poland, and lived in Warsaw. In 1923, he immigrated to Argentina and published short stories in the Yiddish press. In 1932 he arrived in Birobidzhan, worked in an agricultural colony, and published reports about Birobidzhan and Argentina in the Yiddish press. Two collections of his short prose works were published in Moscow. He served as an officer in the Soviet Army and was killed during World War II. A number of his war stories were published posthumously.

Gotlib, Yankev (1911–1945), poet. Yankev Gotlib was born in Kaunas, and received at traditional education. His first poem was published in 1925 subsequently he published four collections of poetry and a book about H. Leyvik; he also edited literary publications in Kaunas. He died during the evacuation in Central Asia.

Grin, Yerakhmiel (1910–1944), prose writer. Yerakhmiel Grin was born in a village near Kolomyia, Ukraine; he lived in Warsaw. He wrote stories and novels about Jewish life in the Carpathian Mountains, and died in the Janów concentration camp together with his wife Hinde Naiman-Grin (1916–1944), a Polish and Yiddish writer and journalist.

Grodzenski, Arn-Yitskhok (1891–1941), poet and journalist. Arn-Yitskhok Grodzenski grew up in Vilna and published his first poem in 1906. From 1910 to 1913, he lived in Antwerp, and then returned to Vilna, publishing his first collection of poetry in 1914. In 1916, Grodzenski fled to Ekaterinoslav, where he lost his legs in an accident. He contributed to various Yiddish publications in Ukraine as well as translated Russian and German poetry. In 1921, he again settled in Vilna, where he worked as an editor and translator. His most popular work was the novel *Lebn* (*Life*; 1923). Tchaikovsky’s opera *Eugène Onegin* was performed in his Yiddish translation in Vilna in 1923. Grodzenski was murdered in Ponar.

Hartsman, Motl (1908–1943), poet. Born in Berdichev, Motl Hartsman attended the Yiddish school headed by Nina Brodovskaya, who encouraged his first literary and theatrical attempts; he received his higher education in Odessa and Moscow, and completed graduate study in Kiev

with Maks Erik. Hartsman's first poems were printed in Berdichev's Yiddish newspapers and quickly became popular; a few collections of his poems were published in the 1930s. His last long poem, *Der toyt-urteyl* (The Death Sentence), was written during the war while he served in the Red Army. He was killed in action.

Hershele (1882–1941), poet, prose writer, and journalist. Hershele (pseudonym of Hersh Danilevich) was born in Lipno, Poland. As a textile worker in Warsaw, he joined the socialist Zionist movement, was arrested, moved to Switzerland, and then came back to Poland, where he eventually settled in a town near Warsaw. His first publications, in 1904, were greeted warmly by Y. L. Peretz. Beginning in 1910, Hershele contributed poetry, short stories, children's literature, and translations to various Yiddish periodicals; he collected and published Yiddish folklore; and some of his poems became folk songs. His earliest book of poetry came out in 1907; he also published and edited several other collections. His poetry from the Warsaw ghetto appeared in illegal publications, also published a collection of plays and dramatic poems, titled *Bayopgruntn* (*By Abyss*; 1930). He participated in Yung-Vilne and served as chair of the Yiddish PEN club. In 1938 he moved to Palestine.

Heysherik, Kalmen-Khayim (1900–1941), prose writer. Kalmen-Khayim Heysherik was born near Łódź, Poland. As a prisoner of war in Germany during World War I, he kept a diary that later served as the basis of his memoirs and fiction, which became popular during the 1920s. He published stories and essays in major Polish Yiddish newspapers. After the occupation of Warsaw in 1939, he fled to Vilna. He was murdered in Ponar.

Kava, Shloyme-Leyb (1889–?), critic and journalist. Born in Warsaw, Shloyme-Leyb Kava (main pseudonym of Moyshe-Yosef Dikshteyn) served as Y. L. Peretz's secretary and later became vice president of the Association of Jewish Writers and Journalists in Warsaw. From 1905, he published numerous articles and essays in the Yiddish press, some of them sharply satirical and critical. In 1923, he published a collection of Yiddish folklore and was involved with various Yiddish publications in Poland. He died in the Warsaw ghetto.

Kirman, Yosef (1896–1943), poet. Yosef Kirman grew up in Warsaw in a poor family and was a worker; his first poetic publication appeared in the collection *Ringin (Rings; 1919)*, he later contributed to various periodicals and published one collection of poems. He was arrested for his political activity by the Polish police. In the Warsaw ghetto he continued to write poetry and prose, which was partly preserved in the Ringelblum Archive. He was murdered in the Poniatów concentration camp.

Kreppel, Yoyn (1874–1939), journalist and writer. Born in Drohobycz, Galicia, Yoyn (Jonas) Kreppel was active in the Zionist movement and later became a leader of Agudas Yisroel. He also participated in the Czernowitz Conference. Beginning in 1914 in Vienna, he served for many years as an adviser for the Austrian Foreign Ministry. He contributed to *Deryud* and other Yiddish publications in Galicia and from 1919 was a Vienna correspondent for New York's *Yidishes Togblat*. A prolific Yiddish-language author of crime and historical fiction in Poland and America, he published more than 100 small books of stories and novels that were popular among a mass readership. He composed a comprehensive overview of contemporary Jewish life in German with *Juden und Judentum von Heute (Jews and Judaism Today; 1925)*. Kreppel died in the concentration camp at Mauthausen.

Olevski, Buzi (1908–1941), poet and prose writer. Born in Chernigov, Ukraine, Buzi Olevski's primary focus was on the economic and social transformation of shtetl youth; he also wrote for children. He wrote his dissertation on the poetry of Dovid Hofshteyn in Kiev, and later lived in Moscow and Birobidzhan. As an officer in the Soviet Army, Olevski fought in World War II and was killed in action. His autobiographical novel *Osherl un zayne fraynd (Osherl and His Friends)* was published posthumously in 1947.

Pitshenik, Moyshe-Leyb (1895–1941), writer and journalist. Moyshe-Leyb Pitshenik was born in Złoczew, Galicia, spent 1920–1922 in Katowice, and was the director of the Jewish school in Łowicz from 1923 on. He published poetry, stories, and articles in the Polish Yiddish press as well as historical novels about the Haskalah and Hasidism. He was murdered by the Nazis near Chełmno.

Rashkin, Leyb (1903?–1939), prose writer. Born in Kazimierz (Kuzmir), Poland, Leyb Rashkin (Shaul Fridman) began writing stories in the 1930s. His major work, *Di mentshn fun Godl-Bozhits* (*The People of Godl-Bozhits*; 1936), a realistic panoramic portrait of the Polish shtetl, was one of the most important Polish Yiddish debut novels in the 1930s and was awarded a literary prize. Rashkin was murdered while attempting to escape from German occupation to the Soviet Union

Shaevich, Simkhe-Bunem (1907–1944), poet and writer. Born in Tęczyce, Poland, Simkhe-Bunem Shaevich grew up in Łódź. From 1933 he published poetry and short stories, mostly in left-wing papers in Łódź and Warsaw; his first collection of stories was ready for publication in 1939 but was not issued due to the start of the war. In the Łódź ghetto, Shaevich composed profound Holocaust poems that explored traditional concepts such as exile and martyrdom. These works were preserved by survivors and published, posthumously, in 1946.

Shalit, Moyshe (1885–1941), journalist and communal activist. Born in Vilna to a well-off family, Moyshe Shalit was actively engaged in a wide range of public and philanthropic activities in Russia, Poland, and abroad, among them the PEN club and the Association of Jewish Writers and Journalists. In 1906, he published a historical study of the BILU movement in Russian (translated into Yiddish in 1917) as well as articles and reviews in the Yiddish and Russian press, and he edited a number of books and periodicals on politics, culture, and education. He was arrested and murdered immediately after the German occupation of Vilna in July 1941.

Sito, Fayv (1909–1945), prose writer. Fayvl Sito was born Rovno, Volhynia, lost his family during the civil war, and grew up in an orphanage. He studied in Odessa and at the Kharkov Conservatory. His stories about the lives of Jewish orphans in postrevolutionary Russia were based on personal experience, written with warmth and humor, and made him popular with a Yiddish readership. Also popular were his parodies of various Soviet Yiddish writers that were collected in two books (1934, 1938); he additionally wrote plays and translated from Russian and Ukrainian into Yiddish. In 1939–1941, Sito edited a Yiddish magazine for teenagers in Kiev. During the war, he edited an army newspaper and worked for the Moscow Yiddish newspaper *Eynikayt*.

Tumru, Dovid (1910–1941), prose writer. Born in Alitus, Lithuania, Dovid Umru lived in Kaunas. He began to publish short stories in the Yiddish press in the 1930s; two collections of his short stories appeared in Kaunas in 1937 and 1938. In 1940–1941 he edited the newspaper *Vilner emes* and served as the director of the Vilna State Yiddish Theater. He was murdered by the Gestapo in July 1941.

Varshavski, Yakir (1885–1942), writer and journalist. Born in Mława, Poland, Yaki Varshavski contributed to the Hebrew press (from 1908) and to Yiddish periodicals (from 1909); he also taught Hebrew in Warsaw's schools. Varshavski published his travelogue to Palestine and Egypt (1919), as well as a number of other books in Hebrew in Poland, including short stories for children. His two Yiddish collections were ready for publication in 1939 but did not appear due to the outbreak of World War II. He continued writing in the Warsaw ghetto until the Nazis murdered him in the summer of 1942.

Vaynig, Naftole (1897–1943), literary critic and folklorist. Born in Tarnów, western Galicia, Naftole Vaynig studied philology at Kraków University and art in Vienna. He also taught in Polish and Jewish schools. From 1917, his critical essays appeared in the press of Vienna and Warsaw, and he contributed studies of Jewish folklore to academic Yiddish publications in Poland. From 1941, he was in the Vilna ghetto, where he continued to teach, write, and collect folklore. His study of Leyb Naydus's poetry won a literary prize of the Judenrat.

Vulman, Shmuel (1896–1941), prose writer. Shmuel Vulman was born in Kaluszin, Poland. From 1917, he lived in Warsaw and contributed poetry, articles, reviews, and translations to numerous Yiddish periodicals in Warsaw, Lwów, and Czernowitz. He published collections of poetry, memoirs of the German occupation during World War I, an autobiographical novel, and a number of popular books on history, literature, geography, and other subjects. He was murdered by the Nazis in Kremeniec, Volhynia, where he had fled from Warsaw.

Zhitnitski, Hersh-Leyb (1891–1942), writer and journalist. Hersh-Leyb Zhitnitski was born in Szeradz, Poland, and lived in Łódź. From 1920, he lived in Warsaw, and fled to Lwów in 1939. He fell into the hands of the Nazis in 1941, and was deported to a death camp a year

later. His first short story appeared in 1913 in *Lodzer morgnblat*. Zhitnitski worked as an editor of the *Warsaw Haynt*, contributed to the Yiddish press of Poland, the United States, Argentina, and Palestine, and published two collections of novellas and a novel about World War I in installments. His last book was ready for publication in 1939 but was never published due to the outbreak of the war.

Zilburg, Moyshe (1884–1941?), literary critic and translator. Born in Molodechno, Belorussia, Moyshe Zilburg took part in revolutionary activity, was arrested, left Russia, and moved to Galicia. He lived in Kraków, Lwów, and Vienna, where he edited the Yiddish literary magazine *Kritik* (1920–1921). In 1923, he returned to Vilna and worked on various Yiddish literary publications. He began to publish literary criticism around 1908 and later produced several translations from Hebrew, German, and Russian. After the German occupation of Vilna, he was killed in Ponar.

The contribution of this paper is to bring to our awareness the Yiddish writers listed in an Encyclopedia but otherwise not widely recognized and their loss not mourned. This is my Kaddish for them.

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David Roskies (1999). *The Jewish Search for a Usable Past*, Indiana University Press, p. 24)

Mordkhe Gebirtig *Folkshtimlech (In the Folk Style)*, was published in 1920, and a second, *Mayne Lider (My Songs)*, wrote Atos fun nekome (A Day for Revenge).

Shimen Horontshik *In geroysh fun mashinen (Amid the noise of the machines, 1928)*, and *1905 (1929)*.

Alter-Sholem Kacyzne, *Shtarke un Shvakhe (The Strong and the Weak)* was published in 1929/1930; *Bayn shvel (At the threshold, 1935/36 Plays, Dem Yidns Opera (The Jew's Opera), Ester (Esther), and Shvartsbard.*

Yitzhak Katzenelson, *Die zun fargeyt in flamen (The sun sets in flames)* was published in 1909. Dos lid vegn Shloyme Zhelikhovsky [The poem about Solomon].

Zhelikhovsky and Dos lid vegn Radziner [The Poem about the Radzhin Rebbe] Katzenelson wrote two of the Holocaust's most important works: *Pinkas Vitel (The Vittel diary)* in Hebrew, and *Dos lid fun oysgehargetn yidishn folk (The Poem about the Murdered Jewish People)*.

Miryem Ulinover (nee Manya Hirshbeyn), *Der bobes optser (My Grandmother's Treasure, 1922)*.

Oyzer Varshavski, *Shmuglars (Smugglers), In the Mirror of Literature: Shnit-tsayt (Harvest Time, 1926 Rezidentsn (Residences) (Residences; Résidences: On ne peut pas se. 1944)*.

Dvora Vogel, published in 1930, (*Tog-figurn Lider, Figures of the Day). Manekin Lider (Mannequin Poems, 1934)*.

Dreyfus, a novel about actors (*Kulish [Behind the Stage]; 1927*).

Dubilet, Moyshe Dubilet's collection *Kritishe artiklen (Critical Essays)* was published in 1939.

Glik, Hirsh (1922–1944), y the “Partisaner lid” (The Partisan Hymn; Grodzenski, Arn-Yitskhok (1891–1941 Lebn (Life; 1923).

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William Glicksman *The Economic Life of the Jews in Poland as Reflected in Yiddish Literature (1914–1939)*, (1966).

Hershele (1882–1941), poet, prose writer, and journalist. Hershele (pseudonym of Hersh Danilevich) a collection of plays and dramatic poems, titled *Bayopgruntn* (By Abyss; 1930).

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Jewish Origins of the Psychoanalytic Movement **By Dennis B. Klein (1981)**

New York: Praeger

Reviewed by Arlene Kramer Richards

J*ewish Origins of the Psychoanalytic Movement* is likely to be of interest primarily to historians and sociologists. It attempts to discuss psychoanalysis, not as a science, nor as a mode of therapy, but as a social movement. It is as if one were to consider not the science of chemistry but the historical and social group of people among whom chemistry became an interest and an occupation. This unusual point of view leads to a curious conclusion: that Freud and his friends created psychoanalysis as a kind of substitute for the ritual and legal scholarly activities which were the traditional bonds of their forebears.

In this book, Klein does an admirably meticulous job of documenting the influence of his Jewish background on Freud the man; Klein does not, however, demonstrate any influence on psychoanalysis as a science beyond the by now almost banal idea of Judaism's emphasis on learning as a value. Yet the fresh facts and the bright array in which they are mustered make it a book worth reading. By using records of *B'nai B'rith* chapters in Vienna, Klein is able to show how insularly Jewish Freud's circle in Vienna was and how the social isolation imposed on this circle by Viennese anti-Semitism resulted in a coherent social group with mutual assistance and intellectual interchange as its central values.

Klein shows how the Austrian political and economic climate in the 19th century led to the development of general anti-Semitism; of specific discrimination against those Jews who had roots in Eastern Europe as opposed to those who were of German heritage; and, of assimilationist, Zionist and ethnocentric non-Zionist responses to anti-Semitism. He documents the responses of Freud's friends and mentors to the social conditions of their time and place. From their statements and recorded experiences, he draws inferences about Freud's attitudes. He bolsters these inferences with excerpts from Freud's own letters. He makes quite

a convincing case for the idea that Freud selected out of Jewish tradition exactly what Theodor Herzl, his neighbor in Vienna, selected as the central tenet of Zionism: a belief in the inherited strength of the fighting spirit which had been the hallmark of the ancient Hebrews. Klein shows that Freud was like all Jews in the Vienna of his time in having to choose between conversion to the religion of the majority, Roman Catholicism, and retention of a Jewish identity. He shows how Freud more than once must have considered that choice and how it was finally the influence of his friends that led him to his choice of being a Jew among Jews rather than converting to Christianity. Klein makes it clear that Freud's choice was for his people as against an ideology rather than a choice between beliefs or between systems of ideas. An independent confirmation of Freud's feeling that Jewishness was a matter of belonging to a group rather than a matter of adherence to a creed appears in his 1913 letters to a young disciple: "We are and remain Jews. The others will only exploit us and will never understand or appreciate us" (Carotenuto, 1982, p. 121).

The notion that a system of beliefs was the important thing was central to the Viennese society, which was ready to accept Jews if they would convert to Christianity. Freud's opposition to the idea that mere conversion could change people in a fundamental way, making Christians out of Jews, was part of the *Zeitgeist*. Klein reminds us that another young man in Vienna came to the same conclusion that Freud and Herzl had. That young man also recognized Jews as a people who could not change their destiny by baptism. His name later became Adolf Hitler. Given Klein's account of the times, it is clear that a Viennese almost had to come to that conclusion by the end of the first decade of the 20th century. For the best thinkers of their day, the idea was already inevitable thirty years earlier. Herzl's pride led him to believe Jews had to become the dominant majority in a Jewish homeland; Freud's pride led him to believe Jews were a people like all others, entitled to live in Europe with all the other Europeans. If Herzl had Jews as friends, it was because he sought their help in building the new state. If Freud did, it was because Gentiles had not yet understood that Jews were their scientific and social equals.

Apart from the highlighting of Freud's early association with an exclusively Jewish set of friends and intellectual peers, this volume adds little that is new to a specifically psychoanalytic understanding of Freud's Jewish identity. It gives no clues as to how Freud's theories were

influenced by the Jewish circle to which they were presented. Nor does it offer any examples of ideas which could have been traced to Freud's own schooling in Hebrew or in Jewish history or philosophy. This omission leaves the book in the peculiar position of having meticulously proven a weak form of its assertion that Freud's Jewishness made a difference in the development of psychoanalysis. The argument so well documented comes down to the idea that Freud used his Jewish friends as a sounding board until he created a group specifically devoted to psychoanalysis for that purpose.

Other authors have taken a stronger form of the assertion and attempted to prove that Freud experienced his Jewish heritage as a mandate to fight for an unpopular cause (Jones, 1953; Bergmann, 1976; Ostow, 1982). Yet another has linked Freud to the mystical tradition in Judaism (Bakan, 1958). Freud himself ascribed to his heritage the idea that he was free of certain intellectual limitations as well as the capacity to adhere to his own ideas in the face of opposition (1926, p. 274). The case for each of these traits is clearly drawn, but it seems to me that the same traits would be necessary for any scientific innovator. The same character traits of intellectual freedom and tenacity in the face of opposition from traditionalists are just those one looks for in any candidate for a doctorate in any branch of science. Thus Freud's possession of these traits could well account for his success in science but do not in themselves seem specific to psychoanalysis.

We are on quite different ground when we deal with such concepts as the oedipal conflict, unconscious fantasy, resistance, transference and the like. Linking one or more of these core concepts with Freud's Judaism would make a strong case for the influence of his Jewishness on the scientific discipline he created. There are two traditional links between Freud and Jewish heroes. The first, the identification with Hannibal (1900, p. 196), was a symbol for vengeance. The second, Moses (1914), was a symbol for self-control, replacing vengeance with conscience (Bergmann, 1976). If this is taken as the psychoanalytic fruit of Freud's Jewish roots, it links history with the unconscious of the individual in a unique way: via the return of the repressed, such an idea has the quality of a major contribution to psychoanalytic thought. Although there are analysts who would deny the value of psychohistory and consider the idea of a collective return of the repressed in the form of a moral code as

a deleterious rather than an enhancing change, all would agree that it is a change of serious consequence. Klein's own idea that the story of a life has implications for the mind of the person who lived it is very close to the current idea of the psychoanalytic narrative as presented by Spence and Schaeffer.

Klein's historical determinism is parallel to the psychoanalytic method which emphasizes psychic determinism. At its best, each of these methods of explanation produces almost visceral conviction. Ideas are distilled out of the impact of experience on a person's mind. Even when the connections are only very general, as Klein's are in this book, presentation of the evidence may lead a psychoanalytically-minded reader to formulate more specific and challenging propositions. Thus, psychoanalysts interested in psychohistory as well as history and biography readers will enjoy this lively little book even though its implications for clinical theory may be slim.

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***Deciphering the New Antisemitism,*
edited by Alvin H. Rosenfeld**

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568 pp.*

Reviewed By Merle Molofsky

This impressive book, offering essays by 19 authors on the topic of the recent upsurge in virulent anti-Jewish hostility, is daunting, not by sheer size, which is considerable, but by the very fact of its existence, the very fact of what must be its focus the worldwide rise of a pernicious, persistent anti-Semitism. The topic of course must be explored, and is explored with painstaking scholarship, intensive scrutiny of the subject itself, commitment, eloquence, and passion.

The book is the outgrowth of a four-day conference involving 45 scholars from 10 countries at Indiana University's Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism (ISCA) in April 2014. The 19 authors represented in the book live in, and/or are affiliated with, colleges and universities in Austria, England, France, Germany, Norway, Poland, and the United States. It is important, and impressive, that the contributors to the book are international, because anti-Semitism is a burgeoning international problem.

The book is organized into four parts, (I) Defining and Assessing Antisemitism, (II) Intellectual and Ideological Contexts, (III) Holocaust Denial, Evasion, Minimization, and (IV) Regional Manifestations.

The second chapter, "The Ideology of the New Antisemitism," by Kenneth Marcus, is useful in identifying some key psychoanalytic issues. He sets the stage by underscoring that antisemitism is an ideology, quoting Sartre, who described antisemitism as a "conception of the world" (p. 21), giving us a broad, inclusive perspective to consider. He identifies the irrationality of otherwise educated, knowledgeable people who accept an ideology that includes the infamous blood libel, that Jews murder Christian babies to use their blood in making Passover matzoh. He

continues by citing Holocaust-denial statements that Jews invented stories about a Holocaust that never happened, and by citing the belief that the antisemitic forgery, “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” is true. He anchors his discourse in an acknowledgment of Freudian thought, that “the ideology of hatred is a symptom of repressed desire” (p. 25).

Marcus discusses trauma as underlying antisemitic ideology, citing projection and displacement as essential to further understanding how people deal with the conflicts generated by repressed desire, in an attempt to rid themselves of forbidden desires. He delineates various ways in which Jews are blamed for everything, quoting a 19th century CE (Common Era) tract that traces everything evil to Jews, and contemporary Islamic thought that attributes every “catastrophe” to Jews (p. 37).

Indeed, any and every chapter in this book could stand as an exemplar of in depth understanding of a pernicious ideological trend, one that is millennia-old, and startlingly consistently new, the need for a scapegoat that represents what Shakespeare (1936) phrased so movingly in Hamlet’s famous soliloquy, “To be or not to be,” the “heartache and the thousand natural shocks/That flesh is heir to” (p. 752). The answer to the dilemma that humankind eternally experiences, that existence often is painful and desperate, is to blame someone who seems to be eternally “Other.” Jews occupy an unusual place in world culture, in that they are the descendants of an ancient tribal group, who lost their homeland and were dispersed in an ever-expanding Diaspora, yet maintained their identity and traditions and self-awareness. Where are the Hittites, Edomites, Moabites, Babylonians, Assyrians? Gone. But this tiny fragment, currently one quarter of one percent of the world’s population, is known everywhere, and has become a magnet for blame, so that others can relieve themselves of guilt, and self-blame.

A sampling of concepts developed in various forms throughout the book may well illustrate the theme of the function anti-Semitism has had, and continues to have, worldwide.

In Chapter Three, “A Framework for Assessing Antisemitism: Three Case Studies (Dieudonné, Erdogan, Hamas),” Günther Jikeli offers a framework of understanding the threat of antisemitic attitudes emerging from such different sources: a French comedian, the President of

Turkey, and an identified terrorist organization, and the specificity of the underlying attitudes. All three see Jews as dangerous and demonizing; they dehumanize Jews to preserve self-esteem. Each presents a different threat.

Dieudonné M'bala M'bala disguises a genocidal message with humor, mobilizing group antisemitic identity through enjoyment and laughter (p. 58).

Erdogan seems to differentiate between Israel and Jews, comparing Israel with Hitler, yet claiming Jews in Turkey will be safe, and not persecuted, while insinuating that Turkish Jews must disavow Israel. Jikeli points out that Erdogan is not genocidal, but is a proponent of conspiracy theories that cast Jews in a negative light, and his Islamization of Turkey policy will create further hardship for Turkish Jews.

Hamas, of course, is overtly anti-Semitic and genocidal. Jikeli identifies the possibility that if Hamas terrorism expands beyond the Middle East, and becomes active in other countries, for instance, the United States, or in Europe, the possibility of genocidal action against Jews may increase (p. 68).

The range of ideas represented in this book addresses myriad aspects of anti-Semitism in creative, important ways. Ideally, I would summarize every chapter. Perhaps just identifying main ideas will suffice. The chapter titles themselves are attention-grabbing.

“Literary Theory and the Delegitimization of Israel” by Jean Axelrad Cahan, identifies antisemitism in the literary tradition of identifying “nations and nationalism” in the modern era, that traditions are “invented,” and that the actual existence of a coherent group called the Jewish people is questionable, which is used only so that Jews can justify the establishment of the state of Israel. He points out that Edward Said, who is known as the founder of “post-colonial studies,” uses this theory to discredit Jewish attachment to the land of Israel.

“Denial, Evasion, and Antihistorical Antisemitism: The Continuing Assault on Memory,” by David Patterson, begins with a deeply resonant, provocative sentence: “Both Elie Wiesel and Primo Levi—two survivors from very different backgrounds—have described the Holocaust as a

war against memory” (p. 326). He points out that “The Holocaust denier does not hate the Jews because they allegedly lie about the Holocaust; rather, he lies about the Holocaust because he hates the Jews” (p. 327). His chapter focuses on Holocaust denial, and the ethical obligation of the historian to maintain a commitment “to the dead, to the living, and to the unborn” (p. 344).

Further chapters address contemporary situations. The last section of the book is called “Regional Manifestations.” Here is a regrettably truncated sampling: “The EU’s Responses to Contemporary Antisemitism: A Shell Game?” by Amy Elman, pointedly addresses the European Union Monitoring Centre’s deft omission of a meaningful “working definition of anti-Semitism.” She concludes, “(A)ntisemitism is a swiftly moving object on the European agenda. It is addressed and rarely grasped, concealed by the bluster of seemingly sensitive but nonetheless contradictory discourse”(p. 422).

“Anti-Israeli Boycotts: European and International Human Rights Laws Perspectives,” by Aleksandra Gliszczynska-Grabias, offers a hopeful conclusion: “A time may have arrived when those harmed by the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement should claim their rights using the instruments of international laws” (p. 450).

In a world where anti-Semitism, and anti-Semitic violence, is rising, this book is of major importance. We need to do what the book title indicates, we need to dedicate ourselves to “Deciphering the New Antisemitism,” in order to curtail, and defeat, this regrettable evil.

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Aggression and Prejudice: Some Psychoanalytic Observations on the Blood Libel Accusation Against the Jews

Jacob A. Arlow

The 20th Century, now drawing to its close, must surely rank among the most violent in history. The number of people who lost their lives through aggressive acts on the part of their fellow man must be staggering. The brotherhood of man is sadly balanced by man's inhumanity to man. The specter of new bloodletting on a massive scale hangs over mankind, it seems, forever, as part of an ever-recurring cycle of struggle for possession of some life-sustaining sector of the good earth and an intolerance for one's neighbor. As the world of failed socialism disintegrates, ethnic rivalries and hatreds have begun to tear apart the Soviet Union and its satellite states. Totalitarian solidarity gives way to distinctions based on language and ethnic descent. People once united in common purpose now feel like strangers and enemies to each other. The Arabs, who consider themselves brothers, have been warring with each other for quite some time.

Against this background, a violent recrudescence of anti-Semitism is taking place. Although the circumstances are quite different from what they were earlier in this century, the accusations put forward against the few remaining Jews of Europe echo and re-echo themes well known to all. In effect, they say, "The Jews are strangers. They do not belong here. They have no right to be here. They should go back to where they came from. We were doing all right before they came. They are the cause of all our troubles. Get rid of them, and things will be all right again. The ways of the Jews are strange and their customs are different from ours. They don't speak our language and, when they do acquire it, they debase it or pervert it for their own purposes. They do no useful work. They live on the efforts of others. They are greedy and acquisitive. They are lascivious and try to win over our women. In their vulgar ostentation, they want to be admired by all. The Jews are pushy. They want to get into places where they are unwanted and unwelcome."

I do not pretend in this presentation to advance a comprehensive theory of the psychodynamics of anti-Semitism. The issue is much too complex, involving, as it does, such additional factors as historical, economic, political and cultural forces. Our Study Group on Anti-Semitism, under the auspices of the Psychoanalytic Research and Development Fund, under the chairmanship of Dr. Mortimer Ostow, struggled valiantly for years at the interface between these many complex factors and psychodynamics. What I do propose to do is to examine a possible psychodynamic constellation that may account for the appeal of anti-Semitism to some people, a psychological predisposition associated with persistent unconscious fantasies, fantasy reactions to primitive, irrational, childhood wishes.

As a psychoanalyst, I find it appropriate to approach this undertaking with a study of a widespread, historically persistent, irrational myth concerning the Jews, namely, the so-called blood libel.

According to the *Encyclopedia Judaica*, blood libel consists of the accusation that Jews murder non-Jews, especially Christians and usually a young boy, in order to obtain blood for the making of matzos for Passover and for other rituals. It is a complex of deliberate lies, trumped-up accusations, and popular beliefs about the murder-lust of Jews and their bloodthirstiness. It is based on the notion that Jews hate Christianity and mankind in general, and it is combined with the idea that Jews are in some way not human and must have recourse to special remedies and subterfuges in order to appear at least outwardly like other men.

That the Jews, especially religious Jews, should engage in such practices runs counter to what anyone, even with only a minimal knowledge of the religion, knows. While blood sacrifices were practiced by many pagan religions, they were expressly forbidden by the Torah. In fact the law of meat salting is designed to prevent the least drop of avoidable blood remaining in the food to be eaten. It is further noted in the *Encyclopedia Judaica* that, "It is striking that in the early history of Christianity there were times when the blood libel was directed against them. Tertulian complained, 'We are said to be the most criminal of men on the score of our sacramental baby-killing and the baby-eating that goes with it'" (page 1119). Christians sometimes directed such accusations against heretical Christian sects. It is especially noteworthy that, in earlier times, there were Christians who believed that, in some form, a baby was

mysteriously hidden in the bread used for communion. “Thus it was necessary for a popular teacher, Father Berthold of Regensburg, in the 13th Century, to explain to his communicants why they actually do not see a holy child in communion by asking a rhetorical question, ‘who would like to bit off a baby’s head or hand or foot?’ ” (p. 1122).

The theme of cannibalizing a child is the dominant feature the blood libel. In what was supposed to be the first case of blood libel against the Jews in the Middle Ages, that of Norwich in 1144, it was claimed that the Jews had “bought a Christian child ... before Easter and tortured him with all the tortures wherewith our Lord was tortured and, on Long Friday, hanged him on the rood in honor of our Lord.” This theme was repeated, with slight variations, throughout the 12th Century in England, France, and in Spain. In the 13th Century, in the case of Little St. Hugh of Lincoln, it was recorded that “that the child was first fattened for ten days with white bread and milk and then almost all the Jews of England were invited to the crucifixion.” While it is understandable that “the crucifixion motif explains why the blood libels occurred at the time of Passover,” one must also bear in mind that the holiday of Passover also concerns the slaying of the first born child (Hillel ben-Sasson 1972, *Encyclopedia Judaica*).

It is a fact that the heads of state, and of the church, regularly opposed the circulation of such libel. The Emperor Frederick II decided to conduct an investigation of the libel in order to clear up the matter definitively. He convened a synod which used the testimony of Jewish converts to Christianity. The synod concluded that “there is nothing to be found either in the Old or the New Testament that the Jews are desirous of human blood. On the contrary, they avoid contamination of any kind of blood.” Pope Innocent IV, in the 13th Century, stated “Christians charge falsely that the Jews hold a communion rite with the heart of a murdered child; should the cadaver of a dead man happen to be found anywhere, they maliciously lay it to their charge.” The eminent Jewish historian, Cecil Roth (1935) states; “To its lasting credit, the Catholic Church (even when the night of medievalism was at its darkest) never gave the slightest confidence to the calumny. Immediately the Holy See first became cognizant of it in the 13th Century, its remonstrances began, and they continued afterwards in unbroken sequence. It is noteworthy that some of the most vehement protests emanated from the pontiffs who

otherwise showed themselves least sympathetic toward the Jews, their objectivity thus being all the more obvious” (p. 20). Particular credit goes to Cardinal Lorenzo Ganganelli, later Pope Clement XIV, who, having been charged by the Pope to investigate accusations of blood libel against Polish Jews, issued a thorough and comprehensive study, concluding that such accusations were malicious calumnies, immoral and un-Christian, and should be opposed by the full authority of the Church. His memorandum, promulgated in 1759, remains the official view of the Holy See. Roth also notes, “Later in the same year, Frederick Augustus III, penultimate king of Poland, in ratifying the charters of his predecessors, promised the Jews the protection of the law against any accusations of ritual murder which might henceforth arise “ (p. 30).

In spite of these efforts, neither Emperor nor Pope was heeded, generations after generations of Jews in Europe were tortured and Jewish communities were massacred or dispersed and broken up because of this libel. It was spread by various agents. Popular preachers engrained it into the minds of the people. Jewish scholars in the Middle Ages bitterly rejected this accusation and quoted the law and examples from the Jewish way of life in order to refute it. In a psychologically perceptive statement, expressing the general opinion of the Jews, one authority summed up Jewish response to the blood libels as follows: “You are libeling us for you want to find a reason to permit the shedding of our blood.” (12th, 13th Century, *Sefer Nizzahon Yashan*—Lieber Nizzahon Detus, p. 159 in *Tela Iganea Satanae*, edited by J.C.H. Wagenseil, 1681. This material is on p. 1123 of Volume 4 of the *Encyclopedia Judaica*).

All of the Jewish denials, like the opinion of enlightened Christian leaders, did not succeed in preventing the blood libels from shaping, to a large extent, the image of the Jew transmitted from the Middle Ages to modern times. In the 19th Century, anti-Semitism made conspicuous use of blood libel for incitement against Jews in various countries. It was also used as a weapon to arouse the uneducated masses for specific political purposes. Blood libel trials were held in the second half of the 19th Century and the early 20th Century. The Nazis used the blood libel in full force in anti-Jewish propaganda. They revived old allegations and instituted reinvestigations and trials in territories under their rule or influence... . On May 1, 1934 the *Stuermer* devoted a special, horrifying,

illustrated number to the blood libel, in which German scientists openly served the Nazi aims (Hillel ben-Sasson, *Encyclopedia Judaica*, 1972).

Thus the 20th Century began with blood libel accusations against the Jews, and by mid-century such libels could be presented as truth to the educated masses of Germany, and to much of Europe. Such a combination of human credulity and cruelty is hard to fathom. How is it possible to deny in others the essential humanity we perceive in ourselves? How can one abrogate that compassionate identification upon which all morality is founded? For so fantastic an idea to take hold in the human mind, it must resonate some deep primitive, unconscious wish, a kind of unconscious fantasy easily shared in common, based upon common need.

Trying to fathom this phenomenon, we must first underline the essential features of the myth. Its main outline follows. The hateful, unwelcome alien, the Jew, the stranger in our midst, kills a young child, usually a boy, and devours him or his blood in order to develop and prosper—a combination of infanticide, cannibalism and growth. In an earlier study (1961), I was struck by a trans-cultural theme in mythology, one that for some reason combined the motif of welcoming strangers with that of childlessness. In such stories, a childless couple, generously and without question, welcomes strangers to their home and gives them food and lodging. As it turns out, the strangers are gods in disguise. In various ways, they reward the couple for the hospitality, as described in my paper, “Ego Psychology and the Study of Mythology” (1961). The story of Abraham and Sarah in the Bible is particularly apposite in this connection. The three strangers, angels in disguise, had first appeared at the home of Abraham’s nephew, Lot, in Sodom. The inhabitants of that city were far from hospitable. They wished Lot to turn the strangers over to them so that they might assault the newcomers sexually (hence, the term sodomy). Lot protects them. Later, Abraham and Sarah receive the same three strangers with notable hospitality. They feed them and give them lodging for the night and they are rewarded, in time, with a son, Isaac.

A similar theme occurs in the Greek myth of Baucis and Philemon.

I could not, at the time, fathom the connection between childlessness and hospitality to strangers, until I came upon an unfinished novella by

Heinrich Heine, entitled “The Rabbi of Bacherach.”¹ This is a mid-19th-Century retelling of the theme of Abraham and Sarah by Heine, who, with penetrating poetic intuition, placed the story in the context of the blood libel. Interestingly, Heine never could finish the novel. He kept returning to it but did not seem to be able to master the conflicts it evoked in him.

The essential features of the novel are as follows: Abraham is the rabbi of Bacherach, revered for his dedication to the community, and respected for his learning. He and his wife Sarah love each other dearly, but their union is unfulfilled. They have no child. It is Passover and at the seder, Sarah muses that they have no son to ask the traditional four questions. She thinks of a younger brother of hers who had died as a child. The members of their large extended family have assembled for the Passover feast at their home. There are many relatives because the rabbi and Sarah are first cousins. Whether as a literary device or out of ignorance on his part, Heine distorts the order of the seder.

After the second cup of wine has been consumed, and while the rabbi is reading “Lo, this is the bread of affliction” (a statement that one reads at the beginning of the seder) there is a knock at the door. Two strangers are admitted. They say they are fellow Jews on a journey who wish to be taken in for the seder. The hospitality of the rabbi of Bacherach is extended to them, and they are seated at the table with the rest of the family. The rabbi turns to his wife, Sarah, and says, “Be happy, my queen,” but she smiles sadly and replies, “We have no Prince.”

The rabbi says nothing but he points his finger at an illustration in the Haggadah showing the appearance of the three angels to Abraham to announce to him that he would have a son by his wife Sarah. In the middle of the celebration, the rabbi turns deathly pale and discreetly leaves the room. His wife, Sarah, noticing the change in him, follows him out the door, where the rabbi, in terror, explains that they must leave immediately. He had looked under the table and had noticed the corpse of a young, presumably Christian, boy. The rabbi fears that the strangers were not Jews and that they had introduced the corpse in order to implicate him in a blood libel accusation. The rabbi says that Sarah and

¹I am indebted to Mr. Gerald Meyer for bringing it to my attention.

he must flee instantly to save themselves from slaughter. They leave secretly, abandoning their relatives to their fate.

The rabbi notices that Sarah still holds in her hand the silver ewer with which she had been serving the guests. He seizes it and throws it, the last of his possessions, as he says, into Rhine as a peace offering, and they engage Silent William (a deaf-mute who supports an old foster mother), to take them his Frankfurt up the river. In her troubled sleep or reveries on the Ferry up the Rhine, Sarah “suddenly ... thought she saw ... her friends and relatives rushing past in terror, with dead faces Iarah friends and white flowing shrouds, along the Rhine.” (p. 22), apparently slaughtered because of the blood libel.

What Heine did in this story was to transform a seemingly innocuous parable of the desirability of being friendly and welcoming to strangers into a nightmare. The guests at the family banquet are not friendly gods in disguise, but mortal enemies. More than that, they appear as Jews, co-religionists and, as it were, part of the family. In the Biblical story, there are three strangers seeking hospitality. In Heine’s version, there are only two. Where is the third? He, I suggest, is represented by the corpse of the young child under the table. Thus, Heine brings the themes of infanticide and cannibalism to the tale of the Rabbi of Bacherach. This version of the story brings with it a moral quite the opposite from that espoused in the Biblical tale or the Greek myth. The guests so recently welcomed into the family bring with them discord, disruption and even death.

In the lives of most people, the primordial, disruptive, unwelcome guest is the newborn younger sibling. He is the stranger the child has to be taught to accept. The hoped for acceptance is never completely successful or free from conflict. We are fully aware of the terrible violence expressed in the so-called “crimes of passion.” How much more violent and primitive are the fantasies of the immature older sibling, now displaced and fallen from grace? To him, the younger sibling is a stranger who does not belong and who has no right to be here. He feels that the newborn should go back where he came from. Things were fine before the baby came. He is the cause of all our troubles. Get rid of him and things will be all right again. The new baby doesn’t behave right. He doesn’t speak our language and, when he begins to do so, he talks nonsense. He doesn’t do anything. He just lies there and gets fed and cared for. He does nothing

for himself. Everything has to be done for him. He is greedy and wants everything, including mother's undivided attention. He just lies there, waiting for everyone to come, to admire him, and to worship him.

Such sentiments coincide almost exactly with the familiar anti-Semitic complaints lodged against the Jews, as quoted in the early part of this paper. Historically, as aliens and strangers, Jews evoke in their neighbors deep-seated, primitive, unresolved hostilities directed originally against younger sibling figures, and against any other whom they might regard as encroaching upon what they consider their rightful, proprietary domain. The typical fantasy of older siblings consists of destroying the newborn child by eating and incorporating it.² This vision of infanticide and cannibalism not only gets rid of the younger sibling; it also satisfies a fantasy wish of taking the baby's place by incorporating it, and thus becoming identified with it. The blood libel accusation, I would suggest, originates from the projection of these infanticidal and cannibalistic wishes from the Christian upon the Jew. The interpretation of the blood libel accusation as a projection on the part of the accusers was apparently made originally by Manassah ben Israel (Roth, 1935). Cardinal Ganganelli stated quite clearly in his memorandum that, all too frequently, the motive behind the blood libel accusation was to enable the accusers to seize the money, the property, and the real estate of the Jews and, finally, to expel them from their town.

Hunger and envy are important motivating forces. The older sibling usually conceptualizes the threat posed by the newborn in terms of an assault upon his food supply. In the child's mind, there is just so much food available from the mother, and anything given to the newborn, perforce, represents something taken away from him. When people experience real privation and hunger, as was frequent in the Middle Ages, it is very easy to turn upon the outsider, especially if he is better off economically, and accuse him of feeding on the riches of a land to which he has no rightful claim. In this connection, several of the details in Heine's novella are most illuminating. When Rabbi Abraham and his wife arrive

²Ostow (1990), in a personal communication, noted that the theme of brothers orally destroying an unwelcome younger sibling is implicit in the story of Joseph and his brethren. The envious brothers present their father, Jacob, with the bloodstained clothes of Joseph, suggesting that some beast of prey may have killed him.

as refugees in the city of Frankfurt, Heine reminds us that the Jews of Frankfurt were supposed to turn in 5,000 rats' tails each year to the City Council. It was their job to exterminate the dangerous nuisance that constituted a threat to the granaries and storehouses of the city. In his paper, "Day Residue in Dream and Myth" Wangh (1954), demonstrated the connection between rats, dwarfs and little people, i.e., the younger generation, as threats to one's food supply. He notes that, in times of hunger and famine, ambivalent feelings towards children evoke intense oral conflicts, frequently finding expression in myths that equate rats and children. "In the myths of the little people, the oral aspect is stressed over and over again. Most often elves, gnomes and the rest have to be appeased with food. Oft times they steal it" (pp. 450–451).

In any event the myths of the dwarfs, the little people, Wangh asserts, become connected with the fear of rodents menacing stores of food.

In Heine's novella "The Rabbi of Bacherach," while Sarah is in the boat being ferried up the Rhine by Silent William, in her reveries she looks at the mountains and they appear "as if up there a damsel stood with anxiously outstretched arms, as if quick dwarfs were swarming out of their rock fissures."

Almost immediately she begins to think of the stories that her aunt from Lorch told her, of the bold knight who freed the poor damsel the dwarfs had kidnapped, and also of "the Gingerbread Land, where good, obedient children go" (p. 19). Also, after Sarah learns about the responsibility of the Jews of Frankfurt to combat the threat of rodents as evidenced by their handing in a specified number of rats' tails, Sarah turns to her husband and says, "Silent William does bear a great likeness to my late brother" (p. 25). In dreams, Freud (1913) noted, dumbness signifies death. In general, in dream psychology and symbolism, younger siblings are often represented by small animals, and this equation is clearly illustrated by the story of the Pied Piper of Hamelin, who first gets rid of the rats, and then, when he is not appropriately compensated, gets rid of the children.³

³Marcuse (1990, personal communication) has suggested that childlessness in myth, or self-imposed in reality, may also represent a form of punishment for murderous wishes against the newborn sibling. This, then, would represent a special type of self-punishment as described by Loewenstein (1945), in which the punishment consists of the actualization of the hostile wish.

It is discouraging to conjecture that the peace within the family that comes from accepting the unwelcome newborn may come at the expense of distrust and rivalry of those outside of the family. One could extend this process on the national level. Xenophobia seems always to be stronger than compassion and hospitality, I have often pondered why it is so difficult to motivate people to act together for peace, as compared to organizing them for war. It is easier to teach one to hate his enemy than to love his neighbor (Arlow, 1973). The dynamics of the blood-libel accusation against Jews, and the typical anti-Semitic ideology, have at least one root in universally shared, unconscious fantasies occasioned by primitive childhood conflicts over having to share food, security, and the mother's love.

I wish to stress that I do not consider the construction I have just offered as a definitive or comprehensive explanation of anti-Semitism or of particular anti-Semitic attitudes. My aim was to elucidate just one of the dynamics that make it possible to mobilize forces of violent aggression against one's fellow man. Social institutions, it would seem, have a greater power to mobilize forces of aggression than to give license to erotic wishes. Political, economic, historical, and cultural factors serve as the setting facilitating both individual and group violence by their power to evoke and reactivate latent unconscious fantasies expressing primitive murderous impulses common to all. Mankind. The blood libel accusation of anti-Semitism is just one such example.

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Shame, Rejection, and Rebirth

Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi

When humiliation is a daily experience, it often creates a desire for revenge, compensation, and restitution, leading to a rebellion against authority. When dreams of revenge are focused on external oppressors, aggression, in fantasy or reality, seems to emerge smoothly, with no ambivalence. What happens when the oppression seems to be the work of your own kin and your own culture?

The origins of rebirth and revitalization movements are often found in conscious feelings of shame, growing out of the wounds of what are seen as self-inflicted powerlessness and humiliation. Such movements express the rejection of past and present cultural life scripts. Shame is a powerful motivation, which leads to rebelling against tradition, and the re-invention of identity. When individuals feel ashamed of what their parents do and how their parents live, they often create a psychological or physical distance from them. Sometimes they wish to run away and totally escape the legacy of untold past generations and inherited cultural identity.

Modernity, which in reality means Westernization, appears to many in non-Western cultures as tied to power, freedom, self-actualization, and collective liberation. Tradition often means weakness, oppression, and ignorance. Sometimes a revitalization movement may not support total modernity but will still start with shame. An absolute revulsion with social reality may lead both religious prophets and secular leaders to dreams and actions of great cultural revitalization. Handsome Lake was a prophet who saw the deteriorating conditions of his tribe, the Seneca, in the late eighteenth century, and led a successful cultural revolution that combined tribal traditions with ideas drawn from White colonizers (Wallace, 1969).

The process of modernization in all traditional cultures, has meant shame and the rejection of tradition, tied to private and public shame about one's cultural history and identity, often rejected as a result.

Modernization and revitalization have meant rejecting the past, whether in Poland, India, Hungary, or in nineteenth-century Russia. Shame about the past and the present seems to have been shared by most of humanity over the last 300 years. It has been especially painful because it means rejecting one's parents or feeling pity for them. In both cases one feels superior, sitting in judgment. Modernization everywhere means rejecting ancestors and their traditions in favor of new collective and individual identities.

An essential element in the appearance of the Jewish Enlightenment was a sense of shame and inferiority on the part of Jews who were aware of the dramatic changes taking place in the world around them. The confidence felt by earlier generations of Jews about their superiority and election had been lost. The religious idea of a Jewish mission construes Judaism as God's pilot project, carried on by world Jewry on the cosmic stage. Jews were the chosen few, who, when the Messiah comes, would lead the rest of the world towards global salvation (Marmorstein, 1969). This notion is clearly not unique to Judaism, and is central to most, if not all, religious communities. A belief in the group's superiority and election may be found in secular movements as well. A gap between a group's hopes for itself and its objective conditions may be attenuated by the belief in mission and superiority. Believing in a collective mission for the Jewish people made it easier for individual Jews to understand, or at least accept, their individual destinies, but most modern Jews have rejected the idea of a special mission for the Jewish people, either religious or secular.

Shame and anger about the Jewish way of life were expressed stridently and vehemently by followers of the Jewish Enlightenment, the Haskalah. They were repelled by their parents' traditionalism, tied to weakness and passivity. More and more Jews kept asking why the change and renewal occurring around them could not be theirs. Their criticism was total and consistent. Biale (2002, p. 101) described the intensity of the phenomenon as unique to Jews: "Perhaps never have movements of national regeneration held such disparaging views of their subjects: uncompromising criticism of tradition itself became a tradition." Conscious and explicit shame about Jewish life at the time became generalized to all aspects of Jewish Diaspora existence. The extreme pain and shame experienced by young, modernizing, Jews in Eastern Europe fueled the budding Zionist movement and led to its eventual success.

Such criticism of tradition led to the accusation that Zionism has embraced Anti-Semitic stereotypes, and some of the Zionist diagnoses of Diaspora conditions are indeed devastating, but negative stereotypes and self-criticism are the starting point for many national revivals. Zionism is accused of agreeing with anti-Semitism, if not supporting it, by rejecting Jewish reality and traditions, but such rejections are found in all modernization and liberation movement. Liberation starts by rejecting present and past in favor of a glorious future free from the shackles of tradition.

Under conditions of objective and subjective powerlessness, weakness, and insecurity, human dignity and manly dignity are easily wounded. The perception of Jewish masculinity in European culture is tied to strong experiences of doubt and inferiority (Gilman, 1991, 1993; Mosse, 1985). Were Jewish men real men? Sigmund Freud touched on this issue when discussing the views of non-Jews, especially in relation to the Jewish practice of circumcision. In the case of Jews in Europe, it was circumcision that made the metaphor of deficient masculinity more vivid. In Europe through the ages, Jews, that is Jewish males, were (quite correctly) perceived as genitally mutilated, and this made them less than full men. It was not just a matter of genital mutilation, which might have been psychologically significant. It was a question of masculine identity and behavior. There was a socially defined “effeminacy of the male Jewish body” (Bunzl, 1997, p. 74).

The emasculation metaphor has been used and is still being used in connection with many oppressed groups, including women (Greer, 1971). It reflects a male ideal which seems quite universal. While the feminine is judged to be weak and deficient, manliness images are everywhere tied to political and psychological empowerment. Masculinity remains a universal human ideal, not just because of its connotation of physical prowess and bravery, but also because it means reliability, steadfastness, and responsibility. Men are not only violent destroyers; they also help to build and maintain the world around them. Beyond the male physique, there are masculine behaviors and attributes, such as assertiveness, energy, power, and success.

The constant fear of humiliation, attached to the pain of being a powerless Jew, is expressed in Sigmund Freud’s emblematic story of his

father's all-too routine encounter with an anti-Semitic thug: "At that point I was brought up against the event in my youth whose power was still being shown in all these emotions and dreams. I may have been ten or twelve years old, when my father began to take his views upon things in the world we live in. Thus it was, on one such occasion, that he told me a story to show me how much better things were now than they had been in his days. When I was a young man, he said, I went for a walk one Saturday in the streets of your birthplace. I was well dressed and had a new fur cap on my head. A Christian came up to me and with a single blow knocked off my cap into the mud and shouted: 'Jew! Get off the pavement!' 'And what did you do?' I asked. 'I went into the roadway and picked up my cap,' was the quiet reply. This struck me as unheroic conduct on the part of the big strong man who was holding the little boy by the hand. I contrasted this situation with another which fitted my feelings better: the scene in which Hannibal's father Hamilcar Barca, made his boy swear before the household altar to take vengeance on the Romans. Ever since that time Hannibal had had a place in my phantasies" (Freud, 1900, p. 197).

The incident Freud is relating shows that the issue is more than skin deep, or prepuce deep. It had nothing to do with circumcision or castration. Physical courage (or any courage) has nothing to do with the shape of one's penis, or of any other organ. Freud's father looked to him like a coward. Regardless of what gentiles or anti-Semites think, the question is whether Jewish males were cowards, as the visible weakness of Jewish fathers had a serious effect on their sons.

Freud's father was a failure, and was rejected in favor of Hannibal's father Hamilcar Barca, both ancient heroes of a culture which was very close to the ancient Hebrews, as attested by their names. Freud's real father, family ancestors, and the whole tribe were a source of shame. The solution might have been conversion and thus getting rid of the accursed identity, or joining Zionism through dreams of revenge and liberation, but Sigmund Freud chose neither (Bunzl & Beit-Hallahmi, 2002). In any case, Freud's readiness to share with us this painful story reflects his own courage in facing uncomfortable realities.

Jewish cowards were being denounced under much more tragic circumstance. In the spring of 1903, a pogrom took place in the then Russian

city of Kishinev (now the capital of Moldova), following the circulation of a blood libel, the common accusation that Jews killed a Christian boy to use his blood for ritual purposes. During the two days of the pogrom, April 6–8, 49 Jews were killed, hundreds wounded and raped, with incalculable damage to property. The Hebrew poet Chaim Nachman Bialik, who was a member of a commission of inquiry that investigated the events, wrote two poems in response. One was an expression of outrage:

And cursed be the man who says:
 Avenge! No such revenge—revenge for
 the blood of a little child—has yet been
 devised by Satan. Let the blood pierce
 through the abyss! Let the blood seep
 down into the depths of darkness, and
 eat away there, in the dark, and breach
 all the rotting foundations of the earth.

Then, in a much longer poem, published in late 1904, which described the horrors of this pogrom, Bialik criticized the traumatized survivors of the pogrom for their cowardice. Describing how Jews were hiding while their daughters were being raped and their families slaughtered, he wrote:

Come, now, and I will bring thee to their lairs
 The privies, jakes and pigpens where the heirs
 Of Hasmoneans lay, with trembling knees,
 Concealed and cowering,—the sons of the Maccabees!
 The seed of saints, the scions of the lions!
 Who, crammed by scores in all the sanctuaries of their shame,
 So sanctified My name!
 It was the flight of mice they fled,
 The scurrying of roaches was their flight.
 They died like dogs, and they were dead!

(Bialik, 1904/1948, pp. 140).

Other Jewish leaders denounced the victims' passivity and called for self-defense by Jews. When another pogrom took place in Kishinev on October 19, 1905, the attackers encountered an armed defense organization. Twenty-nine Jews were killed, and scores wounded, but there

were some dead among the attackers as well.

The 1903 events were seen as proof, if such were needed, that Diaspora collective existence was a failure, and so was every individual Jewish life: a continuing, complete, defeat of will and character. A national revival movement offered a way of erasing the experience of deficient manhood. As Bialik reminded us, the cowardly Jews hiding from their attackers were supposedly the descendants of the legendary Maccabees. Knowing that made Jews feel even worse. Why are we so submissive, we that are the descendants of kings and heroes? This question is not unique to Jews, as countless tribal and national groups have made this lament. This claim to ancestral heroism has two uses. If I am powerless, I can console myself with the idea that my distant ancestors were kings and queens of great empires. Sometimes the idea inspires action, and dreams about recreating these mythical or real empires.

Zionism envisioned that the opposite of the Diaspora Jew will be a man of action, not of words and books, innocent of Diaspora dust and ghetto habits and tied to the land. He will develop a new kind of courage. Instead of the passive courage of Jewish martyrs, we will witness the active physical courage of fighting men and women. No longer victims of persecution, but fighters, they will resemble the mythological Saul and Jonathan, dying in battle. To die fighting became the ideal, as opposed to dying passively. Never again will Jews be slaughtered in pogroms and holocausts. The term Diasporic has come into use to mark the weakness and passivity of the ghetto Jew.

Zionism offered a dream of the New Jew, the exact opposite of the Old Jew, who would be visibly and clearly masculine. Jewish sovereignty was to create a new human type: in touch with nature, working on the land, productive, physical, renewed by the Hebrew language and by the encounter with pre-Diaspora geography, in short, the anti-Jew.

An important Zionist leader and intellectual, Vladimir Jabotinsky, wrote about the new Hebrew as follows:

“Because the Jid [the Russian derogatory term for Jew] is ugly, sickly, and lacks decorum, we shall endow the ideal image of the Hebrew with masculine beauty, tall stature, mighty shoulders, vigorous movement, radiance of colors and complexion. The Jid

is trodden upon and easily frightened and, therefore, the Hebrew ought to be proud and independent. The Jid is despised by all, and therefore the Hebrew had to charm all. The Jid had accepted submission and, therefore, the Hebrew ought to learn how to command. The Jid likes to hide himself, with bated breath, from strangers and, therefore, the Hebrew has to step with valor and greatness toward the whole world, and to look the world straight in the eye” (Quoted in Gover, 1986, p. 72).

In introducing his memoir of underground activities in the 1940s, Jabotinsky’s disciple and future Israeli prime minister, Menachem Begin, stated that his book was written for both Jews and gentiles: “lest they be unwilling to realise, or all too ready to overlook, the fact that out of blood and fire and tears and ashes a new specimen of human being was born, a specimen completely unknown to the world for over eighteen hundred years, ‘the FIGHTING JEW’ ” (Begin, 1979, p. xxv, capitals in original).

Erasing the shame takes true liberation from the past and from Old Jews, by creating in Palestine a new state, a new culture (in a new language), and New Jews (with new names marking the rebirth). Creating the conditions for a true rebirth implied a real distance from parents and ancestors. Liberation from Diaspora existence had to be radical, erasing the old language and the traditional identity markers. The rebirth of the new language, Hebrew, was made possible by the maskilim in Eastern Europe. The first step towards rebirth was rejecting the language of the ancestors.

A major factor in the definition and creation of most European nationalisms has been that of language. Groups of people have always been identified by the common language they spoke. The various ethnic groups of Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century intermingled to create a boiling cauldron of cultures and movements separated by language. There were speakers of German, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, and Yiddish, as well as other tongues. In European national movements, cultural nationalism and revival meant the dedication to a national spoken language, sometimes elevating it into a literary language and often collecting folktales that represented ancient oral traditions. Jews were the ones who spoke Yiddish and so defined by it. Although some Jews spoke Polish or Russian, and considered Yiddish only an

inferior dialect, it was unique to Jews. It served to unify them and mark off the boundaries of the community. Even today, when it has been disappearing from the world scene, a few words in Yiddish are all that many Jews have to show of their cultural heritage.

Among East European Jews there was a cultural revival movement, which meant elevating the spoken language of the masses into a literary language as was being done with other cultural nationalisms. In this case, the spoken language was Yiddish, but Zionism was not going to offer it either a new home or a new respect.

The Haskalah movement, and later Zionism, rejected Diaspora culture. This rejection covered not only the traditions of rabbinical Judaism, but also the language spoken by European Jews for at least 800 years. The authentic spoken language of Jews in Europe, the language of lullabies and everyday life, was despised by Zionism as symbolizing ignorance and oppression. Many well-educated Jews in the nineteenth century considered it not a real language but a “jargon,” an inferior dialect used by the uneducated masses.

Yiddish was rejected by Zionism as the language of oppression and suffering, part of the Diaspora identity. It had to be eliminated because it was a creation of the Diaspora and any Diaspora attachment had to be extinguished. Yiddish was a bridge to the past and present Diaspora and this bridge had to be burned. It also quickly became identified with movements which opposed Zionism and were based on Jewish autonomy in the Diaspora, socialism or “cultural autonomy.” Moreover, it was, and it remains, the language of the Orthodox, who have always opposed Zionism and preserved historical Jewish culture.

The choice of Hebrew did not reflect a return to religion but just the opposite—turning away from it. In Rabbinical Judaism, Hebrew was the language of prayer and religious ritual, not the language of life. Used in the Diaspora mostly as the language of ritual, it had to become secular and modern. In terms of ancient history, Hebrew was pre-Rabbinical. Talmudic and rabbinical literature was written mostly in a combination of Hebrew and Aramaic—and in the Middle Ages in Arabic as well. The return to Hebrew was an expression of relative secularization.

The end of Yiddish and the revival of Hebrew were a great triumph of

Zionism and another consequence of the Holocaust. In 1939, there were 11 million native speakers of Yiddish in the world. By 2010, there might have been less than 1 million left. The revival of Hebrew as a spoken and written language used by a whole nation seemed like an impossibility less than 100 years ago but was an integral part of the Zionist dream. This was not just the revival of Hebrew, but its revival as a spoken language, pronounced in a way different from the Eastern European pronunciation which was closer to Yiddish. The victory of Hebrew may be Zionism's greatest achievement and a possible basis for Israeli identity.

Jews, and members of other stigmatized groups, sometimes coped with shame through acts that they considered instrumental, but in reality were also magical gestures, with some psychological effects. Thus, changing the name given to you at birth is both a magical gesture directed at the self and a social act directed towards all observers. Choosing names and changing names are laden with aspirations, dreams, and visible or hidden meanings. Sometimes people have fantasies about plastic surgery, or so-called sex-change operations that would solve their personal problems and are sorely disappointed. Individual names are a cultural code. Words have power, and naming is both performative and symbolic, but it does not change your situation or make you into a new person. It can only establish one segment of social identity.

If in the Diaspora changing names and choosing non-traditional first names for children represented assimilation, blending in with the crowd, in Zionism it has become an expression of rebirth. We can easily point to the well-known cases of famous Jews who decided to use such protective coloration. Nathanael West started life as Nathan Weinstein, just as Ayn Rand did as Alisa Rosenbaum. In every case, whether in Israel, where new names are designed to move individuals away from Old Jews, or in the Diaspora, where individuals decide to embrace a more comfortable, less Jewish, or non-Jewish cover, the act is a rejection of one's ancestors.

Traditional Jewish last names, such as Shapiro, Landau, Sachs, or Kovner, reflect Jewish history (and geography) in the Diaspora. Jewish family names teach a history and geography of exile and wanderings. These names reflect old realities, and do not mean anything to speakers of Hebrew. For New Jews, Diaspora names, evidence of exile and alienation, of weakness and oppression, of Jewishness and otherness, had to

be erased. The foreign geography had to be forgotten.

New names, invented with the coming of Zionism, carry clear meanings, reflecting new realities and ideals. Popular Israeli last names, replacing familiar Jewish names such as Rosenthal, Rosenberg, Goldberg, Goldstein, Schwartz, Greenberg, Silberberg, Hirschfeld, and Finkelstein reflect local geography, the return to nature, and the ideal of strength and forcefulness. They include Golan and Galili (of the Galilee), Sella (rock), Even (stone), Gazit (rock), Shaham (granite), Shamir (rock), Tamir (tall), Peled (steel), Regev (clod), Telem, (furrow) and Nir (furrow).

Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, was born in 1886 in Plonsk, Poland, as David Grün. When he went to Palestine in 1906, he found a new last name in stories about the commanders of Jerusalem in the Great Rebellion against the Romans between 66 and 73CE. One of the last commanders was Yossef Ben-Gurion.

In Israel, as among assimilated Diaspora Jews, last names have been dropped because "they sounded too Jewish." In some cases, this included such classical Hebrew names as Cohen and Levy, which still sounded too Jewish. And so, somebody named Cohen ("priest") changed his name to Keidan ("spear") and somebody named Levy (Levite, supposedly descended from a class of ancient priests) changed his name to Lavi ("lion").

First names are intimately tied to personal identity. The choice of a first name for a child place that child, and his or her parents, in the flow of history, be it the history of the family, the tribe or the whole of humanity. By choosing a name for yourself (unlikely) or for your children, you are locating yourself in social space, an imaginary map of belonging. Traditions of naming within human groups are quite persistent over generations.

The Jewish Rabbinical tradition has used a relatively limited onomasticon (list of names). For 1,500 years, Jews used a fairly limited number of names and were known by them. The rules were very clear. First names were selected from among mythical Biblical and Talmudic figures who deserved to be remembered as religious models. Biblical figures involved in misdeeds, or simply lacking in religious distinction, were never the namesakes of Jewish children. The onomasticon of Diaspora first names expressed a commitment to Judaism; this has been replaced by Zionism

with new national ideals. To Zionism, Diaspora names symbolized an existence that was shameful, and so a new vocabulary of personal identity had to be created. Because traditional Jewish names were seen as weak, new names had to express strength. The old vocabulary represented identification with religious models of devotion and righteous living. The new names represented a return to nature and physicality, and a growing distance from tradition.

The changes in naming traditions since the beginnings of Zionism have included two elements:

1. Rejecting traditional Jewish names which came to symbolize Diaspora culture. Getting rid of the old onomasticon, the list of common and approved Jewish names, all of them representing loyalty to rabbinical Judaism and its ideals, has been part of cultural revitalization. Traditional Jewish names became stigmatized, and the most stigmatized were names actually created in the Diaspora, some in Yiddish, which were part of Jewish life in Eastern Europe for generations.
2. Using stigmatized Jewish or non-Jewish names from the Hebrew Bible or totally new Hebrew terms. This was started already in the first Hebrew novel, *Ahavat Zion*, published in 1853, where some of the imaginary Judean heroes had names that were totally stigmatized. The names of Amnon and Tamar, representing an incestuous and cursed princely couple (Samuel 2, 13) were not used by Jews for more than two millennia, but were chosen by Abraham Mapu, the author, in an act of blasphemous defiance for a couple of lovers in his book.

These changes in the pattern of naming children appear in the Zionist settlements of Palestine in the 1880s. By reading the new names, we can conclude that the settlers wanted their children to grow up into heroes. We can observe then, together with the revival of Hebrew, the reappearance of ancient names that were never in use in the Diaspora, such as Gideon, Yoav (mythical Hebrew Bible hero), Boaz (mythical ancestor of David) and the historical rebel known as Bar-Kochva. The rejection of Diaspora names meant a rejection of historical Jewish identity and a re-entry into another kind of history. The Zionist leap over 2,000 years

of Diaspora history took the form of children bearing names from the glorious imagined past, tied to mythological heroes and sovereigns. For the new colonial settlers in Palestine, a commitment to Zionism meant painful shame about the immediate past in the Diaspora, and great pride in the imaginary continuity with the distant historical (Bar-Kochva) and mythological (Yoav) past.

For 2,000 years there was no Jewish Omri or Yoram (the name of two kings who “did evil in the sight of the Lord”). Names rejected by Jewish tradition became desirable among Zionists, as the guiding principle became a rejection of that tradition. A more dramatic form of the same process can be observed when Zionist immigrants with foreign-given names selected Hebrew names for themselves, thus consciously placing themselves in Jewish history. If we look at typical Israeli names more than a century after this process started, we find such combinations as Ayelet Sella (Gazelle Rock), Orly Oren, Aviv Orni, Yoram Eshet, Yael Segev, Idan Agmon, Shahar Ram, Ran Meydan, Netta Moran, Yael Sagi, Ran Ziv and Anat Admati. These names, expressing the admiration for power and nature, belong to Israeli-born individuals. Oren Aviv (oren is pine tree and aviv is springtime), Amir Peled (amir is treetop and peled is steel), and Orna Amir (feminine form of pine and treetop) are authentic New Jews.

When first encountered, they will sound to most Westerners as Turkish or Indian. If we look at them as text to be read and interpreted, one clear message in all of these names is “We are not Jewish.” And, indeed, no one will suspect at first sight that these names have anything to do with Jewishness. Israeli names are not Jewish, which is why they stand out when met with in a community with many traditional Jewish names. Orna Amir, Eyal Arad, Oren Aviv or Amir Peled are names that have nothing in common with Diaspora Jewish culture. They represent the New Jew, created in a deliberate attempt to erase any Diaspora connections. Psychological research has shown that traditional Jewish first names, and especially Yiddish names, are perceived by young Israelis to be ugly, weak, and passive. New Israeli names are perceived as attractive and powerful. Today we may find such names as Tom, Guy, Dean, or Shirley. All these names have the advantage of sounding both American and Israeli, and definitely not Jewish.

The legacy of shame felt by nineteenth century followers of the Jewish Enlightenment, who dreamed of a generation of New Jews with new names, has been very much in evidence for several generations among Hebrew-speaking New Jews. When young, Hebrew speaking, Israelis have to choose names for children, what can be observed is a great fear of any names vaguely reminiscent of the past, even that of 30 years ago. If in traditional Jewish society, as in many cultures, children were named after ancestors, and first names ran in families for many generations, here using ancestral names is inconceivable. These names are perceived as tied to the painful history of oppression and weakness.

The question of naming one's children has become a clear indication of the level of felt shame about ties to historical Judaism. Those who are satisfied with their identity do not seek to change it or redefine it or re-invent it. For them there is no need for renewal or utopia. Those Jews who reject Zionism feel no shame about Jewish tradition. They are ready to face the world as different, subject to ridicule, or out of place in modern life, because they believe in the ancient ideas of superiority and election and are proud of every element of tradition. Today, it is among the Orthodox, and the ultra-Orthodox that historical Jewish names are found. The ultra-Orthodox never had any problem with naming their children Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, or Moshe because they never had any problem with being just Jewish. Those who are not ashamed will give their children Jewish names and not hide their commitment to Rabbinical Judaism. Many will also speak Yiddish.

Jews without feelings of shame or inferiority, and who identify without reservations with historical Jewish traditions, now make up less than 15% of world Jewry. They follow the 613 commandments and keep the purity rules. They look at non-practicing Jews, not to mention gentiles, with feelings of confidence and superiority. Many are indifferent or hostile to Zionism. Some may accept Zionism pragmatically, but without enthusiasm. Still, the majority of world Jews have shared the cultural revolution initiated in the eighteenth century, are far removed from historical tradition and readily identify with Zionism and its dream of the New Jew.

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The Place of Jews in Psychoanalysis in America

Arnold D. Richards and Sheldon M. Goodman

This article represents an effort to further the appreciation of the impact of Jewish life on one salient aspect of our culture—psychoanalysis. It will carry on the spirit that Freud began in his “cultural books,” most conspicuously represented in *Totem and Taboo*, *Civilization and Its Discontents* and *Moses and Monotheism*. The latter book being perhaps the best example of Freud as a provocative and imaginative literary figure and mythmaker, and not only a man of science as he wanted the world to see him. This captures so nicely the tension that was expressed in his personal and public persona, that will be addressed in what follows, and be thought of as an exercise in psychoanalytic-social psychology. We will have to transcend the restraints that individual psychology may place on this endeavor. Thus, in coming to terms with ideologies, we have to study the social and economic contexts of the people who accepted them as it is one of the central contributions of psychoanalysis that it removed from the equation the artificial disunity between the individual and the collective. Freud stressed that there is no individual psychology of man isolated from his environment. Freud knew no *homo psychologicus*, no psychological Robinson Crusoe, like economic man of classical economic theory. The attempt will not made to demonstrate that psychoanalysis is or is not “Jewish.” What will be considered is whether, and to what extent, that was Freud’s position—a very different discussion.”

As with the history of ideas generally, the history of psychoanalysis has been in part a chronology of suppressing or distorting, the vital or subjective or sectarian loyalties of those who are intimately connected in advancing and boosting nonsectarian universal ideas. The early contributors to the psychoanalytic enterprise made it stand out as an intellectual endeavor that courted false construction and muddled it, for it exhibited considerable particularistic tendencies. The original members regarded themselves as an embattled, heroic elite, intolerant of those outside but dedicated, as in battle, to give their findings to the world. Their profound feeling of having a purpose that must be delivered a world, whether it

chose to accept it or not, disposed them to a cause—indeed, occupied them to promote in a fashion that took Freud and his loyal followers far beyond the traditional bounds of a scientific effort.

As we regard psychoanalysis as a moral enterprise as well as an undertaking to heal, it is reasonable to look into the religious origin, development and self-identification of the founder of psychoanalysis. Heretofore, if such an investigation was considered relevant (if at all), it was only as background material, a part of the cultural history of individuals and ideas. Even more sectarian and unanalyzed was the preponderance of Jews who joined forces with Freud from the very beginning in 1902 to 1906—all seventeen were Jewish. The complete meaning of this number can only be appreciated if we consider how they viewed themselves. They were quite aware of being Jewish and often maintained a sense of Jewish purpose and solidarity. Jones realized that this feeling of pride helped form the core identity of group: “As a spur to renewed independence, it tightened the bond among the group members and infused their self-image of a redemptive elite” (1959). So potent were their feelings of being Jewish that even after 1906, when Jones and other non-Jews joined the assemblage, the sense of being part of a Jewish current persisted.

Jones could be thought of as being prototypical of those who supported the psychoanalytic movement yet could not accept the Jewish connection of the early analysts. For Jones, they became more of an impediment and an impurity in the advancement of truth. Annoyed, perhaps, with the Jews in the early circle surrounding Freud, for assuming an air of superciliousness, and possibly a victim of mistrust between Jews and non-Jews, he consistently understood the value that being Jewish played in Freud’s life. To cite but one example, Jones omitted Freud’s voicing his gratitude to “those of our faith” in a then-unpublished letter Freud addressed to Martha in 1884 (Jones, ed. 1961).

David Bakan asserted that in psychoanalysis, “each person is a Torah.” He overextends his reach by some measure but perhaps not without some truth—that the name of one of Freud’s most noted patients, Dora, about whom he wrote abundantly in evolving his views, is curiously similar in sound to the word Torah. Regrettably, Bakan strains to prove his point that it is the Kabbalistic tradition that influenced Freud, even

though he admitted that “we are unable to hypothesize whether Freud actually read any Kabbalistic literature.” What Bakan fails to realize is that the hermeneutic devices he attributes to Freud are actually reminiscent of rabbinic midrash, which influenced kabbalistic thinking as well.

Freud’s great grandfather was Rabbi Ephraim Freud, and his grandfather was Rabbi Schlomo Freud. The information available does not allow us to draw the conclusion that they were rabbis in the religious sense, or whether their titles merely connoted respect. Freud was given the name Schlomo after his grandfather. Freud’s own name demonstrates how resolute the Jewish tradition could be. While Jacob, his father, over time freed himself from his family’s religious estate, he did give Freud the middle name Scholmo, clearly an offering to his own father who had died barely three months prior to Sigismund Schlomo’s birth. It was a name that Freud could never ascribe to. As Freud assumed the role of father, and with it the responsibility of naming his children, he declined to allow this faded remnant of tradition to express itself as he gave none of his children a Jewish name. The choice Freud made provides titillating support for his unconscious life. It might be argued that the six children’s names provide a direct link to one person, and to Freud’s enduring emotional entanglement with his father.

It was generally assumed that in Vienna that there was a “Jewish Mind” that transcended conversion or adaptation, and that this mind was inherently unoriginal (Beller 1989). In the writings of a number of Viennese “Jewish” intellectuals at the turn of the century, such as Theodor Gomperz, Sigmund Freud, Otto Wininger, Fritz Witells, Otto Rank, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, one can see a wide range of the complex internalization of questions of Jewish cultural contributions that are linked in striking ways. It is not that this was a specifically “Viennese” problem, but rather that, in a city in which the *Bildungsbürgertum*—the intellectual middle class—was defined by ideas of originality and creativity, this quality of mind came to be central in the self-definition of those labeled or self-labeled as Jews. This quality, attributed to the Jews, came to be ascribed, in the course of the early twentieth century, to psychoanalysis. They too had so submerged their own identities as Jews, their early myth-building, that they represented a type of intellectual formation. In 1937, after the seizure of power by the Nazis in Germany, and the beginning of the politics of race that led to the Shoah, Karl Menninger,

a non-Jewish American psychiatrist, noted that “if we had no further illustration than the character of Sigmund Freud, we should have a basis for suspecting some connection between the Jew and psychological genius. It would carry us too far to list all of the names of outstanding Jewish psychologists and psychiatrists, nor would it, in my own mind, be fitting to associate lesser names with such a master as he (1937). Jews are “distinguished for their scientific accomplishments in all fields of medicine.” This is a prototypical metaphor for the extraordinary nature of Jewish intelligence, but it is here applied specifically to psychoanalysis. Yet, Menninger is careful not to interpret his own view as views as compensatory. “Furthermore as a Gentile, I am apt—like Gentiles—to overestimate the superiority and attainments of the Jews (a psychological fact which no doubt contributes in part to anti-Semitic reactions).” While psychoanalysis may not have been seen as directly corrosive of the dominant culture, as was communism, its challenge to the American culture has been profound and telling (Rothman and Isenberg, 1974).

In this connection Ostow (1982b) states: “It may be its antagonism to prevailing institutions of cultural and political dominance that attracted, and still attracts, Jewish political liberals and radicals to the psychoanalytic profession, rather than simply the opportunity to escape into universalist discipline” (p. 14).

The marginal status of Jews in European culture has drawn the attention of many. An interesting read from a member of our field can be found in Arieti’s *Parnas and the Holocaust* (1979), and a recent release by Bodernan (2005) addresses the present situation of Jews in Germany. It is ironic that while Freud tried to live out the ideal of a citizen of the world, the final entry in the *Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* consists of a letter to the editor of *Time and Tide* on the subject of anti-Semitism in England (1938). Thus, to the very end of his days, Freud did not escape the fate of the Jew as an outsider, living at the margins of society. Rothman and Isenberg (1974) have written that, since the Jews as marginal men were subject to harassment and discrimination by an accident of birth, a number of possible paths lay open to those anxious to escape the consequences of marginality. First, one could assimilate with the majority culture. In fact, Freud did consider conversion but always rejected it (Ostow 1982a; Bergmann, 1982). Another path was to attempt to transform one’s self and one’s group into a majority. That was

the Zionist solution, but it was a solution Freud could not get himself to accept. Speaking to the B'nai B'rith (1926), Freud said, "Whenever I felt an inclination to national enthusiasm, I strove to suppress it as being harmful and wrong, alarmed by the warning examples of the people among whom we Jews live" (p. 273). Freud's solution fell into the third possible contingency as articulated by Rothman and Isenberg, that being the attempt to undermine the dominant culture that delineates the margin. They reminded us that the new discipline, psychoanalysis, by establishing a universalistic psychology, "denied the reality of culture and cultural difference" (p. 53). In *The Ambivalent American Jew* (1972) Liebman presents us with another option, that being subverting the cultural categories that define Jews as marginal, as an explanation of the characteristic Jewish attachment to universal ideas of a liberal or radical nature.

This discussion of marginality leads us to the figure who picked up the psychoanalytic reins of power and transposed them to the United States, Abraham Arden Brill, a man who had a deep understanding of all the levers and pulleys of policy-creation. When Arthur Schnitzler (1862–1931) wrote *Der Weg ins Frie* (*The Road to the Open Road*) in 1908, he compared the Jews of his day to those of the prior generation: "A Jew who loves his country ... I mean in the way my father did, with real enthusiasm for the dynasty is, without the slightest question, a tragic-comic figure ... A man like that today would certainly appear merely comic." He was making reference to Austria's short but deeply felt era of political liberalism which, only after decades of rule, began to come to an end in the 1880s. The patriotic zeal of the Jews during this period mirrored the pervasive confidence in the extension and guarantee of rights to those outside the domain of economic and political influence that was controlled by the aristocracy. Refused the absolute integration into society in their legal liberation at the end of the proceeding century, Jews typically endorsed the ideals of the constitutional era with unusual fervor.

Into this world did our American missionary and pioneer of psychoanalysis-to-be enter. A strain of independence was always present as he alone, at the age of fifteen, sailed the United States. Who could have predicted that this apparently hapless soul, as one story goes, who was defrauded of his meager funds on the ride across, further restricted by no

knowledge of English, and without a friend to greet him, would eventually rise to the height he did in the world of psychoanalysis in New York? His resourcefulness found expression as he managed find shelter in a saloon by providing chores. He acquired the language of his new home and quickly parlayed his skill into providing English lessons to other newly arriving foreigners for the munificent sum of twenty-five cents per lesson. Conditions improved rapidly for the young Brill as he was befriended by a physician and was allowed to sleep on his office floor. His income was further nourished by teaching mandolin and billiards, and by playing chess, which he excelled at, for stakes.

It might be useful to put the influx of Jewish emigres in some perspective. In 1790 there were probably no more than 2,500 in the United States; by 1825, there about 6,000, of whom 500 lived in New York. By 1848 the Jewish population grew to about 50,000, with about 12,000 living in New York City, which had a total population of 500,000. In 1880, the 60,000 Jews in New York City represented 25 percent of the Jewish national total. It was not surprising that Brill was confronted by a set of conditions that his fellow newcomers faced, that being to “Americanize” the new arrivals as rapidly as possible. Americanization had two purposes: to remove the odium of strangeness from the immigrants, and to help them adjust more readily to their new home. One of the first such institutions established with the specific aim of preparing Jewish immigrants for life in America, was the Hebrew Institute of New York, organized in 1889 as an outgrowth of the YMHA. By 1939, 40,000 Jewish refugees a year were entering the United States (some 200,000 all told came between 1933 and 1940); these latter arrivals were older, poorer, and afflicted with medical and emotional ills. In June 1939 the National Refugee Service (NRS) was set up to replace the predecessor organizations. The NRS offered migration services; resettlement help; subventions to physicians, scientists, and other professionals to enable them to study for examinations and resume their professional careers; an employment and retaining program; loans to small business men; and assistance to refugees who were seeking permanent visas. As Eli Ginzberg (1942) has pointed out, the remarkable work of the NRS, through quiet and efficient assistance to refugees in becoming integrated into American life and American society, deterred the anti-immigration sentiment which was building up among groups in the United States (pp. 22–29).

To those established in the professions, the Jews newly crowding in were a threat. To some degree there was fear of competition and uncertainty as to whether there really would be enough room for everyone. Still more important was the unwillingness to risk the loss of status that association with the Jews might entail. The pattern of exclusion already established the undesirability of these people. Would not an undue number of them transfer their odium to the whole profession? The most serious forms of exclusion developed in the medical profession. At the turn of the century there were already well-founded complaints that the medical societies and three hospitals were refusing to admit qualified Jewish doctors. Although these societies were generally private associations, membership in them was essential to successful practice. Before the first decade of the century was over, the restrictive policies had spread to medical education as well. The number of medical schools and the number of graduates fell steadily, and everywhere, the first to be excluded were the Jews. In part, this development grew out of the desire to improve the quality of medical education, particularly after the Flexner Report had revealed its glaring inadequacies. But there was also the less laudable intention of restricting the number of doctors for competitive reasons, and of excluding the Jews and other groups, labeled as inferior, to protect the social prestige of the profession. In practice, all medical schools devised quota systems to keep the number of Jewish students low.



Anti-Semitism on the Rise

Jonathan Greenblatt

This week I've been in Basel, Switzerland to represent ADL at a conference marking 125 years since Theodore Herzl came here to convene the first international meeting of the Zionist movement. That gathering changed the world by inspiring the creation of a national Jewish homeland.

The panel I was on gave me an opportunity to discuss the historic and current scourge of anti-Semitism—and to reflect on what Zionism means in 2022. I want to share my thoughts about this with you.

From that gathering in 1897, a commitment was made to return the Jewish people to their historic homeland. While two thousand years of marginalization and persecution as a minority living in the Diaspora—let alone the genocide of six million in the Holocaust—could never be remedied, the pursuit of Israel's creation generated new hope for the future.

Today's Israel is a flourishing Jewish state that provides a welcoming haven for Jews around the world and is a pioneering force in areas of science, medicine, technology and agriculture. And yet, Israel's existence has not “solved” anti-Semitism, nor is the Israeli state a perfect utopia.

Herzl could not have foreseen Israel having to defend itself in eight wars since 1948, the still unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the ongoing threats posed by malicious states like Iran and terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, and coordinated international efforts to marginalize and delegitimize the Jewish state, including the absurd claim that “Zionism is Racism” and hateful BDS campaigns.

Anti-Semitism on the Rise

Anti-Semitism continues to be a grave global issue, with tropes and manifestations that would have been painfully familiar to people living in 1897. We have also seen new forms arise—like online hate and

harassment, and the scapegoating of Jewish people and organizations for Israel's actions.

Last year, ADL recorded the highest number of antisemitic incidents in the U.S. since we began tracking the totals in the 1970s. One major spike came during the conflict between Israel and the terror group Hamas in May 2021, when we tracked a 150% increase in incidents including 15 assaults and grotesque displays of anti-Israel hate. Jews were brazenly attacked in public places in major cities such as New York and Los Angeles simply for the crime of their faith and identity.

In the U.S. and around the world we've seen politicians on the far right parrot antisemitic talking points, and those on the far left use anti-Zionist rhetoric that's anti-Semitism at its core.

At ADL, we are combating anti-Semitism from all sides and taking on those who would seek to undermine Israel's legitimacy. But the fact that such virulent anti-Semitism is aimed at "Zionists"—i.e., Jews—writ large is perhaps one of the biggest challenges.

As I have said before, anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism. At this moment, there is a need for the entire Jewish world and our allies to stand together against this dangerous form of anti-Semitism.

Despite these obstacles, the Basel anniversary is a moment to celebrate. The Jewish people are much stronger now than we were in 1897. In the same ways that the first Zionist Congress offered strength to Jews around the world and redefined our narrative, today we must also draw strength from that moment and let it nourish us to meet the challenges ahead.

Sincerely,

Jonathan Greenblatt
CEO and National Director
ADL

P.S. You can read an extended version of my essay about Zionism and global anti-Semitism on the Jerusalem Post website.



Freud and Anti-Semitism

Douglas Kirsner

In this article, I will discuss Freud's approach to Judaism, and particularly the key role of anti-Semitism in the context of Freud's life and work. Anti-Semitism colored Freud's life and work and provides their backdrop. From cradle to grave it provided the conditions that were a constant threat, always on the radar, sometimes more threatening, sometimes less, but always there. Whether Freud was among Jews constructing what could be labeled a "Jewish Science" or trying to promote a racially free universal method based upon reason, evidence, and critique, applicable across times and cultures, he was always beset by the Jewish Question. Carl Jung was unsuccessfully slotted to be the "Crown Prince" of psychoanalysis not just because of his undoubted capabilities but because he was a noted Gentile who could help bring psychoanalysis into the intellectual, clinical and cultural mainstream.

Anti-Semitism was a major issue, no matter if he positively identified as a Jew (which he did) or kept it low profile, whether he was religious or not. It was a major issue for his work, given that freestanding psychoanalytic institutes were established and sustained in a context where Jews and a "Jewish Science," in particular Freud and his theories, were not welcome in the University of Vienna nor across universities throughout the Empire. However, there was one university which welcomed Freud as a member of its first Board of Governors, along with Einstein, Martin Buber and Chaim Weitzman—the Hebrew University of Jerusalem when it opened in 1925.

What qualities made Freud identify as a Jew?

Ludwig Braun, friend to Sigmund Freud and vice president of the B'nai B'rith 1904–1905 defined Jewishness, and thus Freud's Jewishness, as:

the spirit of independence—independence from religious dogma, conventional morality, and for that matter, from the rest of the world. The second dimension brought the Jew back into a relationship with

the world. ...The third Jewish characteristic was his wholeness (das Ganze). (Klein, 1985, p85)

With this definition, Freud identified himself as Jewish. He is also famously quoted as saying to Oskar Pfister, 1918,

Why did none of the devout create psychoanalysis? Why did one have to wait for a completely Godless Jew?

Freud stated that:

what bound me to Judaism...many obscure emotional forces...as well as a clear consciousness of inner identity, the safe privacy of a common psychological structure. (Geller, 2006, p. 2)

In 1925 he wrote to the Jewish Press Centre in Zurich:

I have always had a strong feeling of belonging together with my people and have always nurtured it in my children as well. We have always remained in the Jewish denomination. (Geller, 2006, p. 2)

The evidence is clear in Freud's Jewish background and identity; the Jewish origins of the psychoanalytic movement; Freud's identification with Moses; Freud's relation with the B'nai B'rith; Freud's dream theories parallel those of the Talmud; his hermeneutic theory of jokes, often Jewish ones; the psychoanalytic meanings of Jewish rituals; Freud and Rabbinic hermeneutics; psychoanalytic interpretations of stories from the Hebrew Bible; psychoanalytic memory and forgetting and Jewish memory and forgetting; Freud as embodiment of Jewish Viennese emancipatory universalist Enlightenment thinking; Freud and the Jewish mystical tradition, and even Freud's Jewish anxieties (Aron, 2004, p. 444).

Freud's family came from Moravia. His grandfather and great-grandfather were Chasidic rabbis. His father was also a religious man. But in 1860 the family emigrated to Vienna, when Freud was 4; and assimilation into Viennese society meant that a public display of the Jewish religion was curtailed, and religion became a private matter. The family lived in the Jewish part of Vienna and, except for a notable few, all Freud's colleagues and patients were Jewish. The Emperor Franz-Joseph held a benign attitude towards the Jews and there was hope for universalist,

enlightenment liberation. For Freud, science was to provide a vehicle for this.

In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud recalls his memory of the humiliation of his father picking up his cap from the pavement after hooligans had struck it off his head. This spoke of his father as unheroic or of a time so anti-Semitic as to necessitate such behavior from Jews that held their feelings in, for fear of worse reprisals. Perhaps this indicated the other side of his positive identification with Judaism as his own shame.

After Germany's annexation of Austria in March, 1938, Freud left for London in June, to die in freedom from the Nazis before the beginning of World War II in 1939. As a Jew, Freud was an outsider in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The traumas of the Great War, followed by revolutions and hyperinflation, the rise of Nazism and Fascism, the Great Depression and the looming tragedies of World War II and the Holocaust, placed him right at the center of a context that demanded very special responses from members of a people that were targeted victims for so much of their lives.

Anti-Semitism has many faces—sociological, religious, biological—that Jews are hated because they have the wrong religious beliefs, run the world—what they do, or what they are, biologically in essence. *Fin de siècle*, Vienna was a hotbed of creativity and of an anti-Semitism of a different hue from the sociological or religious versions. The emphasis was on how Jews were different in essence, feminized, and sexual addicts. As New York psychoanalyst Edgar Levenson suggests, Freud's proposal of sexual libido theory as a life force was especially courageous in this context (Levenson, 2001, p. 382).

Levenson wrote that although Freud's metapsychology was Apollonian reason, his actual psychotherapy praxis was midrash, interpretative. As an interpretative or hermeneutic approach, psychotherapy can be seen in this light as a 'feminine' pursuit.

B'nai B'rith

In this vast territory about Freud and Judaism, I want to focus for a while on his involvement with the Jewish lodge, B'nai B'rith, of which he was a member for much of his life. Although it is not apparent in reading

Freud's scientific papers, his involvement played a crucial role in his life, certainly in the early years of psychoanalysis.

In 1926 he was invited to attend a meeting for an award but was unable to attend because of his illness. He sent a meaningful and heartfelt message to the meeting instead, from which I will quote. B'nai B'rith counted as an important part of his life in his time of need, given the ascent of the anti-Semitic demagogue Karl Lueger to Mayor of Vienna and the times of his early development of his new theories on dreams, and sexuality, neurosis and the unconscious.

There was considerable resistance to Lueger both from above and below, but he prevailed.

Freud identified as being a Jew at the hardest times: in 1873, during an anti-Semitic surge after an economic crisis, he wrote:

I have never understood why I should be ashamed of my descent or, as one began to say, my race.

In 1926 he told an interviewer in recognition of the political situation:

My language is German. My culture, my attainments are German. I considered myself German intellectually, until I noticed the growth of anti-Semitic prejudice in Germany and German Austria. Since that time, I prefer to call myself a Jew.

The B'nai B'rith order was established in New York in 1843 to unite immigrants in the spirit of humanism and American idealism and not take sides in religious disputes. It spread across the US and later into Europe. The Vienna chapter of B'nai B'rith was established in 1895 on a different basis, as an "ethical society on the basis and in the frame of Judaism. There were strict standards to become a member and attendance at lectures every second Tuesday was compulsory. Together with committee meetings and family social events, B'nai B'rith was an important part of each member's life, requiring considerable and consistent investment of time and money. It was very formally structured, and required formal attire. It was a haven at the time of the anti-Semitic activities of Karl Lueger and his associates.

At the time, Freud had no disciples or formal associates, and his first

lecture to a lay audience on psychoanalysis took place in 1897 at B'nai B'rith, on the topic, "On Dream Interpretation." He delivered eleven lectures to the Wien and was active on the Committee for Intellectual Interests, which planned the lectures. His illness prevented him going to meetings, for which he apologized in the 1926 letter. Still, in 1931, his 75th birthday was commemorated at the Lodge with a lecture. In 1937 his response to the Lodge President's congratulations on the 40th anniversary of his membership reflects his enduring commitment to the Lodge:

I am touched every time I hear that the association remembers me and wishes me well. I thank you, Mr. President and all my dear brothers, for your letter. That which has united us will surely not perish with the changing times.

But back to 1926, where he recalled to the Lodge:

It happened that in the years from 1895 onwards I was subjected to two powerful impressions which combined to produce the same effect on me.

On the one hand, I had gained my first insight into the depths of the life of the human instincts; I had seen some things that were sobering and even, at first, frightening.

On the other hand, the announcement of my unpleasing discoveries had as its result the severance of the greater part of my human contacts; I felt as though I were despised and universally shunned.

In my loneliness I was seized with a longing to find a circle of picked men of high character who would receive me in a friendly spirit in spite of my temerity. Your society was pointed out to me as the place where such men were to be found.

That you were Jews could only be agreeable to me; for I was myself a Jew, and it had always seemed to me not only unworthy but positively senseless to deny the fact.

What bound me to Jewry was (I am ashamed to admit) neither faith nor national pride, for I have always been an unbeliever and was brought up without any religion though not without a respect for

what are called the “ethical” standards of human civilization.

The year after this note, Freud published ‘The future of an illusion’, his most well-known and devastating critique of religion. Religion was an illusion because it hadn’t moved on from human infancy where the parent was our protector. We neurotically turn away from reality when our wishes for pleasure are not fulfilled.

In ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, Freud argued that the pleasure principle, which holds that we seek the immediate gratification of our drives, must be modified with the advent of civilization by the reality principle, which involves the subservience of the pleasure principle to the demands of reality (e.g., work is required to bring about future pleasure).

We cannot fulfill our desires because of our inherent vulnerability to nature, our bodies and one another. Religion is a response to civilization as inherently tragic for Freud. And it stops thought, according to Freud, and is the enemy of reason.

Freud’s view of reason, which of course resides in the ego and not in the id (it), which was the driving force of our lives. But Freud at least granted the quality of insistence to reason:

‘The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing. Finally, after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of the few points on which one may be optimistic about the future of mankind. . . . The primacy of the intellect lies, it is true, in a distant, distant future, but probably not an infinitely distant one.’¹

The double negative of the ‘not infinitely distant’ demonstrates how little hope Freud had in the short or even medium term for mankind. He regarded ‘our best hope for the future’ as lying in the intellect or reason being able to establish in time ‘a dictatorship in the mental life of man’.

Freud was, understandably, a cultural pessimist. Against the dark forces at work at his doorstep for so much of his life, Freud still retained some faith in reason to finally prevail.

¹S. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*. (In J. Strachey, Ed. & Trans., *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 21, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, pp. 5–56. Original work published 1927), p. 53.

He postulated the crucial role for ‘such a domain of reason’ that it would prove ‘the strongest uniting bond among men and lead the way to further unions.’ In contrasting this liberating role, which would bring people together with that of religion, Freud shows us why he saw religion in such a negative light.

‘Whatever, like religion’s prohibition against thought, opposes such a development, is a danger for the future of mankind.’²

He declared to his B’nai B’rith brethren:

Whenever I felt an inclination to national enthusiasm I strove to suppress it as being harmful and wrong, alarmed by the warning examples of the peoples among whom we Jews live. But plenty of other things remained over to make the attraction of Jewry and Jews irresistible—many obscure emotional forces, which were the more powerful the less they could be expressed in words, as well as a clear consciousness of inner identity, the safe privacy of a common mental construction.

And beyond this there was a perception that it was to my Jewish nature alone that I owed two characteristics that had become indispensable to me in the difficult course of my life.

1) Because I was a Jew I found myself free from many prejudices which restricted others in the use of their intellect;

2) and as a Jew I was prepared to join the Opposition and to do without agreement with the ‘compact majority’.

Here Freud is referring to the protagonist in Henrik Ibsen’s play, *An enemy of the people*, who was demonized by the people in the town he was trying to reveal the plague-infested sewers beneath the town. Ibsen has Stockmann proclaim,

“...the strongest man in the world is the man who stands most alone.” He

²Freud, S., *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*. (In J. Strachey, Ed. & Trans., *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 22, pp. 3–182. London: Hogarth Press, 1964. Original work published 1933), pp. 171–172.

also says: “A minority may be right; a majority is always wrong.” Freud early identified with Hannibal whose conflict with Rome, according to Freud, ‘symbolised the conflict between the tenacity of Jewry and the organization of the Catholic Church’. It is important to recognize that Freud’s barbs against religion were not aimed at the Jewish religion but at the very established Catholicism that so dominated European societies during his life. His concerns were with the established religion of Catholicism rather than with the Judaism which he identified with as his tradition and ethnicity.

The organization of the Catholic Church was front and center in Freud’s view of religion. Not Judaism. Bear in mind the context of the relatively small number of Jews in a hostile world together with the severe limits to their influence. Especially in view of the fact that most psychoanalysts were Jewish, Freud welcomed Jung with open arms, anointing him as the ‘crown prince’ of psychoanalysis because he could bring some appearance of objectivity beyond the ‘Jewish science’.

Science itself was an aim as a universal of the Enlightenment beyond the irrationalities of particularist approaches. That would allow for Jews to be neutral and pursue knowledge and truth for their own sake.

So religion was for Freud really the Catholic Church. But of course the other increasingly big form of irrationality was the rise of Nazism, which was a direct menace not only to humanity at large but targeted the Jews in particular.

Freud concluded *Civilization and its Discontents* with this paragraph:

The fateful question for the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent their cultural development will succeed in mastering the disturbance of their communal life by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction. It may be that in this respect precisely the present time deserves a special interest. Men have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their help they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last man. They know this, and hence comes a large part of their current unrest, their unhappiness and their mood of anxiety. And now it is to be expected that the other of the two ‘Heavenly Powers’ [p. 133], eternal Eros, will make an effort to assert himself in the struggle with

his equally immortal adversary.

Freud added this final sentence to in 1931 in recognition of what was by then the undeniable looming Nazi danger:

But who can foresee with what success and with what result?

The other major threat in the secular world was Bolshevism or Communism, against which Freud later argued though it wasn't at least overtly anti-Semitic.

Freud concluded his letter for the 1926 award to B'nai B'rith:

So it was that I became one of you, took my share in your humanitarian and national interests, gained friends among you and persuaded my own few remaining friends to join our society.

There was no question whatever of my convincing you of my new theories; but at a time when no one in Europe listened to me and I still had no disciples even in Vienna, you gave me your kindly attention. You were my first audience.

A much-neglected work of Freud's last years, *Moses and Monotheism* (1939, *Standard Edition*, XXIII: 1-138), narrates Freud's long interest in Moses whom he postulates was an Egyptian prince and not Jewish. In Freud's speculations, Moses was murdered by some of his followers, who, years afterwards, regretted their action and created the idea of a messiah. According to Freud, their sense of guilt in recognizing they deserved punishment ended up creating more and more ethical commandments and regulations in an obsessive-compulsive reaction formation to the murderous deed that Freud saw as founding the Father religion (1939, *Standard Edition*, XXIII: 134-5). Perhaps he was identifying with Moses in the movement aspect of psychoanalysis and the creation of a psychoanalytic *Weltanschauung*.

He was trying to understand the overwhelming longevity and extent of anti-Semitism in that work and during his life. It was something so enduring, irrational and powerful that defied reason and was at heart utter envy. It was clear in his life and work. He was shaped by it personally and culturally. His last years saw the force of anti-Semitism not just from Catholicism but from the Nazis. The soft voice of his reason in making

this such a significant issue to understand tried to see it as epochs old with the repetition and repression down the ages that like a good clinical psychoanalysis could only be changed through insight.

We know that Freud found the eternal question about the dark continent of ‘What is woman?’ very puzzling. But the troubling issue of the persistence and worsening of anti-Semitism was an issue that percolated throughout. Although some might say that Moses was an escape for him, an obsession, I suspect it went to the core of the importance and breadth of the problem of anti-Semitism, which was associated with the collective neurosis he portrayed religion to be. Until the end, it was an issue that impacted on him and which he was trying to solve, with good reason, throughout his whole life.

I conclude by citing what was probably Freud’s last public comment. Arguably Freud’s last public comment on anything, and certainly his last word on anti-Semitism was his sardonic response in 1939 to Lady Rhonnda, the editor of the British literary and political weekly review, *Time and Tide*, asking him to contribute to a special issue on anti-Semitism:

‘I came to Vienna as a child of 4 years from a small town in Moravia. After 78 years of assiduous work I had to leave my home, saw the Scientific Society I had founded, dissolved, our institutions destroyed, our Printing Press (‘Verlag’) taken over by the invaders, the books I had published confiscated or reduced to pulp, my children expelled from their professions. Don’t you think you ought to reserve the columns of your special number for the utterances of non-Jewish people, less personally involved than myself?’

About the Contributors

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
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Nathan Szajnberg, M.D., graduated the University of Chicago (BA '74; MD '74) and was the Freud Professor at the Hebrew University (2007–10) and Wallerstein Psychoanalytic Research Fellow (2005–2016). His most recent book is *Jacob and Joseph, Judaism's Architects*. His upcoming book, *Inner Life Across Time*, studies the development of Western literature's concepts of inner life over two and a half millennia. His next book, *Rambam and Freud*, explores parallels between *Maimonides Guide for the Perplexed* and Freud's dream book.



David M. Terman, M.D., is a past Director of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis where he had been a Training and Supervising Analyst for the over 40 years. Dr. Terman had his undergraduate and medical education at the University of Chicago and his psychoanalytic training at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. He has been one of the analysts who helped develop the work of Heinz Kohut and what has become known as self psychology. He has contributed to several central aspects of clinical and developmental theory. He reconceptualized the Oedipus complex in self psychological terms, and he was one of the first to note the importance of positive experience in forming psychological structure in development. He has also explored the history of anti-Semitism from a self psychological perspective, and he has coauthored and edited a book with Charles Strozier and James Jones on the psychology of fundamentalism and other political and social forces: *The Fundamentalist Mindset*. He has applied his work on paranoia to an understanding of some of the features of classic psychoanalytic theory. He is now retired from clinical practice but continues to teach, supervise, and write in the area of applied psychoanalysis.





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